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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, Taiwan has seen continued and ex-
panded engagement with Southeast Asia. In the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, under LEE Teng-hui’s presidency, the Republic of China (hereaf-
ter, R.O.C. or Taiwan) started to pursue a set of “Go South” policy initia-
tives to deepen its ties with the member countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), aimed at securing the island’s political 
and economic interests in the region.1 At the center of the geopolitical 
struggle, however, lies the “one-China” principle promoted by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (hereafter, P.R.C., or mainland China) and the 
related “one-China” policy adopted by each of the ASEAN countries, 
which recognizes the P.R.C. over the R.O.C.’s lack of formal diplomatic 
relations in Southeast Asia. Coupled with the substantial growth of main-
land China’s economic clout in the region, the one-China policy points to 
numerous uncertainties in the future of Taiwan-ASEAN relations, which 
merits a careful examination of the opportunities and constraints which 
currently exist in Taiwanese engagement with ASEAN countries. In order 
to elucidate these issues, this research undertakes an exploration of the 
historical measures Taiwan has implemented to improve ties with the re-
gion, followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of these efforts over the 
past three decades. Evaluating the previous course of Taiwan-Southeast 
Asia relations is essential in orchestrating feasible “Go South” initiatives 
for the new government in Taiwan. 
This monograph attempts to analyze Taiwan-ASEAN relations from 
a variety of perspectives: political development, economic cooperation, 
and cultural engagement, as well as the related dynamics with mainland 
China. The main argument contends that, on the political and economic 
fronts, there are two major determinants in calculating the effectiveness of 
Taiwan’s engagement with Southeast Asian countries. The first factor is 
Taiwan’s economic influence vis-à-vis mainland China. In the early 
1990s, the significant Taiwanese investment and trade presence in South-
east Asia provided leverage and opportunities that Taiwan needed to en-
 1.  ASEAN was established in Thailand in 1967 by the five original member countries 
(ASEAN-5) – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It was later joined 
by Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), Cambodia (1999). Its objec-
tives, besides the promotion of regional peace and stability, include the acceleration of economic 
growth, social progress, and cultural development among its member countries. See the ASEAN 
Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) at http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declara-
tion-bangkok-8-august-1967/. 
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 TAIWAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 3 
hance political ties with ASEAN countries. However, after the Asian fi-
nancial crisis in the late 1990s, Taiwan’s relative economic prowess in 
Southeast Asia steadily declined while mainland China started to actively 
bolster its trade and investment ties with the region. 
The second factor is the overall status of cross-Taiwan Strait relations 
(hereafter, cross-Strait relations). Cross-Strait peace and stability arguably 
create more space for Taiwan to engage Southeast Asian countries. When 
the Taiwan Strait was relatively stable during the first half of President 
Lee’s tenure between 1988 and 1994, Taiwan augmented political rela-
tions with Southeast Asian countries. When President MA Ying-jeou pro-
moted cross-Strait peace between 2008 and 2016, Taiwan also made re-
markable strides in improving relations with ASEAN countries and 
strengthening people-to-people connectivity with the region. In contrast, 
Taiwan encountered more obstacles to “Go South” when cross-Strait rela-
tions deteriorated from 1995 to 2000 under Lee’s presidency and from 
2000 to 2008 under CHEN Shui-bian’s. 
On the cultural and people-to-people fronts, this monograph argues 
that Taiwan holds copious amounts of soft power assets through its aca-
demic exchanges and developmental assistance programs. Consequently, 
Taiwan can wield greater soft power in Southeast Asia if it continues to 
mobilize these resources and expand existing initiatives. Measures, such 
as further strengthening higher education and tourism ties with ASEAN 
countries and proactively offering technical assistance and humanitarian 
aid to the region, can help Taiwan increase its image abroad and in turn 
promote the island’s interests in Southeast Asia. 
This monograph is divided into five chapters. Following this intro-
ductory Chapter I, Chapter II of this monograph examines the political 
development of Taiwan’s relationships with ASEAN countries under Pres-
ident Lee, President Chen, and President Ma, and analyzes their “Go 
South” policy initiatives and the mainland China factor in the region. 
Chapter III focuses on the economic component of Taiwan-ASEAN rela-
tions, particularly in the fields of investment, trade, and labor cooperation. 
Chapter IV evaluates Taiwan’s soft power resources and public diplomacy 
approaches that help the island attract citizens from ASEAN countries and 
strengthen people-to-people ties. The concluding Chapter V summarizes 
the main arguments and assesses the prospects of Taiwan-ASEAN rela-
tions. As Southeast Asia has been a focal point of the new government’s 
“New Southbound” policy, which was emphasized by President TSAI Ing-
wen in her inaugural address, the conclusion also provides some policy 
suggestions for enhancing the effectiveness of  “Go South” strategies. 
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II.   TAIWAN’S “GO SOUTH” POLICY AND                                   
THE MAINLAND CHINA FACTOR 
This chapter analyzes the “Go South” policy initiatives pursued under 
the LEE Teng-hui, CHEN Shui-bian, and MA Ying-jeou administrations: 
whether they strengthened or weakened political ties with Southeast Asia 
and how they dealt with emerging mainland Chinese influence in the re-
gion. The role of ASEAN leaders in engaging with Taiwan and mainland 
China is also examined, with particular emphasis on their calculations re-
garding regional stability. In this chapter, Section A discusses how Presi-
dent Lee’s policy of pragmatic diplomacy toward ASEAN countries, cou-
pled with the launch of his “Go South” strategy, enabled Taiwan to expand 
political relations with ASEAN between 1988 and 1994. Section B ex-
plores Lee’s presidency from 1995 to 2000, examining the challenges 
posed by heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the Asian financial 
crisis, and the warming of P.R.C.-ASEAN ties. Section C assesses Presi-
dent Chen’s aggressive foreign policy towards ASEAN countries and Bei-
jing’s growing leverage in the region vis-à-vis Taipei from 2000 to 2008. 
Finally, Section D analyzes the viable diplomacy approach taken by Pres-
ident Ma from 2008 to 2016, its effect on Taiwan’s overarching engage-
ment with ASEAN countries, and its implications for the TSAI Ing-wen 
administration. 
A. LEE Teng-hui’s Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia 
(1988-1994)
LEE Teng-hui’s foreign policy was one of pragmatism fueled by Tai-
wan’s economic prowess. No sooner had Lee assumed the presidency after 
the passing of CHIANG Ching-kuo in January 1988 than he started adjust-
ing the R.O.C.’s foreign affairs strategy, embarking on a diplomatic offen-
sive to raise international visibility. At the national party congress of the 
ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in July 1988, Lee proclaimed that his admin-
istration would adopt a more pragmatic, flexible, and forward-looking ap-
proach to upgrade Taiwan’s external relations.2 He also emphasized the 
consolidation of existing diplomatic ties and the forging of new allies pre-
dominantly through economic cooperation. 
Amid a series of major diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s – Taiwan’s 
loss of both the seat representing China in the United Nations in 1971 and 
formal diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979 – CHIANG 
 2.  Michael Leifer, “Taiwan and South-East Asia: The Limits to Pragmatic Diplomacy,” 
The China Quarterly, No. 165 (March 2001), p. 180. 
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Ching-kuo began modifying CHIANG Kai-shek’s “non-coexistence” for-
eign policy into flexible diplomacy when he became premier of the R.O.C. 
in 1972.3 Premier Chiang ascended to the presidency in 1978, and, while 
still insisting that the R.O.C. was the only legitimate government repre-
senting the whole of China, Premier Chiang aimed to rejoin international 
organizations and build substantive relations with countries Taiwan did 
not have formal diplomatic relations with. Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy rep-
resented continuity in substantive terms but defined each side of the Tai-
wan Strait as a separate political entity, a departure from Chiang’s self-
imposed “one-China” concept. Lee believed as long as dignity and equal-
ity can be guaranteed, Taiwan should actively join the international arena 
and use its growing economic clout rather than be solely concerned with 
names or forms of participation. Hence, the Lee administration did not de-
mand formal recognition or require the use of the term “Republic of 
China” when dealing with foreign nations or international organizations. 
Under Lee’s policy of broader engagement with foreign countries and 
multilateral organizations, Southeast Asia moved up on Taiwan’s strategic 
radar in the Asia-Pacific. Geographic proximity coupled with Taiwan’s 
burgeoning investment and trade linkages with ASEAN countries in the 
late 1980s made the Lee administration eager to boost its economic pres-
ence in the region. In an analysis of the development of Taiwan-ASEAN 
economic relations, Michael Leifer noted: 
From Taiwan’s point of view, engagement with Southeast Asia 
was initially driven by a genuine interest in reaping economic 
benefit from trade ties and from the investment advantages of 
the lower costs of labor and land. The more economically vi-
brant Taiwan became, the greater its chances of upholding an 
independent existence on its own terms. In addition, Taiwan set 
out to cement ties by promoting cultural and academic ex-
changes as well as by dispatching agricultural advisers. Such 
ties burgeoned with the growth in trade links. . .4
The emergence of Taiwan as a newly industrialized economy in Asia 
in the 1980s became the main source of its growing economic clout and 
influence in Southeast Asia. Successful economic developments from the 
1960s through the 1990s generated abundant capital and rich technical ex-
pertise in Taiwan, facilitating the island’s role as a major trading partner 
and source of foreign direct investment in the region. For example, within 
 3.  Under the policy of “non-coexistence,” or “han zei bu liang li,” the R.O.C. strictly saw 
itself representing the government of China and refused to coexist with the P.R.C. in the inter-
national arena.   
 4.  Leifer, “Taiwan and South-East Asia,” supra note 2, p. 177. 
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a few years of Lee taking office in 1988, Taiwan became one of the top-
five largest investors in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines. Taiwan-ASEAN trade also experienced double-digit growth in the 
early 1990s (see Chapter III). Under the banner of Lee’s pragmatic diplo-
macy, Taiwan also set aside ideological differences, establishing eco-
nomic and other informal ties with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 
1988. Vietnam’s high demand for foreign capital offered Taiwan an op-
portunity, and thus, the island’s first trade mission was welcomed in Hanoi 
in 1988.5 Taiwan then soon became the largest foreign investor in Vietnam 
– a position that lasted until the mid-1990s. 
Given its lack of formal diplomatic ties with ASEAN countries, Tai-
wan has relied on its economic clout, bypassing typical diplomatic chan-
nels to obtain political advantages.6 Since the R.O.C. government lost the 
Chinese Civil War to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and retreated 
to Taiwan in 1949, the P.R.C.’s “one-China” principle has become the 
dominant factor in minimizing Taiwan’s international space. Besides the 
aforementioned diplomatic setbacks Taiwan suffered in the United Na-
tions and with the United States in the 1970s, a number of diplomatic 
losses were also experienced in Southeast Asia during that period. In May 
1974, Malaysia broke off its ten-year-long counselor relationship with Tai-
wan and established formal diplomatic relations with mainland China. On 
April 30, 1975, Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with South Vietnam were 
ended by the Fall of Saigon. Following the reunification of Vietnam, the 
Philippines and Thailand also switched their diplomatic recognitions from 
the R.O.C. to the P.R.C. in June and July of that year, respectively. There-
after, Taiwan was left without any formal diplomatic relations with 
ASEAN countries. 
In the late 1980s, the remaining ASEAN countries without formal 
diplomatic ties to mainland China, namely Indonesia, Singapore, and Bru-
nei, began preparing to establish or reestablish diplomatic relations with 
mainland China in the early 1990s. Initially, Indonesia was the first South-
east Asian country to recognize communist China, establishing diplomatic 
ties with the P.R.C. in January 1950. However, the relationship was frozen 
in October 1967 after suspicions arouse that Beijing had been involved in 
the September 30, 1965 coup initiated by the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI). The coup resulted not only in the assassination of six Indonesian 
military generals but also the death of tens of thousands of real and sus-
pected communists, mostly ethnic Chinese, during the subsequent anti-
 5.  Ibid, p. 181. 
 6.  Ibid, p. 177. 
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communist and anti-Chinese movements from October 1965 to mid-1967.7
During the two decades that followed, Indonesia under Suharto had great 
reservations about resuming diplomatic relations with mainland China and 
bilateral trade was filtered indirectly either through Singapore or Hong 
Kong. It was not until July 1985 that trade representatives from Indonesia 
and mainland China reopened direct trade channels by signing a memo-
randum of understanding in Singapore. This agreement paved the way for 
the resumption of diplomatic ties between the two countries on August 8, 
1990.8
Two months after Indonesia reopened its embassy in Beijing, Singa-
pore followed suit and became the last ASEAN founding member state to 
formalize diplomatic ties with mainland China. The move was not surpris-
ing to Taiwan because Singapore announced its intent to normalize rela-
tions with the P.R.C. before inviting LEE Teng-hui to visit the city-state 
in 1989. In fact, Singapore and mainland China had already started high-
level engagements and economic exchanges after then-Prime Minister 
LEE Kuan Yew’s first visit to Beijing in 1976, which was followed by 
DENG Xiaoping’s visit to Singapore in 1978. Taiwan was allowed to es-
tablish a trade mission in Singapore in March 1969 while Singapore set up 
a trade representative office in Taipei in June 1979. Singapore also coop-
erated with mainland China and each country established trade representa-
tive offices in the other’s territory in 1981. Nine years later, on October 3, 
1990, when Singaporean Foreign Minister WONG Kan Seng signed the 
Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with his 
Chinese counterpart QIAN Qichen at the United Nations complex in New 
York, Wong said that the agreement would simply formalize existing re-
lations between Singapore and the P.R.C., which were already warm.9
With the normalization of Brunei-P.R.C. relations in September 
1991, all of the ASEAN countries had established diplomatic relations 
with mainland China, adopting the “one-China” policy that favored Bei-
jing. Faced with the reality of diplomatic isolation from Southeast Asia, 
LEE Teng-hui’s pragmatic approach emerged as the best option for Tai-
wanese relations with the region. As Lee often expressed during the first 
 7.  Samuel C. Y. Ku, “Indonesia’s Relations with China and Taiwan: From Politics to Eco-
nomics,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2002), pp. 229-232. 
 8.  Ibid; and Lai To Lee, “Taiwan and Southeast Asia: ‘Realpolitik Par Excellence?’” Con-
temporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 7, No. 3 (December 1985), p. 218. 
 9.  Hui Min Chew, “Singapore-China ties: 7 things to know about 25 years of diplomatic 
relations,” The Straits Times, November 4, 2015; http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singa-
pore-china-ties-7-things-to-know-about-25-years-of-diplomatic-relations. 
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few years of his presidency, “formal diplomatic links are not essential to 
the pursuit of foreign relations.”10
Like the first visit abroad by Taiwan’s head of state since 1977 (when 
President YEN Chia-kan traveled to Saudi Arabia), Lee’s visit to Singa-
pore in March 1989, represented the beginning of his pragmatic diplo-
macy.11 In December 1988, twelve months into his presidency, Lee sent 
his Foreign Minister LIEN Chan to Singapore to pave the way for his visit 
to the country several months later. The invitation had officially been sent 
by Singaporean President WEE Kim Wee, but had undoubtedly been 
agreed upon and carefully planned by Prime Minister LEE Kuan Yew – a 
longtime friend of CHIANG Ching-kuo who had visited Taiwan numerous 
times. In order to make it appear less political, the visit’s official purpose 
was said to strengthen friendship between the people of Taiwan and Sin-
gapore, and promote economic, scientific, and cultural exchange and co-
operation between the two islands.12 As a result, the programs arranged for 
President Lee’s visit were kept relatively casual. In addition to formal ban-
quets in honor of President Lee, the Singaporean government prepared a 
visit to Singapore Science Centre’s Omni Theatre where Lee and his del-
egation viewed a three-dimensional movie.13 This scientific visit was also 
accompanied by then-Singaporean Education Minister Tony Tan, who 
later became the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore from 1995 to 2005, 
and the President of Singapore in 2011. 
Despite the trip’s casual nature, political and economic factors re-
mained the most important part of Lee’s historic visit to Singapore. During 
the four-day visit, Lee was received as the “President from Taiwan,” in-
stead of the “President of the Republic of China,” or the “President of Tai-
wan.” His belief that substance held more importance than form allowed 
Lee to claim that, although he was not completely satisfied, he could live 
with such a “flexible” title.14 In fact, the significance of  “Taiwanization” 
during Lee’s presidential career would suggest that the “President from 
 10.  Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2005, p.171 
 11.  Jie Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 38. 
 12.  “Documentary: Lee’s visits to Singapore and Penghu (no. 007-040102-00002-001),” 
viewing available at Academia Historica, Taipei, Taiwan (accessed on March 31, 2016). 
 13.  See the photo document on the National Archives of Singapore’s website: 
http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/photographs/record-details/a0910524-1162-11e3-83d5-
0050568939ad. 
 14.  Tsai, Taiwan’s Quest, supra note 10, p. 173. 
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Taiwan” was a most respectable and favorable title for Lee.15 Moreover, 
the term “president” had a strong official connotation, making it more rea-
sonable for Lee to accept the title. Therefore, as “President from Taiwan,” 
Lee exchanged views with Prime Minister LEE Kuan Yew, acting Presi-
dent LIM Kim San, Deputy Prime Minister GOH Chok Tong, and the Am-
bassador from the Philippines to Singapore, Frank Benedicto, covering 
topics from global politics to bilateral investment and trade relations be-
tween the two “Asian Tigers.” It is unknown how deeply they touched 
upon sensitive Beijing-Taipei-Singapore trilateral issues such as the nor-
malization of Singapore-P.R.C. relations, but LEE Teng-hui appeared to 
be willing to accommodate Singapore’s diplomatic needs. When asked his 
opinion about Singapore’s intent to establish diplomatic relations with the 
P.R.C. during the post-visit press conference in Taipei, Lee said “as long 
as it does not deteriorate Singapore’s relationship with the Republic of 
China, or it could maintain the status quo or even improve the relationship, 
I wouldn’t care too much about it.”16 Lee’s answer clearly conveyed the 
pragmatic and flexible elements of his foreign policy agenda. 
Lee’s historic visit to Singapore was an opportunity to showcase his 
strategy of pragmatic diplomacy. During the middle of the trip, Lee pub-
licly said that Taiwan must stand by the principle of maintaining its sov-
ereignty and that the concept of sovereignty should be viewed within the 
context of economic logic and viability. Lee also emphasized that his 
adoption of pragmatic diplomacy would be applied in incremental steps.17
An examination of Lee’s major diplomatic achievements in Southeast 
Asia demonstrates how Lee’s pragmatic strategy was mainly carried out 
in the form of international economic agreements, bilateral diplomatic rep-
resentation, reciprocal high-level official visits, institutionalized economic 
ministerial meetings, and multilateral economic cooperation. As CHEN 
Jie noted, incremental advancement in both the quality and quantity of 
these accomplishments strengthened Taiwan’s standing as a legitimate 
sovereign state.18
First, the significant growth of investment and trade relations be-
tween Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s encouraged the parties involved to seek economic agreements 
in order to protect their national interests. These relations provided Taipei 
 15.  Taiwanization refers to the process in which Taiwan began to emphasize the importance 
of its separate culture, society, economy, and nationality, rather than regarding itself solely as 
an appendage of China.  
 16.  “Documentary: Lee’s visit to Singapore,” supra note 12.  
 17.  Tsai, Taiwan’s Quest, supra note 10, p. 172. 
 18.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 22. 
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legitimacy in negotiating bilateral agreements with Southeast Asian coun-
tries, especially investment protection and promotion agreements, double 
taxation avoidance agreements, and temporary admission of goods agree-
ments. In this context, Singapore led the way for Taiwan-Southeast Asia 
economic relations by signing two first-of-its-kind economic agreements 
between Taiwan and an ASEAN country. On April 9, 1990, Singapore and 
Taiwan signed an investment protection and promotion agreement and a 
temporary admission of goods agreement. Although these agreements 
were signed under the name of “Taipei” as opposed to the “Republic of 
China” – a name that Singapore had previously accepted on agreements 
signed with Taiwan before 1983, they were substantive and pragmatic, 
leading to more economic agreements between Taiwan and ASEAN coun-
tries. In the years following, Taiwan successfully signed investment pro-
tection and promotion agreements with Indonesia (December 1990), the 
Philippines (February 1992), Malaysia (February 1993), Vietnam (April 
1993), and Thailand (April 1996). In addition to the double taxation avoid-
ance agreement reached between Taiwan and Singapore in December 
1981, agreements were also signed with Indonesia (March 1995), Malay-
sia (July 1996), Vietnam (April 1998), and Thailand (July 1999). These 
economic agreements not only helped protect the rights of Taiwanese busi-
nesspeople but also entailed implications for Taiwan’s sovereignty, in-
cluding mutual recognitions of legitimacy for legal systems, financial sys-
tems, and monetary systems.19
Secondly, as the economies of Taiwan and Southeast Asia became 
increasingly intertwined, Lee was able to leverage the island’s economic 
influence to promote the status of Taiwan’s representative offices in the 
region and their regional counterparts in Taipei. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 
demonstrate the evolution of the names of representative offices involved 
in Taiwan-ASEAN relations. Due to the lack of formal diplomatic ties be-
tween Taiwan and Southeast Asian nations and to avoid antagonizing 
mainland China, the R.O.C. government was asked to use obscure names 
for their representative offices in the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, names 
such as the “Chinese Chamber of Commerce,” the “Far East Trade Of-
fice,” the “Far East Travel and Trade Centre,” and the “Pacific Economic 
and Cultural Center” were adopted by Taiwanese offices in the region. 
Similarly, Southeast Asian missions in Taiwan also adopted ambiguous 
names. For example, visas and other counselor services for Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, were carried out by the “Indone-
sian Chamber of Commerce,” the “Thai Airways International Ltd. Of-
fice,” the “Malaysian Airline Taipei Branch,” and the “Asian Exchange 
 19.  Ibid, p.84. 
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Center, Inc.” These names, however, were far too obscure for Lee to ac-
cept under his pragmatic diplomacy strategy. After Lee took office in 
1988, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) pushed for the names 
of their representative offices in Southeast Asia to be changed. Among the 
ASEAN countries, Indonesia was the first to allow Taiwan to rename the 
“Chinese Chamber of Commerce” to the “Taipei Economic and Trade Of-
fice” (TETO). The renaming took place on October 10, 1989, the R.O.C.’s 
National Day, which indicated Indonesian goodwill toward Taiwan. 
TETO in Indonesia became Taiwan’s first representative office in South-
east Asia to use the name of the R.O.C.’s capital, an act that significantly 
improved Taiwan’s diplomatic representation status.20 Following Indone-
sia’s example, other ASEAN countries subsequently approved name 
changes to Taiwan’s representative offices in the region, commonly adopt-
ing the name “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office” (see Table 2.1). Like-
wise, the names of offices representing ASEAN countries in Taiwan were 
also gradually changed to the “Indonesian Economic and Trade Office,” 
the “Malaysian Friendship and Trade Centre,” the “Manila Economic and 
Cultural Office,” and the “Thailand Trade and Economic Office” (see Ta-
ble 2.2). The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) was formally 
transformed from the Pacific Economic and Cultural Center in January 
1993. Six months later, former President of the Philippines Corazon 
Aquino joined the official opening ceremony of MECO in Taipei.21 Alt-
hough Aquino had already been succeeded by Fidel Ramos, her presence 
at the ceremony undoubtedly represented a significant improvement in 
Philippines-Taiwan relations. When Singapore established full diplomatic 
relations with mainland China in 1990, the name “Republic of China” was 
removed from Taiwan’s representative office in Singapore. However, 
some scholars argue that the new name “Taipei Representative Office” 
actually implied full government representation because it did not contain 
the words “economic” or “cultural.”22 Vietnam signed a representative of-
fice establishment agreement with Taiwan in June 1992, allowing Taiwan 
to set up the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office” in both Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City in November of that year. The following year, in July 1993, 
Vietnam established a representative office in Taipei under the name “Vi-
etnam Economic and Cultural Office.” 
 20.  Ku, “Indonesia’s Relations,” supra note 7, p. 238. 
 21.  See the photo document on the Digital Taiwan’s website: http://catalog.digitalar-
chives.tw/item/00/3a/a1/a1.html.
 22.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p.81. 
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Table 2.1: The Changing Names of Taiwan’s Representative 
Institutions in Southeast Asia (1988-Present) 
Host Coun-
tries
Names in Jan. 
1988 
Set-up 
Date 
Names at Present Renaming 
Date 
Brunei Far East Trade and 
Cultural Centre 
June 1978 Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Office 
July 1996 
Indonesia Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce 
Apr. 1971 Taipei Economic 
and Trade Office 
Oct. 1989 
Malaysia Far East Travel and 
Trade Centre 
Aug. 1974 Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Office 
July 1992 
Philippines Pacific Economic 
and Cultural Center 
July 1975 Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Office 
Dec. 1989 
Thailand Far East Trade Of-
fice 
Feb. 1980 Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Office 
Aug. 1999 
Singapore Trade Mission of 
the Republic of 
China 
Mar. 1969 Taipei Representa-
tive Office 
Sept. 1990 
Vietnam  No Representation   Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Office 
Nov. 1992 
(Set-up Date) 
Myanmar No Representation  Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Office  
Mar. 2016 
(Set-up Date) 
Sources: MOFA, R.O.C., and Jie Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic 
Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 82. 
Notes:
1. Taiwan’s representative office in Malaysia was renamed first as Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Centre in June 1988. 
2. Taiwan’s representative office in Thailand was renamed first as Taipei Economic and 
Trade Center in September 1991, and then as Taipei Economic and Trade Office in 
May 1992. 
3. In November 1995, Taiwan established the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representa-
tive Office in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. However, after Hun Sen overthrew Prince No-
rodom Ranariddh in July 1997, Taiwan’s representative office in Cambodia was shut 
down by Hun Sen on July 27, 1997. 
Thirdly, Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy also facilitated an unprecedented 
number of reciprocal visits from high-level officials in Southeast Asia. 
During CHIANG Ching-kuo’s tenure, only two high-level visits from Tai-
wanese officials were held in ASEAN countries: Premier SUN Yun-suan’s 
visit to Indonesia in 1981 and Premier YU Kuo-hwa’s visit to Singapore 
in 1987. Under President Lee, Taiwanese officials traveled much more 
frequently to Southeast Asia. Besides his first visit to Singapore in 1989, 
Lee also made ice-breaking visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thai-
land in 1994. Lee’s premiers also traveled more to ASEAN countries dur-
ing Lee’s presidency: HAU Pei-tsun visited Singapore in 1990, LIEN 
Chan travelled to Singapore and Malaysia in 1993, and Vincent Siew vis-
ited Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia in 1998. High-level officials 
from Southeast Asia also conducted visits to Taiwan in the 1990s, includ-
ing the prime ministers from Singapore and Malaysia, the vice president 
38189-aop_16-2 Sheet No. 7 Side A      08/11/2016   08:45:46
38189-aop_16-2 Sheet No. 7 Side A      08/11/2016   08:45:46
No. 2 2016 Macro (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2016  3:29 PM 
 TAIWAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 13 
from the Philippines, and vice prime ministers from Thailand, Singapore, 
and Malaysia.23 Visits at the ministerial level also proliferated – Taiwanese 
foreign ministers under Lee traveled to Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines, and received foreign ministers from Singa-
pore, the Philippines, and Malaysia. On the economic side, bilateral eco-
nomic consultation meetings at the ministerial level were institutionalized 
with Singapore (since 1990), Indonesia (since 1991), the Philippines 
(since 1991), Thailand (since 1991), Vietnam (since 1993), and Malaysia 
(since 1997).24 However, these consultations have become increasingly 
low-profile and unpublicized due to growing pressure from Beijing.25
Table 2.2: Changing Names of Southeast Asian Representative 
Institutions in Taiwan (1988-Present) 
Sources: The websites of the Southeast Asian representative offices in Taiwan; and Jie 
Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Chel-
tenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 83. 
Notes:
 23.  Ibid, p. 84. 
 24.  Ibid, p. 83. 
 25.  See “Taiwan Seeks to Sign an ECA at the Ministerial Meeting between Taiwan and the 
Philippines,” United Daily News, December 03, 2015; http://udn.com/news/story/6/1354996. 
Countries  Names in Jan. 1988 Set-up 
Date 
Names at Present Renaming 
Date 
Indonesia Indonesian Chamber 
of Commerce 
June 1971 Indonesian Economic 
and Trade Office 
Jan. 1995 
Malaysia Malaysian Airline   
Taipei Branch; and 
Malaysian Culture and 
Trade Exchange     
Centre
1977; 1983 Malaysian Friendship 
and Trade Centre 
June 1988 
Philippines Asian Exchange     
Center, Inc.  
Mar. 1976 Manila Economic and 
Cultural Office 
Dec. 1989 
Thailand Thai Airways Interna-
tional Ltd. Office 
Feb. 1976 Thailand Trade and 
Economic Office 
Sept. 1992 
Singapore Office of the Singa-
pore Trade Repre-
sentative
June 1979 Singapore Trade Of-
fice 
Sept. 1990 
Vietnam  No Representation   Vietnam Economic 
and Cultural Office 
July. 1993 
(Set-up Date) 
Brunei No Representation  Brunei Darussalam 
Trade and Tourism 
Office 
Oct. 2002 
(Set-up Date) 
Myanmar No Representation  Myanmar Trade Of-
fice 
June 2015 
(Set-up Date) 
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1. Exact months of set-up dates for the Malaysian representative institutions are un-
known in both cases. In June 1988, the two institutions were merged to become Ma-
laysian Friendship and Trade Centre. 
2. The Philippine representative office in Taiwan was renamed to MECO on the docu-
ment in December 1989 and the transformation was completed in January 1993. 
3. Cambodia set up the Phnom Penh Economic and Cultural Representative Office in 
Taipei in January 1996. However, in retaliation for Hun Sen’s decision to close Tai-
wan’s representative office in Cambodia on July 27, 1997, R.O.C.’s MOFA ordered 
the closure of Cambodia’s representative office in Taiwan on July 28, 1997. 
Lastly, Taiwan benefitted from Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy in the in-
ternational arena. Shortly after Lee assumed the presidency in 1988, Tai-
wan resumed participation in the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) an-
nual meetings under the name “Taipei, China.”26 Even though the R.O.C. 
was one of the founding members of the ADB, launched in 1966, it was 
forced to change its membership name to “Taipei, China” when the ADB 
accepted the P.R.C.’s participation in 1986. Under CHIANG Ching-kuo, 
Taiwan boycotted the ADB’s annual meetings from 1986 to 1987. Lee’s 
disposal of the exclusive “one-China” principle, however, created flexibil-
ity in his foreign policy. Therefore, Lee sent Taiwan’s Central Bank Gov-
ernor CHANG Chi-cheng to the ADB annual meeting in Manila in April 
1988 and even authorized his Finance Minister Shirley Kuo to attend the 
annual meeting in Beijing in 1989.27 Since then, Taiwan’s officials have 
joined the ADB’s annual meetings but would place “under protest” plac-
ards next to the “Taipei, China” nameplates (in 1998, the name was 
changed to “Taipei,China”).28 Taiwan also joined the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) forum under the non-inflammatory name 
“Chinese Taipei” in November 1991 and was offered observer status in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a “Separate Cus-
toms Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” in September 
1992. Moreover, Taiwan’s Central Bank not only joined the Association 
of Directors of Southeast Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) as the “Central 
Bank of China, Taipei” in January 1992 but also hosted SEACEN’s 1994 
 26.  The name “Taipei, China” was changed to “Taipei,China” (space deliberately omitted 
after the comma) by the ADB in 1998 after Hong Kong’s 1997 return to China. To differentiate 
from Hong Kong’s participation as “Hong Kong, China,” the ADB adopted the name “Tai-
pei,China” for Taiwan. See “The History of Ministry of Finance, R.O.C.” at http://mu-
seum.mof.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3760&ctNode=41&mp=1.  
 27.  Ibid.
 28.  Ibid.
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annual meeting in Taipei.29 Multilateral achievements, coupled with pro-
gress in bilateral relations between Taiwan and ASEAN countries, signif-
icantly increased Taiwan’s international profile and enhanced Lee’s do-
mestic popularity. 
Building on momentum from the advancing ASEAN-Taiwan rela-
tions, LEE Teng-hui officially launched his “Go South” policy at the be-
ginning of 1994. This policy was the apex of initiatives that Lee took with 
respect to advancing Taiwan’s relations with Southeast Asia through prag-
matic diplomacy. Concerned about the risks inherent in increasing Tai-
wan’s economic interdependence with mainland China, Lee encouraged 
Taiwanese companies to look to their neighbors in the south, hoping to 
further expand foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia rather than 
mainland China and Hong Kong. The “Guidelines for Strengthening 
Economic and Trade Ties with Southeast Asia,” a three-year plan 
adopted by the R.O.C.’s Executive Yuan in early 1994, laid out policy 
goals for the “Go South” strategy. The plan’s objectives included assisting 
Taiwanese companies in identifying favorable production and distribution 
bases in ASEAN, expanding financial services to Taiwanese business in 
the region, co-developing industrial zones in Vietnam, the Philippines, and 
Indonesia, promoting investment and trade relations with ASEAN, reduc-
ing the degree of trade dependence on mainland China, and helping South-
east Asian countries create job opportunities.30 The policy effectively 
helped grow Taiwan’s investment in Southeast Asia. Between 1994 and 
1996, when the three-year plan of the “Go South” policy was initially im-
plemented, Taiwan’s total approved investment in Southeast Asia signifi-
cant grew to over US$13.7 billion – approximately double that of US$6.7 
billion between 1991 and 1993 (see the next chapter for details). 
The Lee administration’s decision to “Go South” was also encour-
aged by the January 1992 signing of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
agreement in Singapore. The AFTA agreement contained a Common Ef-
fective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) arrangement that was designed to elim-
inate tariff barriers among Southeast Asian countries, integrate ASEAN 
economies into a single production base, and create a regional market of 
more than 500 million people. Under CEPT, tariffs on a wide range of 
 29.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 83; when mainland China joined SEACEN in 
2011, Taiwan’s membership name was changed to “Central Bank, Chinese Taipei,” see 
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/467437. 
 30.  Samuel C.Y. Ku, “The Changing Political Economy of Taiwan’s and China’s Relations 
with Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective,” in Khai Leung Ho and Samuel Ku, eds., 
Southeast Asia and China: Global Changes and Regional Challenges, Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asia Studies, 2005, p. 264; and Chiang, “Go South Policy,” supra note 25.   
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products traded in the region were gradually reduced to 0 to 5 percent.31
The AFTA also sought to eliminate non-tariff barriers. Lee knew that if 
Taiwan grew its business presence in ASEAN during this trade liberation 
process, Taiwanese companies in the region would benefit from the inte-
grated production base and market. 
As soon as Lee announced his “Go South” policy he began what he 
characterized as “vacation diplomacy” to Southeast Asia, arranging a 
number of meetings and golf outings with regional leaders.32 In February 
1994, President Lee, Foreign Minister Frederick Chien, Minister of Coun-
cil for Economic Planning and Development Vincent Siew, KMT treasury 
czar LIU Tai-ying, and Chief Executive Officer of the China Trust Bank 
KOO Lien-sung paid unprecedented visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, 
and Thailand during the Chinese New Year holiday. Lee’s initial visit to 
these three countries, where Taiwan had no diplomatic ties but substantial 
investments, was a powerful symbol of his administration’s “Go South” 
commitment to ASEAN and a significant success in his pragmatic diplo-
macy. 
The first stop on his 1994 ice-breaking trip was Subic Bay, where Lee 
held a luncheon with President Fidel Ramos. Lee and Ramos agreed that 
both sides should work together on infrastructure development projects 
such as Subic Bay’s industrial park, a project modeled on Taiwan’s export 
processing zones. During the meeting, Ramos requested technical assis-
tance from the Taiwan Power Company to solve problems with electricity 
shortages in the Philippines. Ramos and Lee also agreed to improve the 
rights of overseas Filipino workers in Taiwan (see the next chapter for 
more details). Right after the luncheon, Lee flew directly to Bali, Indonesia 
to continue his “vacation diplomacy.” It is worth noting that the Lee dele-
gation was greeted at the airport by then-Minister of Research and Tech-
nology B.J. Habibie, who would later become President of Indonesia after 
Suharto’s fall in 1998. According to sources, Habibie was key in facilitat-
ing Lee’s trip to Indonesia and accompanied him throughout his travels in 
Bali and Bandung.33 During his stay in Bali, Lee met with President Su-
 31.  Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “The Logic of China-ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of 
‘Peaceful Ascendency,’” in Khai Leung Ho and Samuel Ku, eds., Southeast Asia and China: 
Global Changes and Regional Challenges, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2005, 
p. 24. 
 32.  Edward A. Gargan, Taiwan Pushes to Rebuild Its Position in Global Community, The 
New York Times, June 26, 1994. 
 33.  “Documentary: Lee’s visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand in 1994 (no. 
007-040102-00003-002),” viewing available at Academia Historica, Taipei, Taiwan (accessed 
on March 31, 2016). 
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harto over a three-hour luncheon to discuss economic cooperation, Tai-
wan’s “Go South” policy, ASEAN-Taiwan relations, and possibility of 
Lee attending the APEC summit, scheduled to be held in Bogor, Indonesia 
that year.34 During formal meetings and some informal meetings on the 
golf course, both sides agreed to jointly develop Indonesia’s natural gas 
and heavy chemical industry, increase sugar and salt production, and im-
prove infrastructure on Batam Island.35 During questioning by the Taiwan-
ese press, Habibie said, “Your country is now the third [largest] investor 
in my country, I think [there is a] big possibility that one day you will be 
number one, and in fact, why not?” Habibie also promoted Batam Island 
as a favorable investment destination, claiming that it could become a base 
for Taiwanese companies offering banking, financing, trading, and other 
services to ASEAN.36
The final stop on Lee’s “private vacation” was Thailand, where he 
visited the renowned tourist destination of Phuket Island for three days 
before flying to Bangkok. Though Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai can-
celled his meeting with Lee because of pressure from Beijing, his Deputy 
Prime Minister Amnuay Viravan hosted a dinner for Lee in Phuket. During 
the meeting, the two discussed issues in Taiwan-Thailand bilateral eco-
nomic cooperation, particularly Taipei’s quota for Thai migrant workers 
in Taiwan.37 Importantly, despite numerous official protests from main-
land China, Thailand’s monarch King Bhumibol Adulyadej received Lee 
in his palace in Bangkok – the only capital city Lee visited on his trip. 
During their 70-minute meeting, the parties exchanged views on agricul-
tural cooperation for the Royal Project in northern Thailand. They agreed 
to enhance technical collaboration between Taiwanese and Thai agricul-
tural experts with the shared goal of converting opium fields in northern 
Thailand into fruit and vegetable plantations (for details of Royal Project, 
see Chapter IV).38
B. Political and Economic Obstacles to LEE Teng-hui’s            
“Go South” Policy (1995-2000) 
Lee’s “vacation diplomacy” tour in Southeast Asia succeeded in rais-
ing Taiwan’s international profile, especially after meeting with President 
Ramos, President Suharto, and King Bhumibol. However, behind the fa-
çade of warming ties, obstacles to closer bilateral and multilateral political 
 34.  Ibid.
 35.  Tsai, Taiwan’s Quest, supra note 10, p. 193 
 36.  “Lee’s visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand,” supra note 33. 
 37.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 116. 
 38.  “Lee’s visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand,” supra note 33. 
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relations between Taiwan and ASEAN countries proliferated. Though Lee 
had directly lobbied Suharto for permission to attend the 1994 APEC sum-
mit in Indonesia, his efforts were not rewarded. In 1996, the Philippines 
hosted an APEC summit for the first time. Despite the fact that the event 
was held at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, which Taiwan helped develop, 
Lee failed to convince the Ramos administration to allow him to attend. 
Lee also attempted to become a dialogue partner in ASEAN, citing Tai-
wan’s substantial economic ties with the region. At the 1992 ASEAN Min-
isterial Meeting, the Foreign Ministers of Singapore and the Philippines 
proposed this idea with their regional counterparts.39 However, nothing 
was achieved and Taiwan remained excluded from ASEAN ever since. 
Another ASEAN-centered forum Taiwan lobbied to participate in 
was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Established in Bangkok in 1994, 
the ARF encompasses the ASEAN countries and other nations such as 
mainland China and the United States. The forum aims to foster construc-
tive dialogue and consultation among its participants on political and se-
curity issues of common interest and concern.40 In 1996, mainland China 
proposed a rule that required admission of a new member to be approved 
by all existing members, effectively blocking the way for Taiwan’s partic-
ipation.41 Beijing objected to Taiwanese participation on the ground that 
membership in the ARF, as in the United Nations, was a prerogative of 
sovereign states.42 When mainland China became a member of the “track-
two” Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in 
1996, Beijing again applied the “one-China” principle to Taiwan’s mem-
bership, though participation was on a non-official basis. Though Taiwan 
was allowed to send scholars in individual capacity to CSCAP meetings, 
they have only been offered in places of subordinate working groups rather 
than in plenary sessions.43 From mainland China’s perspective, Taiwan’s 
full participation in APEC, ARF, and even CSCAP would implicitly con-
firm the island’s view of its independent status. 
Undoubtedly, the status of cross-Strait relations highly influences 
ASEAN leaders’ calculations regarding their level of engagement with 
Taiwan. Stable cross-Strait relations create an environment for Southeast 
Asian governments to more easily deal with Taipei, while a tense atmos-
phere across the Taiwan Strait allows these countries to side with Beijing 
 39.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, pp. 87-88. 
 40.  Ralf Emmers, Joseph Chinyong Liow, and See Seng Tan, “The East Asia Summit and 
the Regional Security Architecture,” Baltimore, Maryland: Maryland Series in Contemporary 
Asian Studies, 2009, p. 10. 
 41.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 88. 
 42.  Leifer, “Taiwan and South-East Asia,” supra note 2, p. 174. 
 43.  Ibid.
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under the “one-China” policy. In April 1993, Chairman of the Taipei-
based Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), KOO Chen-fu, held an unprec-
edented meeting in Singapore with his Chinese counterpart WANG Dao-
han, President of the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Straits (ARATS). The historic “Koo-Wang talks,” facilitated by 
LEE Kuan Yew, sent a message to the world that representatives from 
mainland China and Taiwan could sit together and sign agreements based 
on the principles of equality and reciprocity. Improved cross-Strait rela-
tions from 1993 to 1994 arguably created some manoeuver room for 
ASEAN leaders to engage Taiwan. This is exemplified by LEE Teng-hui’s 
“private” trip to Southeast Asia in February 1994 when political leaders 
from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand received Lee in their coun-
tries despite pressure from Beijing. 
However, political relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asian 
countries stagnated and even deteriorated, during the 1995-1996 Taiwan 
Strait Crisis. On June 9, 1995, President Lee traveled to the United States 
on a visa granted by President Bill Clinton to pay a “private” visit to his 
alma mater, Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. Lee delivered a 
speech, titled, “Always in My Heart,” to an audience of 4,000 people, em-
phasizing Taiwan’s successful economic development and political de-
mocratization. Beijing viewed this visit as an act of separatism and reacted 
by conducting a series of missile tests into the waters surrounding Taiwan 
from July 1995 to March 1996. Beijing also threatened to use force against 
Taiwan if either Lee or the candidate for the Democratic Progress Party 
(DPP) was elected in the island’s first popular presidential election in 
March 1996. The crisis not only led to a stand-off between the naval forces 
of the United States and mainland China but also raised deep concerns 
among ASEAN countries. Given that their diplomatic ties with mainland 
China were firm and their leverage over Beijing was extremely limited, 
most ASEAN leaders had no choice but to side with mainland China. In 
order to maintain peace and stability in the region, ASEAN countries 
urged Taiwan not to provoke mainland China by challenging the P.R.C.’s 
“one-China” principle. For example, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad publicly stated that Taiwan should play the role of an economic 
entity, instead of a nation-state.44 Thai Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa 
went so far as to say that mainland China had a right to carry out military 
exercises “within its own territory.”45 The city-state of Singapore was the 
 44.  Ku, “The Changing Political Economy,” supra note 30, p. 269. 
 45.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 92. 
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only regional voice willing to urge caution on mainland China with a mes-
sage delivered through a public statement by LEE Kuan Yew.46 cross-
Strait military conflict is not in Singapore’s national interests. Strong his-
torical links between Taiwan and Singapore on defense and security 
through the “Starlight” program (the implementation of which Singapore 
has relied on Taiwanese support for training space and large scale exer-
cises since 1975) meant that a cross-Strait military conflict was not in Sin-
gapore’s national interests. 
In a similar vein, the sudden escalation of tensions across the Taiwan 
Strait in 1999 forced ASEAN to stand with mainland China. During an 
interview with Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany) in the Office of the 
President on July 9, 1999, LEE Teng-hui surprisingly brought up his “Two 
States Theory,” arguing that: 
The 1991 constitutional amendments have designated cross-
Strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special 
state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship 
between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or be-
tween a central government and a local government. Thus, the 
Beijing authorities’ characterization of Taiwan as a “renegade 
province” is historically and legally untrue. . .Moreover, in 
1991, amendments to the Constitution designated cross-Strait 
relations as a special state-to-state relationship. Consequently, 
there is no need to declare independence.47
Shortly after Lee dropped his “Two State Theory bombshell,” as SU 
Chi dubbed it, Chinese President JIANG Zemin ordered that cross-Strait 
consultations between ARATS and SEF cease.48 As tensions rose, the for-
eign ministers of Southeast Asian countries issued a joint communique on 
July 24, 1999, at the 32nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. Their 
declaration stated, “we expressed our concern over the tension that arose 
in the Taiwan Strait after 9 July 1999, which could seriously affect re-
gional peace and stability and prospects for economy recovery. We hoped 
for a quick and peaceful return to normalcy. We reaffirmed our commit-
ment to our One China Policy.”49 This collective declaration was the first 
 46.  Leifer, “Taiwan and South-East Asia,” supra note 2, p. 181. 
 47.  Chi Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A tail wagging two dogs, New York: 
Routledge, 2009, p. 53. 
 48.  Ibid, pp. 52-85. 
 49.  See the full text of the joint communique at http://www.asean.org/?static_post=joint-
communique-the-32nd-asean-ministerial-meeting-amm-singapore-23-24-july-1999. 
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of its kind for the ASEAN ministerial forum – a major diplomatic victory 
for Beijing over Taiwan.50
Increases in diplomatic challenges that Taipei faced in ASEAN coun-
tries during the late 1990s can also be attributed to warming ties between 
mainland China and Southeast Asia. Although mainland China’s eco-
nomic power and political image were severely damaged by the Tianan-
men crisis on June 4, 1989, which consequently provided Taipei some lee-
way for regional diplomacy, Beijing attempted to stabilize its political 
economy and improve ties with its neighbors in the south. At the CCP’s 
Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992, strengthening mainland 
China’s economic relations with Southeast Asia was placed on the national 
economic policy agenda for the first time.51 Since then, mainland China 
has gradually increased its economic engagement with ASEAN countries. 
According to statistics from the ASEAN Secretariat, mainland China’s 
trade with ASEAN surged from US$8.9 billion in 1993 to US$16.7 billion 
in 1996. During that same period, Taiwan’s trade with ASEAN also grew 
from US$14.3 billion to US$24.1 billion, remaining ahead of mainland 
China as a trading partner of ASEAN. However, in 1998, after the Asian 
financial crisis, ASEAN’s trade with mainland China surpassed its trade 
with Taiwan for the first time, valuing at US$20.4 billion and US$12.7 
billion respectively.52
The expansion of P.R.C.-ASEAN ties is exemplified by the for-
mation of institutionalized dialogues between the parties. Between 1994 
and 1995, the ASEAN-China Joint Committee on Economic and Trade 
Cooperation and the ASEAN-China Joint Science and Technology Com-
mittee were established. By early 1997, three other parallel dialogue 
frameworks were also convened, including the senior official level China-
ASEAN political consultation, the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation 
Committee (ACJCC), and the ASEAN Beijing Committee.53 The 
ASEAN-China Business Council was also established in 1997, promoting 
ties between the private sectors. Most importantly, mainland China was 
accorded Full Dialogue partner status in ASEAN at the 29th ASEAN Min-
isterial Meeting in Indonesia in July 1996, an upgrade from the title of 
Consultative Partner it had held since 1991. In December 1997, in the 
 50.  Christopher R. Hughes, “China’s membership of the ARF and the emergence of an East 
Asian diplomatic and security culture,” in Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, eds., Coopera-
tive Security in the Asia-Pacific, The ASEAN Regional Forum, New York: Routledge, p. 64. 
 51.  Ku, “The Changing Political Economy,” supra note 30, p. 271.  
 52.  See ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2003. pp. 66-67, 70-71. 
 53.  Swee-Hock Saw, Lijun Sheng, and Kin Wah Chin, “An Overview of ASEAN-China 
Relations,” in Saw, Sheng, and Chin, eds. ASEAN-china relations: Realities and prospects, Sin-
gapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, pp. 1-2. 
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wake of the Asian financial crisis, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was ini-
tiated; membership including the ASEAN countries, mainland China, Ja-
pan, and South Korea. At the first APT informal summit, China and 
ASEAN issued a joint statement, titled “ASEAN-China Cooperation To-
wards the 21st Century,” agreeing to “promote good neighborly and 
friendly relations, increase high-level exchanges, strengthen the mecha-
nism of dialogue and cooperation in all areas to enhance understanding 
and mutual benefit.”54 The joint statement also explained, “ASEAN mem-
ber states reaffirmed their continued adherence to the one China policy,” 
representing the first time ASEAN countries collectively acknowledged 
the “one-China” policy.55
By the late 1990s, ASEAN had already engaged Beijing in many as-
pects of regional cooperation, reducing maneuverability for Taipei’s prag-
matic diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, Taipei continued trying 
to gain support from ASEAN countries by using its economic leverage, a 
tactic which proved beneficial during the Asian financial crisis. To help 
smooth the flow of currency, the R.O.C. Central Bank deposited around 
US$1.2 billion into the state banks of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. In order to ease the burden of troubled Taiwanese compa-
nies in the region, the Central Bank also provided US$1.1 billion of special 
funding to branches of Taiwanese banks in countries affected by the cri-
sis.56 KMT-backed enterprises such as the China Development Corpora-
tion (CDC) also established a holding company named “Southeast Asia 
Investment Company.” The company launched its “buying cheap” cam-
paign with more than US$300 million in capital allocated to its special 
funds for Southeast Asia.57 The CDC made acquisitions at bargain prices 
in the banking and manufacturing industries of Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia as conglomerates in the region began to collapse.58 As CDC 
President Benny Hu put it, “this is the worst financial crisis in Asia, and it 
is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.”59
The urgent need for Taiwan’s financial assistance during the crisis 
permitted several high-level visits between Taiwan and ASEAN countries, 
even though visits above the ministerial level had been suspended since 
 54.  See the full text of the joint statement at http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-statement-
of-the-meeting-of-heads-of-stategovernment-of-the-member-states-of-asean-and-the-president-
of-the-people-s-republic-of-china-kuala-lumpur-malaysia-16-december-1997. 
 55.  Ibid; and Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 162. 
 56.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 113. 
 57.  Author’s interview with Benny T. Hu, Taipei, Taiwan, March 28, 2016. 
 58.  Ibid; and Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, pp. 113-131. 
 59.  Keith B. Richburg, “Exploiting Asia’s Crisis: Taiwan Buys Up Bargains and Widens 
Its Influence,” The Washington Post, January 22, 1998. 
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LEE Teng-hui’s diplomatic tour to Southeast Asia in 1994. Vice President 
LIEN Chan visited Singapore and Malaysia in February 1998, Premier 
Vincent Siew visited Indonesia and the Philippines in January 1998, and 
Malaysia (with Foreign Minister Jason Hu) in April 1998. Economic Min-
ister WANG Chih-kang traveled to Kuala Lumpur in September 1998 for 
the second Malaysia-Taiwan economic ministerial forum.60 In January 
1998, a 70-member Taiwanese trade delegation also completed a journey 
through Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.61 Southeast 
Asian leaders also traveled to Taipei during the 1997-1998 period, includ-
ing Indonesian Economic Affairs Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Indo-
nesian Trade Minister Bob Hasan, and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim.62 In November 1997, Singaporean 
Prime Minister GOH Chok Tong and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad also made transit stops to Taipei within the same 24 hour time-
period to hold talks with Premier Vincent Siew about how Taiwan could 
help during the crisis.63
These visits and initiatives, driven by economic considerations dur-
ing a time of acute financial adversity in the region, provided opportunities 
for Taiwan to “Go South” and gain long-term influence in ASEAN coun-
tries. However, from the mid-1990s onward, Taiwan was gradually re-
placed by mainland China as a critical economic partner of ASEAN. On 
top of that, poor investment conditions, in Southeast Asia economies that 
were hit the hardest during the financial crisis, drove away a large amount 
of Taiwanese investment in the region. Many of these countries were later 
drawn closer to mainland China through economic incentives. The Lee 
administration extended its “Go South” policy for another three years from 
1997 to 1999 and tried to expand the policy to include New Zealand and 
Australia by changing the policy name to “Guidelines for Strengthening 
Economic and Trade Ties with Southeast Asia, New Zealand, and 
Australia.” However, the Lee administration rarely used the rhetoric “Go 
South” from the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 until President 
Lee stepped down in May 2000. 
 60.  Xiu-lan Chen, “WANG Chih-kang visits Malaysia today,” China Times, September 03, 
1998; http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/malaysian/90303.htm. 
 61.  Richburg, “Exploiting Asia’s Crisis,” supra note 59. 
 62.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, pp. 159-160. 
 63.  Lawrence Chung, “Rare Taiwan visits spur talk of aid to S.E. Asia,” Reuters, November 
28, 1997.  
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C. CHEN Shui-bian’s Diplomatic Aggression towards    
Southeast Asia (2000-2008) 
On March 18, 2000, CHEN Shui-bian’s unanticipated victory in Tai-
wan’s presidential election created uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region. 
As the first Taiwanese president nominated by the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) – a party that has long held a pro-Taiwan independence 
stance, Chen’s words on cross-Strait relations and foreign affairs were 
carefully examined not only by political leaders in the United States, main-
land China, and Taiwan but also by policymakers in ASEAN and North-
east Asia. As heir to the “chess game” left by his predecessor LEE Teng-
hui, Chen’s decision on whether or not to continue the “special state-to-
state relationship” policy would lead to either conciliatory or confronta-
tional cross-Strait relations.64 Developments across the Taiwan Strait 
would have an undeniable effect on the whole of East Asia. For example, 
if cross-Strait relations deteriorated uncontrollably, the United States 
would likely become involved in an armed intervention and implement 
economic sanctions against mainland China, which would immediately 
and directly impact Japan, Korea, and ASEAN.65
Due to this regional security concern, Singaporean Prime Minister 
GOH Chok Tong and Senior Minister LEE Kuan Yew traveled to Beijing 
and Taipei, respectively, in the wake of Chen’s victory. In April 2000, one 
month before Chen’s inauguration, Goh visited Chinese President JIANG 
Zemin and Chinese Premier ZHU Rongji in Beijing. Goh was the first for-
eign leader to visit Beijing after Taiwan’s presidential election in 2000. 
During an interview in Hong Kong, Goh urged moderation on both sides 
and advised Chinese leaders that how they decided to handle cross-Strait 
relations would affect the security and stability of the Asian region.66 In 
September 2000, four months after Chen took office, LEE Kuan Yew paid 
a “private” visit to Taipei to meet Chen, his advisers, and opposition lead-
ers: LIEN Chan, Vincent Siew, and James Soong. During his visit, Lee 
said “the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait can lessen their prob-
lems by establishing easier relations over the years.” When asked whether 
Beijing and Taipei would be able to find common ground on which cross-
Strait talks might resume, Lee argued “there is no reason why talks cannot 
be resumed if both sides return to the basis on which the 1993 Wang-Koo 
 64.  “Majority of people in Taiwan want the status quo,” The Straits Times, October 1, 2000.   
 65.  Ibid.
 66.  Barry Porter, “Beijing serious about war threat to Taiwan, says Goh,” South China 
Morning Post, April 18, 2000. 
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talks were started, that is, the 1992 Consensus, with each declaring its own 
position.”67
On the one hand, as LEE Kuan Yew observed, both LIEN Chan and 
Vincent Siew of the Kuomintang (KMT) and James Soong of the People 
First Party (PFP) supported the 1992 Consensus. On the other hand, Chen 
of the DPP referred to it as the 1992 “Spirit” instead of the 1992 “Consen-
sus” – mainly because pro-independence fundamentalists in Taiwan 
strongly opposed the “one-China” connotation of the 1992 Consensus. It 
is worth noting that even after 20 years, these terms remained a source of 
debate between presidential candidates Eric Chu of the KMT, TSAI Ing-
wen of the DPP, and James Soong of the PFP during Taiwan’s 2016 pres-
idential election campaign. 
In April 2000, as the Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council 
(MAC) in Taiwan, SU Chi created the term “1992 Consensus” to encap-
sulate the tacit understanding reached by two semi-official organizations, 
the Taipei-based SEF and the Beijing-based ARATS, following their 1992 
meeting in Hong Kong. The implicit understanding was that both sides 
could still uphold the “one-China” principle while agreeing to disagree on 
its definition. In mainland China, the 1992 Consensus incorporated the 
“one-China” principle to safeguard the territorial integrity of the People’s 
Republic of China. In contrast, Taiwan’s KMT emphasized the respective 
interpretations stating that the “one-China” was the Republic of China, 
which was an independent sovereign country in accordance with the 
R.O.C. Constitution.68 The argument that the 1992 Consensus laid the 
foundation for the 1993 Koo-Wang talks was widely accepted by KMT 
leaders and LEE Kuan Yew during Chen’s era; however, Chen and TSAI 
Ing-wen, who served as Minister of the MAC from 2000 to 2004, never 
publicly stated that they supported the 1992 Consensus. 
Without mutual trust between Taipei and Beijing, cross-Strait rela-
tions were highly fluid under Chen’s presidency – despite the “Five Nos” 
pledged in Chen’s inaugural address on May 20, 2000: 
. . .as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military 
force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I 
will not declare independence, I will not change the national ti-
tle, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-
state” description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a 
referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question 
of independence or unification. Furthermore, the abolition of the 
 67.   “Majority of people in Taiwan,” supra note 64. 
 68.  Bao-chiun Jing, “Ma-Xi meeting and the arts of words,” Bangkok Post, November 20, 
2015.
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National Unification Council or the National Unification Guide-
lines will not be an issue.69
While the “Five Nos” temporarily alleviated tensions across the Tai-
wan Strait, mainland China insisted that Chen was evasive regarding “one-
China.” Therefore, JIANG Zemin adopted the so-called “listening to his 
word, monitoring his deeds” approach toward the Chen administration. 
During the first 18 months of Chen’s tenure, under the peaceful waters of 
the Taiwan Strait, both sides harbored deep suspicions of the other’s true 
intentions.70 The tensions finally surfaced shortly after Chen’s DPP be-
came the single largest party in Taiwan’s legislature, following the De-
cember 2001 legislative election. In 2002, despite what he pledged on the 
first day of his presidency, Chen proposed hosting referendums on whether 
to change the status of cross-Strait relations and establish a new constitu-
tion. Chen first called for the “rectification of the name of Taiwan and the 
writing of Taiwan’s constitution” in a conference held by the World Fed-
eration Taiwanese Associations on March 17, 2002.71 Then on August 3, 
during a videoconference with the same organization, Chen said, “Taiwan 
and China are standing on opposite sides of the Strait, there is one country 
on each side (yibian yiguo).”72 He also called for the consideration of leg-
islation that would enable a referendum to decide the future of Taiwan. 
Chen’s pro-independence rhetoric went far beyond LEE Teng-hui’s “Two 
States Theory,” and, unsurprisingly, drew strong criticism from Beijing. 
As Richard Bush notes, “the yibian yiguo episode solidified China’s mis-
trust of him and its inclination to prepare for the worst.”73 Since that inci-
dent, cross-Strait relations continued on a downward spiral until the last 
day of Chen’s presidency in May 2008. 
In July 2002, the Chen administration decided to adopt a more ag-
gressive diplomatic approach vis-à-vis mainland China, a tactic commonly 
translated as “scorched-earth diplomacy.” Chen’s National Security Coun-
cil Secretary General CHIOU I-jen introduced the strategy during a 
closed-door meeting at the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fol-
lowing the meeting, Chiou’s words were leaked to the press, publicizing 
the island’s foreign policy strategy under Chen’s presidency. Chiou be-
lieved that Taiwan could light so many diplomatic fires (“set fire every-
where” was his phrasing) that Beijing would be deprived of the resources 
needed to harass Taiwan at regional forums. Chiou referred specifically to 
 69.  Su, Taiwan’s Relations, supra note 47, p. 117. 
 70.  Ibid.
 71.  Ibid, p. 182. 
 72.  Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005, pp. 69-70. 
 73.  Ibid.
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the October 2001 APEC summit in Shanghai where the top representative 
from “Chinese Taipei” was absent due to a dispute over Chen’s request to 
attend the summit in person.74 The “scorched-earth” strategy was designed 
to aggressively compete with P.R.C. diplomacy through diplomatic offen-
sives. High-level visits to as many countries as possible were planned un-
der the logic that “success will bring diplomatic breakthroughs; failure will 
win sympathy at home. Either way, Taiwan gains.”75
Chen’s diplomatic offensive began in Indonesia when Vice President 
of Taiwan, Annette Lu, paid a much-publicized visit to the country. On 
August 14, 2002, Lu flew to Bali via Jakarta, hoping to meet Indonesian 
officials in the capital of the country before her “vacation” in Bali. After a 
lengthy delay, followed by denied entry to Jakarta, Lu traveled to Bali and 
told reporters that she was visiting Indonesia on holiday and mainland 
China had no right to meddle with her personal travel plans. She said, 
“traveling is my basic right. Mainland China can persecute mainland Chi-
nese. It is not qualified and has no right to persecute others.”76 After spend-
ing two nights in Bali, Lu was allowed to return to the Indonesian capital 
on August 16. Although Taiwanese media reported that Lu met with Pres-
ident Megawati Sukarnoputri in Jakarta, Foreign Minister Hassan 
Wirajuda immediately denied having arranged any private or official 
meeting with Lu. The Indonesian government also reaffirmed the coun-
try’s support of a “one-China” policy. Lu’s first attempt at arranging a 
high-level meeting in Southeast Asia, therefore, was arguably a failed ex-
ample of Taipei’s “vacation diplomacy.” 
In the months following Lu’s unpleasant trip to Bali and Jakarta, Tai-
wan suffered another diplomatic blow. On December 15, 2002, a day after 
the Jakarta Post broke the story of President Chen’s plans to visit Indonesia 
for three days, Taipei was forced to abort the secretly-arranged trip at the 
last minute. Originally scheduled to visit Bali, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta, 
Chen planned to hold meetings including one with Yogyakarta Governor 
Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X.77 However, news of the meeting drew 
protests from Beijing, forcing Jakarta to adhere to the “one-China” policy 
again. Hassan Wirajuda then declared that he would not allow Chen to 
enter Indonesian territory for any reason. Indonesian Foreign Ministry 
Spokesman Marty Natalegawa also told reporters, “we have learned from 
the past that Taiwanese leaders often take political advantage of their pri-
vate visits to Indonesia’s tourist resorts,” adding that, “Chen Shui-bian is 
 74.  Su, Taiwan’s Relations, supra note 47, p. 183. 
 75.  Ibid.
 76.  “Taiwan’s VP flies into Jakarta row,” BBC News, August 15, 2002. 
 77.  “Economic sanctions depend on Jakarta’s response, says Taipei,” The China Post, De-
cember 19, 2002. 
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not welcomed here.”78 The reactions and comments from the Indonesian 
government illustrated the increasingly difficult conditions Taiwan’s dip-
lomatic offensive would encounter in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, 
leaders in ASEAN were unwilling to be used by Chen for his own political 
gain.79  They astutely observed the deterioration of cross-Strait relations 
and avoided the diplomatic fires Chen’s aggressive foreign policy was set-
ting. On the other hand, ASEAN leaders were influenced by mainland 
China as it became more assertive and confident in expanding its engage-
ment with the region in the early 2000s. Mainland China’s economic clout 
in ASEAN countries rose after the 1997 Asian financial crisis when it be-
came the number one trading partner for many Southeast Asian countries. 
Consequently, while similar pressures from mainland China were not al-
ways effective in blocking high-level visits between Taiwan and ASEAN 
during the 1990s, Beijing’s growing regional influence effectively shrank 
Taipei’s international maneuverability, reducing the island’s diplomatic 
opportunities in ASEAN countries at the beginning of the 21st century. 
In the early 2000s, in accordance with the 1997 “ASEAN-China Co-
operation Towards the 21st Century” joint statement, mainland China con-
tinued strengthening mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation with 
ASEAN by building on previously existing structures.80 On November 4, 
2002, mainland China and ASEAN signed two new agreements: the Dec-
laration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the Joint 
Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-
Traditional Security Issues.81 The non-traditional security issues referred 
to illegal drug trafficking, people-smuggling and the trafficking of women 
and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling, money-laundering, 
international economic crime, and cybercrime. ASEAN and mainland 
China agreed to address the problems that “have become important factors 
of uncertainty affecting regional and international security and are posing 
new challenges to regional and international peace and stability.”82 In con-
trast, Taiwan, was completely excluded from these regional cooperation 
mechanisms. 
 78.  Deborah Kuo, “Taiwan Lodges Protest Against Indonesian Foreign Minister’s Re-
marks,” Central News Agency, December 17, 2002. 
 79.  Su, Taiwan’s Relations, supra note 47, p. 184. 
 80.  Jie Chen, “Taiwan’s Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Still Going-South?” in Khai Leong 
Ho, Samuel Ku, eds., China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges,
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p. 250. 
 81.  See the full text of the joint declaration at http://www.asean.org/?static_post=joint-dec-
laration-of-asean-and-china-on-cooperation-in-the-field-of-non-traditional-security-issues-6th-
asean-china-summit-phnom-penh-4-november-2002-5. 
 82.  Ibid.
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In November 2001, mainland China and ASEAN announced their in-
tent to create a free trade area (FTA) within the decade, aimed at creating 
the world’s largest FTA and covering 1.7 billion consumers. In November 
2002, during the Eighth ASEAN-China Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambo-
dia, ASEAN leaders and Chinese Premier ZHU Rongji signed a Frame-
work Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation. This frame-
work provided the legal basis for ASEAN and mainland China to negotiate 
further agreements, leading to the creation of the ASEAN-China Free 
Trade Area (ACFTA) in January 2010.83 The agreement went into force 
on July 1, 2003, becoming the first FTA that ASEAN concluded with an 
external party.84 According to Vincent Wang, ACFTA was essential for 
mainland China’s “peaceful rise” – the foreign policy strategy promoted 
by President HU Jintao and Premier WEN Jiabao from late 2003 to early 
2004.85 Wang argues that the ACFTA helped to cultivate goodwill among 
mainland China’s neighbors, maintain peace and security in the region, 
defuse U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, and secure important markets and 
raw materials needed for mainland China’s economic security.86  South-
east Asian countries also viewed the signing of the FTA with mainland 
China as in their national interests and a rational step toward benefiting 
from mainland China’s burgeoning domestic markets. After the P.R.C.’s 
accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, 
ASEAN foresaw the benefits that would arise from the phasing-in of main-
land China’s pledged economic liberalization. ASEAN also perceived the 
ACFTA as a catalyst that would accelerate their integration into the AFTA 
and a stratagem to engage larger trading partners such as Japan and the 
United States.87
On October 8, 2003, during ASEAN’s Ninth Summit, both mainland 
China and India acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC). Accession to the TAC, which was first negotiated in 1976 and sub-
sequently amended to allow non-regional countries to accede, is seen not 
only as a symbol of ASEAN’s emphasis on multilateral processes, but also 
 83.  Wang, “China-ASEAN FTA,” supra note 31, p. 18. 
 84.  See the full text of the agreement at: http://www.asean.org/?static_post=framework-
agreement-on-comprehensive-economic-co-operation-between-asean-and-the-people-s-repub-
lic-of-china-phnom-penh-4-november-2002-4. 
 85.  Wang, “China-ASEAN FTA,” supra note 31, pp. 34-35. 
 86.  Ibid.
 87.  Ibid.
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as the signatory’s commitment to engagement in Southeast Asia.88 Imme-
diately after acceding to the TAC, mainland China and ASEAN also 
signed the Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China 
on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, seeking to further ex-
pand its influence in the region. While these initiatives did not end linger-
ing suspicions between mainland China and Southeast Asia – especially 
regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea – closer political, eco-
nomic, and cultural ties between ASEAN and mainland China certainly 
raised Beijing’s leverage in the region vis-à-vis Taipei. 
Facing the challenges of rising Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, 
an increasingly integrated ASEAN, and growing Taiwanese dependence 
on Chinese markets after each ascended into the WTO (for details, see 
Chapter III), the Chen administration resumed Lee’s “Go South” rhetoric 
in July 2002. During his speech at the annual Asia Taiwanese Chambers 
of Commerce (ASTCC) meeting – an organization established in 1993 by 
the Lee administration to expand ties with Southeast Asia – Chen pledged 
to rekindle the “Go South” policy. He called on Taiwan to strengthen eco-
nomic relations with Southeast Asia to reduce the island’s increasing eco-
nomic dependence on mainland China, a situation he believed could jeop-
ardize national security and weaken Taiwan’s position in future 
negotiations with mainland China.89 The Chen administration had actually 
already extended Lee’s “Go South” policy – the “Guidelines for Strength-
ening Economic and Trade Ties with Southeast Asia, New Zealand, and 
Australia”–from the end of 1999 to the end of 2003.90 However, Chen’s 
“Go South” rhetoric in 2002 signaled that Southeast Asia had become a 
huge priority in Chen’s foreign policy strategy. Interestingly, his “Go 
South” pledge emerged around the same time that his leadership brought 
up the terms “scorched-earth diplomacy” and “one country on each side.” 
Within that context, it is not surprising that Vice President Annette Lu 
chose a Southeast Asian country as the target of her first diplomatic offen-
sive in August 2002. 
Whether Lu’s visit to Indonesia should be considered an accomplish-
ment is debatable. However, during Chen’s first term, the “Go South” 
campaign experienced tangible achievements. For example, in October 
 88.  Mark E. Manyin, Michael John Garcia, and Wayne M. Morrison, “U.S. Accession to 
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC),” Library of Congress Congressional Re-
search Service, May 5, 2009. pp. 1-2. 
 89.  Chen, “Still Going-South?” supra note 80, p. 250.  
 90.  The guidelines were again renewed in 2004 and 2007 under Chen. The second phase 
of the guidelines were implemented from 1997 to 1999, the third phase from 2000 to 2003, the 
fourth from 2004 to 2006, and the fifth from 2007 to 2009.  
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2002, Brunei established its first representative office in Taiwan under the 
name “Brunei Darussalam Trade and Tourism Office.” In terms of high-
level visits, Taiwanese Minister of Economic Affairs LIN Yi-fu led trade 
and investment delegations to the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vi-
etnam between October 2002 and January 2003. During the visits, Lin also 
held ministerial level economic consultation meetings with his counter-
parts in Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam.91 In Thailand, Lin and Thai 
Minister of Industry Somsak Thepsutin held the first industrial coopera-
tion meeting between Taiwan and Thailand – the first ministerial-level 
meeting since their second bilateral economic consultation meeting in 
1991.92 In the Philippines, Lin also met Philippine President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo to discuss investment and migrant worker issues. 93
ASEAN leaders also reciprocated with high-level visits to Taiwan. 
Besides LEE Kuan Yew’s September 2002 trip to Taiwan, the Deputy Sec-
retary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat TRAN Duc Minh also visited 
the island in December 2002 to exchange views with Taiwanese officials 
regarding the latest AFTA developments.94 In 2004, the Chen administra-
tion received three cabinet leaders from the Philippines, including Secre-
tary of Interior and Local Government Angelo T. Reyes, Secretary of La-
bor and Employment Patricia Santo Tomas, and Secretary of Trade and 
Industry Cesar Purisima.95 Though the Chen administration made some 
strides in its “Go South” campaign, continued engagement remained 
highly restricted in the realm of economic affairs. As LEE Kuan Yew said 
at the World Economic Forum’s East Asia Summit in 2003, “let’s play 
economics as economics and let’s play politics as politics.”96 Concerned 
about pressure from Beijing and rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, 
ASEAN countries avoided touching upon political ties when they dealt 
with the Chen administration. It is clear that Chen’s diplomatic achieve-
ments in ASEAN were not as remarkable as LEE Teng-hui’s “Go South” 
attainments (discussed in the previous section). 
The reelection of CHEN Shui-bian on March 20, 2004 not only po-
larized Taiwanese society but also fueled regional tensions and raised se-
rious questions about Chen’s intentions to pursue de jure independence 
 91.  “Special Report: The Problems and Solutions of the Go South Policy,” MOEA, R.O.C., 
March 26, 2003, pp. 6-16; http://npl.ly.gov.tw/npl/report/920326/3.pdf.  
 92.  See the R.O.C. Bureau of Foreign Trade Yearbook 2002.  
 93.  “Special Report,” supra note 91, p. 16. 
 94.  Ibid, p. 8. 
 95.  See the R.O.C. Foreign Relations Yearbook 2004 at http://multilin-
gual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac/almanac2004/08/08_01_01.htm 
 96.  Edna Koh, “Taiwan wants to restart S’pore FTA talks,” The Straits Times, October 15, 
2003.
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during his second term. Facing instability across the Taiwan Strait, in the 
wake of Chen’s reelection, Singaporean leaders once again flew from the 
Strait of Malacca to Beijing and Taipei, respectively. In June 2004, Senior 
Minister LEE Kuan Yew visited Beijing to meet with HU Jintao and WEN 
Jiabao. During an interview with Singaporean newspaper Lianhe Zaobao,
Lee said Hu and Wen emphasized that Beijing would not watch idly as 
Taiwan moved towards independence. Lee also believed that no country 
in Southeast Asia or East Asia would encourage Taiwan to declare inde-
pendence.97
In the following month, Deputy Prime Minister LEE Hsien Loong of 
Singapore, the Prime-Minister-in-waiting and son of LEE Kuan Yew, paid 
a four-day visit to the island which drew Beijing’s ire. Unlike his father’s 
trips to Taiwan in 2000 and 2002, LEE Hsien Loong’s “private” visit to 
the island in 2004 provoked an extremely furious response from mainland 
China. Beijing asserted that intermediaries were not needed and a trip by 
Lee in any capacity to Taipei damaged relations between mainland China 
and Singapore.98 Given the rise of mainland China and its growing influ-
ence in the region in the early 2000s, mainland China’s assertiveness over 
Southeast Asia and Taiwan had grown even more salient by the middle of 
the decade. Even though Lee reiterated that his unofficial visit did not 
change or contradict Singapore’s consistent position of maintaining the 
“one-China” policy and opposing Taiwan independence, Beijing saw it as 
a violation of commitment to the “one-China” policy and requested Lee 
abort the trip.99 Consequences from Beijing’s disagreement came immedi-
ately during Lee’s visit when the Governor of the People’s Bank of China 
ZHOU Xiaochuan cancelled a trip to Singapore, where he had planned to 
give a lecture. According to SU Chi, Beijing also cancelled the Singapore 
Fireworks Festival scheduled to be held in Shanghai that year and put bi-
lateral free trade agreement negotiations with Singapore on hold.100
To defend his visit to Taipei, Lee hosted a question and answer ses-
sion with the Singaporean press immediately following his trip. Lee said 
his job was to see to the well-being of Singapore, which was dependent on 
a peaceful and stable regional environment. As the incoming Prime Min-
ister, and to better assess how the situation across the Taiwan Strait might 
evolve, Lee said he wanted to update himself on cross-Strait relations and 
 97.  Su, Taiwan’s Relations, supra note 47, p.253. 
 98.  “China fury at Singapore deputy PM trip to Taiwan,” Reuters, July 13, 2004.  
 99.  “Q&A with DPM Lee on his visit to Taiwan” Consulate-General of the Republic of 
Singapore, July 19, 2004; http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/shanghai/ar-
chive_press_statements/2004/200407/press_200407.html 
 100.  Su, Taiwan’s Relations, supra note 47, p.253. 
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understand first-hand how the Taiwanese observe their position.101
Against Chinese pressure, Lee went to Taiwan to meet Taiwanese leaders 
and U.S. representatives, including President Chen, KMT Chairman LIEN 
Chan, Taipei City Mayor MA Ying-jeou, and Director of the American 
Institute in Taiwan Douglas Paal. Lee perceived cross-Strait issues to be a 
potential flash point, arguing that “a conflict across the Strait will have 
dire consequences not just for the involved parties, but the entire region, 
and for many years.”102
On August 22, 2004, during his first National Day Rally speech as 
Prime Minister, Lee again explained his reasoning behind the Taipei visit 
and expressed his concerns about regional security. Beyond reaffirming 
Singapore’s stance on the “one-China” policy, Lee also stated that a real 
risk of miscalculation and mishap existed across the Taiwan Strait and that 
“if war breaks out across the Strait, we will be forced to choose between 
the two sides.” He then added that “as a friend of both sides, any decision 
is going to be painful, but if the conflict is provoked by Taiwan, then Sin-
gapore cannot support Taiwan.”103 Lee’s message stressed that he was op-
posed to Chen’s pursuit of Taiwan’s independence. Lee directly pointed 
out that “a move by Taiwan towards independence is neither in Singa-
pore’s interests nor in the region’s interests. If Taiwan goes for independ-
ence, Singapore will not recognize it. In fact, no Asian country is going to 
recognize it.”104
LEE Hsien Loong’s strong words on cross-Strait relations were 
clearly in opposition to Chen’s pro-independence ambitions. On top of 
that, Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo delivered a statement at 
the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2004, criticizing 
pro-independence forces in Taiwan. Yeo pointed out that “to push towards 
independence by certain groups in Taiwan is most dangerous because it 
will lead to war with mainland China and drag in other countries. At stake 
is the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region.”105 Yeo’s remarks drew a 
strong rebuke from Taiwanese Foreign Minister CHEN Tang-shan. Dur-
ing a meeting with a pro-independence group, Chen used a crude statement 
to describe  how Yeo had just been fawning over Beijing by criticizing 
Taipei. He continued, saying “even a country as large as a piece of dried 
 101.  “Q&A with DPM Lee,” supra note 99. 
 102.  Ibid, and “China fury at Singapore,” supra note 98.   
 103.  See LEE Hsien Loong’s speech at National Day Rally 2004, Singapore, August 22, 
2004; http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-html?filename=2004083101.htm. 
 104.  Ibid.
 105.  See George Yeo’s statement at the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly, New York, September 24, 2004; http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmis-
sion/newyork/archive/plenary/2004/200409/press_200409.html. 
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nasal mucus can swagger around to criticize Taiwan at the United Nations. 
Where is the justice in the world?”106 The spat between Singapore and 
Taiwan illustrated that CHEN Shui-bian’s “scorched-earth diplomacy” 
and pro-independence stance failed to strengthen Taiwan’s international 
standing. Instead, the Chen administration was burned by the fire they 
fueled when Taiwan lost the support of its long-time ally, Singapore. Los-
ing Singapore’s support turned the regional environment more hostile to-
ward Taiwan at the beginning of Chen’s second term. 
After his second inauguration in May 2004, Chen became further pre-
occupied with “Taiwanization” and Taiwan’s independence agendas. As a 
result, a large portion of Taiwan’s diplomatic resources were appropriated 
to support pro-independence policies. Taiwan’s drive for participation in 
the United Nations and the “rectification” of Taiwan’s name to alter any 
China-related name designations to Taiwan reflected the growth of Tai-
wanese identity. However, Chen’s initiatives neither generated support 
from ASEAN countries in Taiwan’s United Nations campaign nor did they 
encourage ASEAN countries to change the name of Taiwan’s representa-
tive offices in the region. Today, most of Taiwan’s offices in Southeast 
Asia remain under the name “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office.” 
Moreover, due primarily to Taipei’s insistence on using the name “Tai-
wan” as a signatory, the Chen administration failed to sign a free trade 
agreement with Singapore.107 In December 2005, the scope of regional ar-
chitecture expanded significantly through the establishment of the East 
Asia Summit (EAS). EAS members included ASEAN countries, Aus-
tralia, mainland China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand, later 
incorporating Russia and the United States in 2011. However, Taiwan con-
tinued to be even more marginalized in the Asia-Pacific as it was left out 
of the expanding regional architecture provided by the EAS. 
President Chen’s diplomatic frustrations were further exacerbated by 
his mere two visits to Southeast Asia, each made under the guise of “tech-
nical landings” in Indonesia, first in Bali in 2005 and in Batam in 2006, 
and lasting less than 24 hours. Because of the drastic deterioration of Tai-
wan-ASEAN relations, Southeast Asian politicians who visited Taipei 
during Chen’s second term were mostly congressional leaders rather than 
incumbent government officials.108 Chen’s confrontational approach to 
 106.  Laurence Eyton, “Behind the Taiwan-Singapore spat,” Asia Times Online, October 1, 
2004.
 107.  Su, Taiwan’s Relations, supra note 47, p.183, and Koh, “S’pore FTA talks,” supra note 
96.   
 108.  See the R.O.C. Foreign Relations Yearbooks from 2004 to 2008, 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/NewsNoHeadOnlyTi-
tle.aspx?n=19C2F1F943CBD946&page=2&PageSize=10 
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foreign policy and advancements toward independence for Taiwan not 
only failed to shore up diplomatic support from Southeast Asia but also 
put Taipei on a collision course with both Beijing and Washington.109 All 
in all, Chen’s diplomatic engagement with ASEAN was overshadowed by 
Beijing’s rising influence in the region and Chen’s controversial de jure
Taiwan independence policies, which increased political polarization on 
the island as well as diplomatic isolation abroad. 
D. MA Ying-jeou’s Viable Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (2008-
2016) 
In May 2008, MA Ying-jeou came to office determined to promote 
cross-Strait reconciliation and put an end to the confrontational foreign 
policy adopted by his predecessor CHEN Shui-bian. To leaders from 
Washington, Beijing, and in ASEAN capitals, Ma’s firm commitment to 
cross-Strait peace and regional stability came as a significant relief. Dur-
ing his first inaugural address, Ma emphasized that his administration 
would strive to maintain the cross-Strait status quo of “no unification, no 
independence, and no use of force” under the framework of the R.O.C. 
Constitution. He also claimed that both sides of the Taiwan Strait should 
resume negotiations based on the 1992 Consensus of “one China, respec-
tive interpretations.”110 In terms of Taiwan’s international space, Ma 
called for a “diplomatic truce” with mainland China in an effort to end 
longstanding practices of “checkbook diplomacy” – in which each side 
tries to lure the other’s allies to switch diplomatic recognition by offering 
large sums of foreign aid. Evidently, Ma attempted to transform cross-
Strait relations and Taiwan’s foreign relations from being perceived in a 
negative light to a more positive one, which was achieved through coop-
eration and collaboration rather than competition. 
Of course, no unilateral action on the part of Taiwan or mainland 
China can send cross-Strait relations on a positive trajectory. As HUNG 
Kwei-bo has put it, “it takes two to tango.”111 During the Boao Forum on 
Hainan Island in April 2008, the foundation for rationalizing cross-Strait 
economic relations was laid when Taiwanese Vice President-elect Vincent 
 109.  Dennis V. Hickey, “President Ma Ying-jeou and Taiwan’s Internal and External Chal-
lenges,” in Seyom Brown, Cal Clark, Hiroki Takeuchi, and Alex Tan, eds. Taiwan at a Turning 
Point, Baltimore, Maryland: Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 2009, p. 29. 
 110.  See the full text of Ma’s inaugural address in 2008 at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/tai-
wan/national/national-news/2008/05/21/157332/p3/Full-text.htm. 
 111.  Kwei-bo Huang, In Pursuit of Gradual Stabilization and Peace Dividends: Cross-Tai-
wan Strait Relations and Their Influence on the Asia Pacific, Baltimore: Maryland Series in 
Contemporary Asian Studies, 2011, p. 5. 
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Siew met with Chinese President HU Jintao on the sidelines of the confer-
ence to discuss a number of economic initiatives.112 Hu responded posi-
tively to President-elect Ma’s conciliatory approach to cross-Strait rela-
tions with his “four continuations” – continuing to promote cross-Strait 
economic and cultural cooperation, continuing to promote direct flights 
and mainland Chinese tourism to Taiwan, continuing to care for and safe-
guard the appropriate rights of the Taiwanese people, and continuing to 
encourage the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations.113 Upon this frame-
work and within a month of Ma’s inauguration, SEF-ARATS negotiations 
reconvened for the first time in a decade. On June 13, 2008, SEF Chairman 
CHIANG Pin-kung and ARATS President CHEN Yunlin signed a trans-
portation pact in Beijing that would allow regular “weekend charter 
flights” to cross the Taiwan Strait starting from July 2008. Chiang and 
Chen also agreed to the Cross-Strait Agreement on Travel by Mainland 
Residents to Taiwan, initially enabling up to 3,000 mainland Chinese tour-
ists to visit Taiwan each day for a maximum of ten days.114 Following the 
first “Chiang-Chen Talks” in Beijing, both sides met again in November 
2008 in Taipei and concluded four agreements for direct cross-Strait 
scheduled flights, direct cross-Strait sea shipping, direct cross-Strait postal 
services, and food safety.115
The rapid unfolding of cross-Strait rapprochement successfully 
turned this former East Asian flashpoint into a peaceful Strait. This devel-
opment was quickly applauded by ASEAN leaders. At the 41st ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on July 21, 2008, Foreign Ministers of 
the ten ASEAN countries issued a joint communique, stating, “We wel-
comed the positive development in relations across the Taiwan Strait. We 
expressed our hope that cross-Strait relations would continue to im-
prove.”116 Compared to the escalating tensions across the Strait during 
President Chen’s era, President Ma’s cross-Strait policy undoubtedly alle-
viated regional security concerns among ASEAN countries. 
This positive reaction from the ASEAN foreign ministers appeared 
to justify Ma’s “viable diplomacy” – an approach of warming ties with 
mainland China while expanding Taiwan’s role in the international arena. 
 112.  Hickey, “President Ma Ying-jeou,” supra note 109, p, 33.  
 113.  “MM Lee says Taiwan unlikely to enjoy more int’l space, despite easing China-Taiwan 
tension,” Channel NewsAsia, May 9, 2008. 
 114.  The terms of the agreement were further softened in early 2009. See Hickey, “President 
Ma Ying-jeou,” supra note 109, P, 33, and Huang, Peace Dividends, supra note 111, p. 7. 
 115.  Huang, Peace Dividends, supra note 111, pp. 8-9. 
 116.  See the full text of the joint communique at http://www.asean.org/?static_post=joint-
communique-of-the-41st-asean-ministerial-meeting-one-asean-at-the-heart-of-dynamic-asia-
singapore-21-july-2008-2. 
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During his eight-year presidency, Ma had argued many times that his for-
eign policy, based on a “sincere, low-key, principled, and surprise-free ap-
proach,” successfully transformed Taiwan’s global image “from a trouble-
maker to a peacemaker, and from a liability to an asset.”117 Ma’s modus 
vivendi strategy generally received positive responses from Southeast 
Asia. For example, when then-Philippine Secretary of Finance Margarito 
Teves visited Taipei in March 2009, he said that”it was possible for Tai-
wan to join the ASEAN family in the future as long as its government 
continues to adopt a non-confrontational policy with China and to 
strengthen a barrier-free and close economic cooperation with East Asian 
countries.”118 Moreover, Taiwanese diplomats in Southeast Asia appeared 
to have had greater access to high-ranking officials in the region after Ma 
took office. Former Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council Andrew 
Hsia, who served as Taiwan’s Representative to Indonesia from 2009 to 
2013, said that he was able to meet most of the ministers of the Indonesian 
cabinet as the top envoy from Taipei. He attributed improved Taiwan-In-
donesia relations to cross-Strait reconciliation.119
Ma’s vision of Taiwan-ASEAN relations was one of ambition. Dur-
ing an international press conference on his first day in the office, Ma pro-
posed forming an “ASEAN Plus Four” forum. He pointed out that Taiwan 
was left out in the regional economic integration as ASEAN had already 
signed FTAs and started negotiating details with mainland China in 2002 
(ASEAN-China Free Trade Area), South Korea in 2005 (ASEAN-Korea 
Free Trade Area), and Japan in 2008 (ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership). Given Taiwan’s trade-dependent economy and large 
investment presence in ASEAN, Ma said it was Taiwan’s ultimate goal to 
be included in the economic integration between Southeast Asia and 
Northeast Asia, adding that “if we can have ASEAN Plus Three, why not 
ASEAN Plus Four?”120 Concerned about the island’s marginalized role in 
the regional architecture, Vice President Vincent Siew also said that Tai-
wan should strive to become a dialogue partner with ASEAN.121
 117.  “Retrospective on and Prospects for Viable Diplomacy,” President Ma’s address to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. June 26, 2015; http://www.taiwan.gov.tw/pub-
lic/Data/512791371.pdf. 
 118.  “Philippine minister says “possible” for Taiwan to join ASEAN framework,” BBC 
Monitoring Asia Pacific, March 27, 2009.   
 119.  Author’s interview with Andrew Hsia, Taipei, Taiwan, March 30, 2016. 
 120.  Vincent Low Seng Guan, “President Ma Ying-jeou again proposes ASEAN+4 (Tai-
wan),” Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies, May 22, 2008.  
 121.  “Vice President voices hope for Taiwan’s inclusion in ASEAN,” Central News Agency,
July 30, 2008. 
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In order to achieve these goals, Ma actively lobbied political leaders 
from ASEAN such as Philippine Senator Francis Escudero.122 In late 2008, 
Ma also instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to establish an 
ASEAN task force – a strategic inter-agency group that reports on ASEAN 
affairs to the National Security Council before making suggestions to the 
president. Former Foreign Minister Francisco Ou stressed that the estab-
lishment of the task force on ASEAN was a clear indication that, under 
Ma’s “viable diplomacy” strategy, Taiwan’s diplomacy in the region 
would be more proactive and pragmatic as opposed to passive and inac-
tive.123 In addition to the task force, MOFA in October 2009 set up an 
ASEAN-focused think tank, the Taiwan ASEAN Studies Center (TASC), 
under the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. Moreover, as 
suggested by Foreign Minister Timothy Yang, MOFA in 2012 created the 
ASEAN Affairs Section under its Department of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs.124 While the existing Southeast Asian Affairs Section focused on 
bilateral issues with the ten ASEAN countries, the newly-founded ASEAN 
Affairs Section worked primarily on multilateral issues in Southeast Asia 
such as the South China Sea, ASEAN regional architecture, and regional 
economic integration, such as exploring the feasibility of joining the Re-
gional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).125 These initiatives 
illustrated the elevated status of ASEAN in Ma’s foreign policy agenda. 
Therefore, despite the fact that Ma never used the term “Go South” 
during his presidency – not least because of its political implication that 
Taiwan’s investment and trade should avoid “going west” to mainland 
China – his foreign policy intrinsically emphasized enhancing ties with 
ASEAN countries.126 Besides the aforementioned initiatives led by 
MOFA, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) continued to imple-
ment the fifth “Guidelines for Strengthening Economic and Trade Ties 
with Southeast Asia, New Zealand, and Australia” passed by the Chen 
administration in 2007. In 2010, MOEA changed the name of the policy 
back to the “Guidelines for Strengthening Economic and Trade Ties 
 122.  “Taiwan wants free trade ties with ASEAN: president,” Central News Agency, July 15, 
2008.
 123.  “MOFA to set up a special unit on ASEAN,” Central News Agency, September 14, 
2008.
 124.  Author’s interview with Timothy Yang, Taipei, Taiwan, April 1, 2016. 
 125.  RCEP is a proposed FTA between the ten ASEAN member countries and Australia, 
mainland China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. The negotiations were launched 
in November 2012.  
 126.  Kwei-bo Huang and Rong-hui Chou, “The Retrospect and Influence of Taiwan’s 
“Southward Policy”,” Zhan-wang yu tan-suo (Prospect & Exploration), Vol. 12, No. 8 (August 
2014), pp. 67-69. 
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with Southeast Asia,” signaling the government’s focus on forging 
stronger trade and investment relations with ASEAN.127
Despite Ma’s initiatives, Taiwan’s inclusion in the regional architec-
ture still hinged on cross-Strait ties as well as decisions made in mainland 
China. Taipei’s efforts to establish ties with ASEAN as a whole were heav-
ily clouded by Beijing’s strong influence in the region. As LEE Kuan Yew 
pointed out in May 2008, “an ASEAN-Taiwan agreement is not easy be-
cause ASEAN functions on consensus and there are several ASEAN mem-
bers that maintain strong ties with China. They will not want to displease 
China.”128 Lee also asserted that Taiwan was unlikely to be included in the 
ASEAN dialogues becase the issues discussed included security and po-
litical affairs, issues Beijing did not want Taiwan to get involved in. From 
mainland China’s perspective, these topics were reserved for sovereign 
states. In a similar vein, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan, 
hinted during the Fourteenth ASEAN Summit in March 2009 that Tai-
wan’s pursuit of free trade pacts with ASEAN would face challenges due 
to the “one-China” policy. He said, “The ball is in Taiwan and China’s 
court,” meaning ASEAN countries were willing to work towards free trade 
pacts with Taipei; however, the onus would fall on Taiwan and mainland 
China to ascertain a way of cooperation so that ASEAN members could 
engage with both sides without reneging on the “one-China” policy.129
Former Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar also argued that if 
Taiwan wanted to join the ASEAN Plus Three, Taiwan would have to first 
address political issues with mainland China.130
On the bilateral economic side, the mainland China factor also ob-
structed Taiwan’s efforts to negotiate trade pacts with Southeast Asian 
countries such as Singapore and the Philippines. In the case of Singapore, 
LEE Kuan Yew stressed that “Singapore-Taiwan relations should not de-
velop faster than Taiwan’s ties with mainland China.” Based on this posi-
tion, Lee argued that “Singapore will only be able to sign a FTA with Tai-
wan if Taiwan improves its relations with mainland China.”131 Clearly, 
Beijing would not tolerate seeing its diplomatic allies sign FTAs with Tai-
wan before concluding its own agreement with Taiwan. 
 127.  The Ma administration implemented the sixth phase of the Guidelines from 
2010 to 2012 and the seventh phase from 2014 to 2016. 
 128.  Jay Chen, Charles Kang, and Y.F. Low, “Taiwan FTA hinges on cross-strait ties: Sin-
gapore minister mentor,” Central News Agency, May 8, 2008.  
 129.  “Taiwan to pursue closer trade ties with ASEAN states – ministry,” BBC Monitoring 
Asia Pacific. March 1, 2009. 
 130.  “Ma hopes ECFA will help ties with ASEAN,” The China Post. December 17, 2009.  
 131.  Chen, et el, “Taiwan FTA” supra note 128. 
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In order to pass these political hurdles, the Ma administration endeav-
ored to negotiate a free trade deal with mainland China during the first 
year of Ma’s tenure. In June 2010, representatives of SEF and ARATS 
successfully signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) during the fourth “Chiang-Chen Talks” in Chongqing. Despite 
opposition from the DPP, the ECFA was ratified by the Legislative Yuan 
in August 2010 and went into effect in September 2010. As Taipei ex-
pected, the signing of ECFA instantly led to the resumption of talks on a 
FTA-like agreement between Taipei and Singapore in August 2010. After 
three years of negotiations, the two Asian Tigers finally signed the Agree-
ment between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP) on No-
vember 7, 2013 – the first and, so far, the only FTA-like agreement that 
Taiwan has achieved with ASEAN countries. Meanwhile, Taipei and New 
Zealand signed the Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic 
Cooperation (ANZTEC) on July 10, 2013. Both ASTEP and ANZTEC 
exemplified the Ma administration’s breakthroughs in concluding eco-
nomic cooperation deals with Asia-Pacific countries following the ECFA, 
which seemingly relaxed Beijing’s attitude towards Taiwan’s trade nego-
tiations with other countries.132
The successful FTA-like negotiations with Singapore and New Zea-
land encouraged Taipei to pursue economic cooperation deals with its 
trading partners in the region rather than with ASEAN as a group. In the 
words of Rodolfo Severino, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, “Tai-
wan would do well to seek to strike deals with individual ASEAN coun-
tries, rather than with ASEAN as a group, on the basis of the WTO frame-
work and whatever template emerges from its discussion with 
Singapore.”133 On the one hand, Taiwan would have a better chance to 
avoid being economically marginalized in the region. On the other hand, 
“ASEAN countries would hopefully have the benefit of increased trade 
and investments from Taiwan-based companies without incurring prob-
lems with Beijing.”134 Taking into account the geopolitical situation and 
calculation described by Severino, the Ma administration was likely to 
 132.  Joshua Meltzer, “Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and the Im-
portance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Brookings Institution. January 2014, p. 9; 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/09/30-taiwan-trans-pacific-partnership-melt-
zer.
 133.  Rodolfo C. Severino, “ECFA not the Way for Taiwan, ASEAN,” The Straits times,
August 31, 2010. 
 134.  Ibid.
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tone down rhetoric on “ASEAN Plus Four” and becoming a dialogue part-
ner of ASEAN from 2011 onwards, as indicated from a lack of formal 
open-source statements. Instead, Ma prioritized negotiating bilateral eco-
nomic cooperation agreements (ECAs) – a type of FTA-like agreement 
that is similar to the ones Taiwan signed with Singapore and New Zealand 
– with Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, especially after 
the conclusion of ASTEP with Singapore in 2013. 
However, the progress of Taiwan’s ECAs with ASEAN countries 
still hinged on the development of cross-Strait relations. In March 2014, 
student protestors from the Sunflower Movement took over the Legislative 
Yuan to protest the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, which was 
signed by the SEF and the ARATS in June 2013 in Shanghai. The protest-
ers – mostly undergraduate students – questioned the procedure and sub-
stance of the agreement, calling the pact a “Black Box” and arguing that it 
would make Taiwan vulnerable to mainland Chinese political influence. 
The impact of the Sunflower Movement has been extensive: not only have 
efforts by Taiwan to further liberalize its trade with mainland China fal-
tered but the island’s endeavors to ink trade deals with ASEAN countries 
have also lost momentum as well. Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and 
Manila have been more cautious with the pace of trade negotiations with 
Taipei since the Sunflower Movement.135  The ECA feasibility studies, 
jointly conducted by non-governmental think tanks in Taiwan and the re-
spective countries, were completed with Indonesia in December 2012, 
Thailand in July 2013, Malaysia in March 2014, and the Philippines in 
September 2014; however, none of these countries concluded an ECA with 
Taiwan within the last two years of Ma’s tenure. 
In spite of the domestic and external obstacles to Taiwan’s attempt to 
sign FTA-like agreements with ASEAN countries, the Ma administration 
made strides in enhancing Taiwan-ASEAN ties under the banner of viable 
diplomacy. In addition to the signing of ASTEP with Singapore, Ma’s tan-
gible achievements in the region included opening the first-ever repre-
sentative office, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, in Myanmar in 
March 2016, establishing the Taipei Economic and Trade Office in Sura-
baya, Indonesia in December 2015, setting up the semi-official Taiwan 
External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) office in Yangon, My-
anmar in November 2013, adding Malaysia and Indonesia to the visa-
waiver program already authorized by Singapore, and reaching electronic 
visa service deals with the Philippines and Myanmar in favor of Taiwanese 
 135.  A similar view was expressed by LIN Chu-chia, see “Lin: Taiwan needs to speed up to 
go out,” China Times, April 9, 2014; http://www.chinatimes.com/realtime-
news/20140409002522-260407. 
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short-term travelers. The Ma administration also facilitated ministerial-
level consultation talks with ASEAN countries, although most kept ex-
tremely low-profile and unpublicized. In terms of bilateral agreements, the 
Ma administration signed a total of 36 agreements with Southeast Asian 
countries, enhancing cooperation in education, transportation, agriculture, 
fishery, tourism, immigration, anti-human trafficking, and anti-crime.136
Ma also traveled to Singapore for the first time since assuming the 
presidency to pay respects to the late Minister Mentor LEE Kuan Yew 
after Lee passed away in March 2015. He traveled to Singapore for the 
second time in November 2015 to meet with Prime Minister LEE Hsien 
Loong after his historic meeting with XI Jinping. LEE Hsien Loong even 
posted the photo of him and Ma on his Facebook page, directly addressing 
Ma by President. He wrote, “Caught up with President Ma Ying-jeou over 
tea this evening. Glad his meeting here went well. Hope this will lead to 
greater stability and prosperity for the region.”137 The preceding meeting 
in Singapore was in 1989 when LEE Teng-hui visited LEE Kuan Yew in 
the city-state and was received as the “President from Taiwan.” 
Besides Ma’s visits to Singapore, there were a number of high-level 
exchange visits between officials from Taiwan and ASEAN countries. The 
ministerial-level officials that the Ma administration had received included 
Philippine Secretaries of Trade and Industry Peter Favila and Gregory Do-
mingo, Philippine Secretary of Energy Angelo Reyes, Philippine Secretary 
of Finance Margarito Teves, Philippine Secretary of Labor and Employ-
ment Marianito Roque, Indonesian Minister of Manpower and Transmi-
gration Muhaimin Iskandar, Malaysian Minister of Science, Technology 
and Innovation Maximus Ongkili, and Thai Minister of Labor Cha-
lermchai Sri-on. Several former ASEAN leaders such as LEE Kuan Yew, 
Mahathir Mohamad, and Fidel Ramos also traveled to Taiwan during Ma’s 
presidency. As for Taiwanese ministers’ publicized visits to the region, 
Ministers of Economic Affair YIIN Chii-ming, SHIH Yen-shiang, and 
John Deng visited Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Phil-
ippines; Ministers of Foreign Affairs Timothy Yang and David Lin visited 
Malaysia and Myanmar; and Ministers of Finance LEE Sush-der and 
CHANG Sheng-ford visited Vietnam. Reciprocal high-level government 
officials’ visits under President Ma clearly outnumbered those under Pres-
ident Chen. 
Ma often attributed these diplomatic breakthroughs to peaceful cross-
Strait relations grounded in the 1992 Consensus. When interviewed by 
 136.  Author’s correspondence with an official from MOFA, R.O.C.; and see MOFA’s 
Treaty and Agreement Database at http://no06.mofa.gov.tw/mofatreatys/IndexE.aspx.   
 137.  See LEE Hsien Loong’s Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/leehsienloong. 
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CNN anchorwoman Christiane Amanpour on March 24, 2016, Ma argued 
that “the peaceful development of cross-Strait ties have a spillover effect.” 
He said cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s relations with ASEAN coun-
tries, the United States, Japan, and the European Union reinforce each 
other; therefore, “the 1992 Consensus is not just between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait, it also has fundamental international significance.” 
Ma’s points were cogent, at least with respect to ASEAN. It is in ASEAN’s 
interests to see stable cross-Strait relations, as it would allow ASEAN 
countries to engage and cooperate with Taipei with lower risks of antago-
nizing Beijing. This, to a certain degree, explained why Singapore was 
willing to host the unprecedented Ma-Xi meeting in 2015. LEE Hsien 
Loong, like his father LEE Kuan Yew, was also supportive of the use of 
the “1992 Consensus” to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait. In this 
sense, providing a platform for Ma and Xi to highlight that the 1992 Con-
sensus was the foundation for both sides to cooperate was a gain for Sin-
gapore because it promoted cross-Strait stability. The Ma-Xi meeting also 
illustrated Ma’s policy of “mutual non-recognition of sovereignty, and 
mutual non-denial of governing authority,” which he had actively advo-
cated since his second inaugural address on May 20, 2012.138 During an 
interview with the Wall Street Journal on March 29, 2016, LEE Hsien 
Loong said that the basis for cross-Strait progression was the “constructive 
ambiguity” in the 1992 Consensus. However, Lee was concerned about 
the DPP’s stance on the 1992 Consensus, asserting, “there is now ambigu-
ity about that ambiguity. So, that puts the whole edifice in question.”139
In her inaugural address on May 20, 2016, President TSAI Ing-wen 
said she respected the historical fact that “in 1992, the two institutions rep-
resenting each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), through communi-
cation and negotiation, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and un-
derstandings.” She also pledged to “conduct cross-Strait affairs in 
accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing 
Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and 
other relevant legislation.” The references to the “areas,” as Richard Bush 
notes, “could be taken to imply that they are part of the same country and 
 138.  See the full text of Ma’s inaugural address in 2012 at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/tai-
wan/national/national-news/2012/05/21/341720/Full-text.htm. 
 139.  “PM Lee Hsien Loong’s interview with Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on 29 March 2016,” 
Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore; http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/pm-lee-hsien-loongs-
interview-wall-street-journal-wsj#eight. 
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so satisfy Beijing.”140 Despite her ambiguous position on the 1992 Con-
sensus, Tsai’s remarks represent further attempts to reassure Beijing that 
she seeks positive cross-Strait relations. However, Tsai’s policies will con-
tinue to be challenged by Beijing’s decisions on which cross-Strait com-
munications will be cut off, how to handle Taiwan’s international space, 
and how to manage the unofficial aspects of its peaceful development pol-
icy.141 As David Brown and Kevin Scott have argued, Beijing’s “choices 
will be shaped by the conflict between its interests in treating a govern-
ment that does not accept its core principles differently from one that does, 
while still pursuing its interest in cultivating good will among the people 
of Taiwan.”142 Thus, Tsai will have to strive to develop a set of feasible 
policies that can maintain the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait and 
strengthen economic and political ties with Southeast Asia. 
In addition to cross-Strait relations, at the center of the current geo-
political struggle lied the sovereign disputes over the islands and waters in 
the South China Sea, as well as the mega-trading blocs Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (TPP) and RCEP.143 In regards to the South China Sea issue, Ma 
had emphasized Taiwan’s sovereignty and effective control over Taiping 
Island (Itu Aba) – the largest naturally-occurring island feature in the 
South China Sea’s highly contested Spratly group. In January 2016, Ma 
flew to Taiping to demonstrate that it was a self-sufficient island capable 
of sustaining human habitation and economic life and therefore, based on 
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), was entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Ma’s visit 
highlighted the R.O.C.’s claim that Taiping was an “island” rather than a 
“rock,” which would not generate its own EEZ, as the lawyer from the 
Philippine side claimed during the hearing of Philippine’s South China Sea 
arbitration case against mainland China. 
Taking advantage of the global attention on his first visit to Taiping 
Island as the Taiwanese President, Ma presented his South China Sea 
Peace Initiative Roadmap, calling for “creating a cooperation and devel-
opment mechanism with equal participation and resource sharing among 
 140.  Richard Bush, “Tsai’s inauguration in Taiwan: It could have been worse,” The Brook-
ings Institution, May 23, 2016; http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-
chaos/posts/2016/05/23-tsai-ing-wen-inauguration-taiwan-bush. 
 141.  See David G. Brown and Kevin Scott, “China-Taiwan Relations: Taiwan Sets a New 
Direction,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 18, No. 1 (May 2016), p. 74. 
 142.  Ibid.
 143.  TPP is a free trade agreement signed on February 4, 2016, among twelve countries, 
including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Sin-
gapore, the United States, and Vietnam. 
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all parties concerned in the region.”144 Ma’s “roadmap” was based on his 
South China Sea Peace Initiative introduced at the International Law As-
sociation - American Society of International Law (ILA-ASIL) Asia-Pa-
cific Research Forum in Taipei on May 26, 2015. The initiative focused 
on respecting the principles of UNCLOS, ensuring freedom of navigation, 
and setting aside sovereignty issues in favor of collaborative development 
in the South China Sea. Over the past two decades, Taiwan was only in-
vited to join the “track-two” Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts 
in the South China Sea initiated by Indonesia and funded by Canada. 
Given Taiwan’s lack of participation in regional negotiations and consul-
tations relating to the South China Sea, Ma’s visit was arguably an effec-
tive measure to increase the visibility of Taiwan’s role as both an im-
portant claimant and a supporter for peaceful resolution of disputes in the 
South China Sea. To secure Taiwan’s national interests, it is crucial for the 
TSAI Ing-wen administration to continue reinforcing Taiwan’s sovereign 
claim over Taiping Island while lobbying ASEAN countries for Taiwan’s 
involvement in negotiations and activities in the South China Sea. As Lynn 
Kuok analyzed, Taiwan’s inclusion in code of conduct negotiations, even 
just as an observer or guest, “is a pragmatic and necessary way of manag-
ing conflict of the South China Sea.”145
In terms of the TPP and RCEP, Taiwan has been seeking membership 
in both in order to better participate in regional economic integration. As 
the Ma administration often stressed, the members of the TPP and RCEP 
accounted for 35 percent and 57 percent of Taiwan’s external trade in 
2014, respectively. In sum, they accounted for 70 percent of the island’s 
total trade, which indicates that Taiwan’s major trading partners will be-
come even more economically integrated once these agreements come to 
effect.146 Facing this challenge, Taiwan’s bid to participate in the TPP and 
RCEP has bipartisan consensus on the island. However, Taiwan’s inclu-
sion in these multilateral trade agreements is a function of decisions made 
in Beijing. Mainland China is driving RCEP and holds significant eco-
nomic and political influence over signatories in the U.S.-backed TPP, 
particularly Malaysia and Brunei.147 This strategic reality facing the Tsai 
 144.  Shannon Tiezzi, “From South China Sea Island, Taiwan’s President Presents 
‘Roadmap’ for Peace,” The Diplomat, January 29, 2016; http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/from-
south-china-sea-island-taiwans-president-presents-roadmap-for-peace/. 
 145.  Lynn Kuok, “Tides of Change: Taiwan’s evolving position in the South China Sea and 
why other actors should take notice,” The Brookings Institution, May 22, 2015, pp.17-20.  
 146.  “President Ma meets Professor Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy at National University of Singapore,” News Release, Office of the President, 
R.O.C., November 27, 2014; http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?ta-
bid=491&itemid=33801&rmid=2355. 
 147.  Jing, “Ma-Xi meeting,” supra note 68. 
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administration will result in an uphill struggle to form feasible policies that 
will allow Taiwan to participate in the regional economic integration of 
the Asia-Pacific. 
III.  TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC TIES WITH SOUTHEAST         
ASIAN COUNTRIES 
This chapter evaluates the development of Taiwan-ASEAN eco-
nomic relations over the past three decades, focusing on three major com-
ponents: investment, trade, and labor cooperation. Section A examines the 
evolution of Taiwan’s investment footprint in Southeast Asia from the 
1980s to the present. Section B analyzes Taiwan’s trade linkages with 
ASEAN countries and their weight in the island’s overall trade portfolio. 
Both sections also assess how Taiwan’s “Go South” policy affected in-
vestment and trade relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asia, analyz-
ing especially the effects under the LEE Teng-hui presidency. Lastly, Sec-
tion C discusses migrant labor ties between Taiwan and Southeast Asian 
countries – particularly Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
This chapter provides policy recommendations for strengthening these 
three major linkages to forge stronger Taiwan-ASEAN economic rela-
tions. 
A. Taiwan’s Investment in Southeast Asia 
Taiwan has long been an active and major investor in Southeast Asia. 
In the late 1980s, the island had already successfully transformed itself 
into one of Asia’s newly industrialized economies (NIEs), becoming one 
of the “Four Asian Tigers,” along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and South 
Korea. The effective implementation of import substitution industrializa-
tion (ISI) in the 1950s and export-led industrialization (EOI) in the 1960s 
and 1970s under CHIANG Ching-kuo’s leadership contributed not only to 
remarkably fast industrial growth in Taiwan but also to the island’s huge 
trade surplus and continued possession of one of the world’s largest for-
eign-exchange reserves since the 1980s.148
This economic development, however, drew complaints from the 
United States about its trade deficit with Taiwan, creating political pres-
sure on the island to allow the New Taiwan dollar (NTD) to appreciate. 
The pressure eventually drove the Central Bank of the Republic of China 
(CBC) to loosen foreign exchange market interventions in 1986, allowing 
 148.  By 1987, Taiwan’s foreign currency reserve had reached US$76.7 billion, the second 
largest reserve in the world at that time. See John Q. Tian, Government, Business, and the Poli-
tics of Interdependence and Conflict across the Taiwan Strait, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006, p. 65. 
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the value of the NTD to appreciate against the U.S. dollar (USD).149 The 
USD to NTD exchange rate rapidly declined from 1 to 37.84 in 1986 to 1 
to 26.41 in 1989, reaching a record low of 1 to 25.16 in 1992.150 In other 
words, in the span of six years, the NTD appreciated approximately 50 
percent against the USD, which posed a challenge to Taiwan’s export in-
dustries and incentivized its businesses to invest in production capabilities 
overseas. In this context, Southeast Asia became a popular region for Tai-
wanese outgoing investment not only because of its geographic proximity 
to Taiwan but also because of its rich endowments in natural resources, 
labor supply, and spacious industrial land. These economic characteristics 
complemented Taiwan’s abundant capital, managerial skills, and technical 
expertise which developed along with Taiwan’s rapid economic growth in 
the second half of the twentieth century.151
Aside from the drastic appreciation of Taiwan’s currency, an ex-
panded Taiwanese business presence in Southeast Asia was simultane-
ously prompted by internal factors such as Taiwan’s skyrocketing land 
prices, robust labor unions, and surging labor costs.152 In 1984, Taiwan’s 
government introduced the Labor Standards Law, protecting worker’s 
rights for the first time. Subsequently, the labor pension fund was launched 
in 1986, significantly raising the cost of labor on the island.153 Unfavorable 
labor and land costs were compounded by mounting public concern over 
the effects of industrial pollution on the environment, making Taiwan’s 
domestic business environment hostile to labor-intensive industries.154 In 
light of these challenges in Taiwan and the aforementioned favorable fac-
tor endowments in Southeast Asia, a large number of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing industries moved their operations 
from Taiwan to ASEAN countries after 1987 – the year the CBC relaxed 
its foreign exchange controls on capital movements.155
These factors drove the expansion of Taiwan’s outbound investment 
five to six years prior to the official launch of President LEE Teng-hui’s 
 149.  Jia-Dong Shea, “Taiwan’s Foreign Exchange Policy,” April 28, 2014, pp.10-11; 
http://www.econ.sinica.edu.tw/. 
 150.  See “Foreign Exchange Rates of New Taiwan dollar, Hong Kong dollar, and 
Renminbi,” Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, No. 120, Table 46, August 2002, Main-
land Affairs Council, R.O.C; 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=57684&ctNode=5720&mp=1&xq_xCat=2002.  
 151.  Chen, “Still Going-South?” supra note 80, p. 233. 
 152.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 109. 
 153.  San Gee, “The Effects of NT Dollar Variations on Taiwan’s Trade Flows,” in Takatoshi 
Ito and Anne O. Krueger, eds., Macroeconomic Linkage: Savings, Exchange Rates, and Capital 
Flows, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 96. 
 154.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, pp.105-108. 
 155.  See CBC website at http://www.cbc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=857&CtNode=481&mp=2. 
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“Go South” policy in 1994, which encouraged Taiwanese companies to 
expand foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia rather than mainland 
China. Table 3.1 shows Taiwan’s investment in ASEAN countries from 
1959 to 2000, specifically pointing out annual investment during Lee’s 
twelve-year tenure as president from 1988 to 2000. From 1988 to 1989, 
Taiwan’s total approved investment in the ASEAN-5 members, including 
Vietnam and Cambodia, totaled more than US$4.55 billion.156 Investment 
during these two years exceeded the island’s previous 29 years of cumu-
lative investment in these countries, valued at US$3.64 billion. During 
Lee’s first six years in office from 1988 to 1993, Taiwan’s total approved 
investment in the aforementioned countries reached US$15.4 billion, ac-
counting for about 81 percent of the island’s cumulative investment in 
Southeast Asia from 1959 to 1993. 
The heavy influx of capital into the region made Taiwan one of the 
leading sources of foreign investment in Southeast Asia, rivaling both Ja-
pan and the United States.157 By 1988, Taiwan was already the second 
largest foreign investor in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines. By the first half of 1989, the island also became the largest foreign 
investor in Malaysia and the Philippines.158 Foreign investment in Vietnam 
was not allowed until 1988 after Hanoi initiated its “Doi Moi” economic 
policy, which transformed the centrally planned economy to a market 
planned economy, enacted the Foreign Investment Law, and opened the 
door to international capital. Since then, Vietnam has emerged as arguably 
the most popular country for Taiwanese investment. While Lee and his 
technocrats were still crafting the “Go South” policy in 1993, Taiwan was 
already ranked as the largest foreign investor in Vietnam, second largest 
in Malaysia (behind Japan), third in Indonesia (behind Japan and Hong 
Kong), fourth in Thailand (behind Japan, Hong Kong, and the United 
States), fifth in the Philippines (behind Japan, the United States, Hong 
Kong, and the United Kingdom), and thirteenth in Singapore.159
Lee’s policies expanded Taiwan’s commercial ties with ASEAN 
even further. From 1994 to 1996, when the “Go South” policy was first 
implemented, Taiwan’s total approved investment in Southeast Asia in-
creased to over US$13.71 billion – about double that of the US$6.69 bil-
lion from 1991 to 1993 (see Table 3.1). After this dramatic growth in in-
vestment, Taiwan became the largest foreign investor in Malaysia and the 
 156.  ASEAN-5: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
 157.  Tain-Jy Chen, Taiwanese Firms in Southeast Asia, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
1998, p. 36. 
 158.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 109.  
 159.  Chiang, “Go South Policy,” supra note 25. 
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third largest (up from fifth) in the Philippines in the first half of 1995.160
This growth also sustained Taiwan’s position as Vietnam’s largest foreign 
investor until replaced by Singapore in late 1995.161
By building on the foundation laid by Taiwanese business communi-
ties in major cities like Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Jakarta, Bandung, Bang-
kok, and Manila, the Lee administration encouraged state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs), KMT-operated firms, and private companies to directly 
invest in several new locations. These places, highlighted in the “Go 
South” policy statement, included Batam Island, Indonesia, the Tan Thuan 
area of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, and Subic Bay, Philippines.162 In or-
der to allocate more resources to these areas and help develop existing and 
new industrial zones, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) 
established joint task forces on the Batam development project with Indo-
nesia, the Subic Bay Industrial Park with the Philippines, and the Tan 
Thuan Export Processing Zone (EPZ) as well as other industrial zones and 
city planning projects with Vietnam. As Minister of Economic Affairs 
CHIANG Pin-kung said in a September 1995 interview, “Our priority tar-
gets are still Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. We don’t emphasize 
Malaysia or Thailand as much because so many Taiwan investors are al-
ready there.”163 Chiang also stressed the importance of industrial zones in 
the region because of their ability to pull Taiwan investors together, gain-
ing strength in numbers.164
 160.  Xiangming Chen, “Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia: ‘Go West, but 
Also Go South,’” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 5 (May 1996), p. 454. 
 161.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 109. 
 162.  Chiang, “Go South Policy” supra note 25, pp. 3-5.   
 163.  Fei-yun Wang, “Solving Problems Is Our Job,” Taiwan Today, September 1, 1995; 
http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=136&ctNode=2198&mp=9. 
 164.  Ibid.
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Among the three aforementioned projects emphasized by the Lee ad-
ministration, the Tan Thuan EPZ and Subic Bay Industrial Park were suc-
cessful; however, Batam was not as positive as expected. The Tan Thuan 
EPZ, modeled after Taiwan’s Kaohsiung EPZ, was established in 1991 
and functioned as a joint venture between the KMT-backed Central Trad-
ing & Development Cooperation (CT&D) and Vietnam’s Tan Thuan In-
dustrial Promotion Corporation (TTIPC).165 With the help of CT&D’s cap-
ital and managerial expertise, Vietnam’s first EPZ developed into one of 
the most efficiently-run EPZs in Asia, according to the 1999 rankings of 
Economist Intelligence Unit and Euromoney Corporate Location Maga-
zine.166 Today, the Vietnamese government touts the EPZ as one of its 
“Doi Moi” policy successes, showing it off to former Japanese Prime Min-
ister Keizo Obuchi and former U.S. President Bill Clinton when they vis-
ited Vietnam in 1998 and 2000, respectively.167 Following their success at 
Tan Thuan, the CT&D-TTIPC joint venture launched the Phu My Hung 
Corporation to develop urban infrastructure in the southern part of Ho Chi 
Minh City. The iconic Phu My Hung urban area became another success-
ful Taiwanese investment project in Southeast Asia. 
Subic Bay Industrial Park, unlike the Tan Thuan EPZ, received assis-
tance from both the government-controlled Taiwan International Cooper-
ation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF) and the KMT-backed United 
Development Corporation (UDC).168 In order to help convert the former 
U.S. naval base into a special economic and free-port zone, TaiwanICDF 
agreed to provide a phase-one loan of US$23.58 million to finance con-
struction costs on the 105 hectares of land in 1993.169 In 1994, Taiwan and 
the Philippines established the Subic Bay Development Management Cor-
poration (SBDMC), a joint venture between the local government, the Su-
bic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), and the UDC. In 1995, nearly 
50 Taiwanese companies including Acer, Taiwan’s leading computer 
manufacturer, signed contracts to build factories and facilities in the Subic 
 165.  TTIPC was set up by the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Committee. See Richard Marshall, 
Emerging Urbanity: Global Urban Projects in the Asia Pacific Rim, New York: Spon Press, 
2003, p.140.  
 166.  Ibid.
 167.  See “Obuchi completes events for official visit to Vietnam,” Asian Political News, De-
cember 21, 1998; and “Vietnam: Tan Thuan – a most successful EPZ model in Vietnam,” Thai 
News Service, September 26, 2006. 
 168.  Before 1996, TaiwanICDF was known as the International Economic Cooperation De-
velopment Fund (IECDF); UDC is a joint venture formed by the KMT-backed China Develop-
ment Cooperation and the R.O.C. government-supported Century Development Cooperation. 
169. See TaiwanICDF’s website at 
http://www.icdf.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=5642&ctNode=30032&mp=2. 
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Bay Industrial Park, committing to invest at least US$200 million.170 By 
1998, 74 percent of the available land was leased, and TaiwanICDF fi-
nanced the project’s expansion with a phase-two loan of US$17.1 million 
to develop an additional 42 hectares of land.171 Despite the fluctuations of 
the 21st century global economy, Subic Bay Industrial Park’s convenient 
location and stable infrastructure have continued to attract new invest-
ment. As of March 2016, almost 100 percent of the phase-one land was 
leased and 90 percent of the phase-two land was leased.172
Batam Island did not receive as much investment from Taiwan as Tan 
Thuan and Subic Bay. In 1990, Taiwanese investors established the 
Kwang Hwa Industrial Park in Batam, competing with other industrial es-
tates such as Singapore’s Batamindo Industrial Park. Although the project 
initially drew a large number of potential investors from Taiwan, the 
amount investmened was limited – primarily due to the high labor costs 
and the lack of government-sponsored backers behind the project.173 By 
1992, Taiwan contributed only 2.1 percent of the total foreign investment 
in Batam, trailing behind the 45.4 percent from Singapore, 15.7 percent 
from the United States, 11.8 percent from Japan, 11.3 percent from Hong 
Kong, and 4.5 percent from the Netherlands.174 Despite the Lee admin-
istration’s promise to make Batam one of the “Go South” investment a 
priority in 1994, neither state-backed corporations nor TaiwanICDF came 
to support this development project. In contrast, Batamindo Industrial park 
was developed and functioned as a joint venture between Singapore’s Eco-
nomic Development Bureau and Indonesia’s Salim Group, which pro-
vided better employee housing and reliable electricity system for factories. 
By 1996, Batamindo Industrial park contributed approximately half of the 
US$2,094 million cumulative investment in Batam Island.175
Mainland China’s strong economic growth in the early 1990s also 
had a serious impact on investment prospects at Batam Island and other 
areas in Southeast Asia. As part of his famous tour of southern China in 
 170.  Tsai, Taiwan’s Quest, supra note 10, p. 194. 
 171.  See TaiwanICDF Annual Report 1998, p. 52; 
http://www.icdf.org.tw/web_pub/20071218175614ANNUAL%20REPORT%201998_p51-
57.pdf; and TaiwanICDF’s website at 
http://www.icdf.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=6327&ctNode=30032&mp=2. 
 172.  “Report on Investment Opportunities in Subic Bay,” Taiwan International Ports Cor-
poration, Ltd, March 20, 2016; http://report.nat.gov.tw/ReportFront/report_de-
tail.jspx?sysId=C10500225.   
 173.  Wang, “Solving Problems,” supra note 163. 
 174.  Chen, “Taiwan Investments,” supra note 160, p. 455. 
 175.  Karen Peachey, Martin Perry, Carl Grundy-Warr, Boundary and Territoy Briefing: The 
Riau Islands and Economic Cooperation in the Singapore Indonesian Border Zone, Durham, 
UK: University of Durham, 1998, p. 28. 
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early 1992, DENG Xiaoping traveled to the special economic zones 
(SEZs) of Shenzhen and Zhuhai. Soon after, in order to help rebuild the 
confidence of foreign investors in mainland China after the Tiananmen 
crisis of 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) confirmed its “social-
ist market economy” policy roadmap at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 
October 1992. Favorable land and labor conditions in mainland China re-
sulted in new competition for Southeast Asia over foreign direct invest-
ment and light industrial exports. Despite the low cost of labor in Indone-
sia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the cost of labor in mainland 
China was even lower.176 The CCP’s liberalization of land use rights also 
contributed to China’s competitiveness. For example, the governments of 
both mainland China and Indonesia maintained state ownership of land but 
mainland China granted leases of up to 50 years, while Indonesia only al-
lowed a maximum land lease of 30 years at Batam.177
According to LI Kui Wai, utilization of FDI in mainland China in-
creased from US$46.5 billion in 1985 to US$585.6 billion in 1998 result-
ing in 24.3 percent average annual growth of utilized FDI between 1991 
and 1998.178 Given that total world investment is relatively constant in the 
short run, China’s accelerated FDI in the early 1990s could only have hap-
pened at the expense of other Asian economies.179 As shown in Table 3.2, 
mainland China’s annual FDI growth skyrocketed from 25 percent in 1992 
to 156 percent in 1993, outpacing investments in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines combined. From 1993 to 2013, mainland 
China attracted more FDI inflows than ASEAN countries, making the 
P.R.C. the largest recipient of FDI in the developing world for two dec-
ades.180
 176.  Kui Wai Li, Capitalist Development and Economism in East Asia: The Rise of Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 172. 
 177.  Chung-fang Chang, “Waiting for Its Ship to Come in – Indonesia’s Batam Island,” Si-
norama Magazine, September 1994. 
 178.  Li, Capitalist Development, supra note 176, p. 173; in official P.R.C.’s statistics, “uti-
lized FDI” is the actual value of investment that has already materialized in mainland China.   
 179.  Ibid, p. 161. 
 180.  See ASEAN Investment Report 2015, p.3; http://www.asean.org/storage/im-
ages/2015/November/asean-investment-re-
port/ASEAN%20Investment%20Report%202015.pdf. 
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Table 3.2: Annual Growth in FDI (%) of ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) and Mainland China 
(1991-1998)
Year Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Philippines Mainland China
1991 60 40 38 -6 3 
1992 36 71 -18 3 25 
1993 20 30 5 -58 156 
1994 13 -3 -15 443 145 
1995 5 -13 -27 29 23 
1996 106 -5 51 -8 6 
1997 42 13 13 4 14 
1998 -42 -20 59 -18 11 
Source: Kui Wai Li, Capitalist Development and Economism in East Asia: The Rise of 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 172. 
Drawn by the lucrative opportunities in mainland China, Taiwanese 
investors actively joined the investment fever in 1991 after Taipei’s ban 
on investment in mainland China was partially lifted in 1990.181 A shared 
language and culture helped lower barriers to entry for Taiwanese busi-
nesspeople in mainland China. Moreover, preferential treatments such as 
tax breaks or tax waivers were offered to Taiwanese companies by the 
Chinese government.182 These favorable conditions, coupled with main-
land China’s cheap production base and huge market potential, attracted a 
significant amount of capital inflow from Taiwan to mainland China.183 In 
1992, Taiwan’s total approved investment in mainland China was valued 
at just US$247 million. In 1993, this figure dramatically increased to 
US$3,168 million, accounting for 66 percent of Taiwan’s total overseas 
investment in that year.184
Following this dramatic increase in Taiwanese investment, the LEE 
Teng-hui administration began to worry about the risks inherent to increas-
ing Taiwan’s economic interdependence with mainland China. In a speech 
at a business convention in September 1996, President Lee urged Taiwan-
ese investors interested in mainland China to move more slowly and ad-
vocated a policy of “No Haste, Be Patient.” This policy required that all 
 181.  The “Regulations on Managing Indirect Investment and Technological Cooperation in 
the Mainland Area” went into effect in October 1990, partially lifting Taiwan’s ban on invest-
ment in mainland China. 
 182.  Tian, Conflict across the Taiwan Strait, supra note 148, p. 67. 
 183.  Ibid.
 184.  Data acquired and calculated from the Investment Commission, MOEA, R.O.C.; 
http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_external/ctlr?PRO=PubsCateList&cid=5. 
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investments in mainland China be reported to the government and not ex-
ceed US$50 million without special governmental approval.185 Moreover, 
MOEA detailed a list of prohibited investments in mainland China, includ-
ing real estate, insurance, and seventeen different manufacturing products. 
Major infrastructure projects such as railways, harbors, airports, mass 
transit systems, industrial zones, and power plants were also included in 
the prohibited list.186 However, the “No Haste, Be Patient” policy was in-
effective in preventing Taiwanese companies from skirting restrictions 
and moving parts of their business to the mainland where they benefited 
from much lower operational costs. Statistics from Taiwan’s Investment 
Commission of MOEA show that in 1997 as much as 60 percent of Tai-
wan’s outward investments went to mainland China while only 9 percent 
went to ASEAN countries.187
Besides the favorable business environment in mainland China, de-
creasing Taiwanese investments in ASEAN can also be attributed to the 
impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Taiwan’s overseas investment 
were noticeably withdrawn from the suffering economies of Thailand, In-
donesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines between 1997 and 1998. In Thai-
land, for example, FDI from Taiwan plummeted from US$2,785 million 
in 1996 to US$414 million in 1997, falling even further to US$254 million 
in 1998. Taiwanese investments in Indonesia also fell from US$3,419 mil-
lion in 1997 to US$165 million in 1998 (see Table 3.1). 
Though the 1997 financial crisis devastated many companies, some 
Taiwanese export-oriented companies in the region actually benefited 
from the depreciation of currencies during that time period such as the 
Thai First Enamel Co. Ltd, founded by LIU Shu-tien, a follower of Lee’s 
“Go South” policy in the early 1990s and current President of the Thai-
Taiwan Business Association, which exports enamel and stainless steel 
teakettles to the United States, Europe, and Japan. The massive fall of the 
Thai Baht between 1997 and 1998 resulted in cheaper exports encouraging 
overseas sales which turned the company’s losses into profits.188 However, 
as a result of the 1997 financial crisis, many Taiwanese investors suffered 
huge losses and were forced to abandon investments in ASEAN countries 
or divert their capital to mainland China. 
 185.  T.Y. Wang, “Lifting the ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ Policy: Implications for Cross-Strait 
Relations,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002), p. 132. 
 186.  Ibid.
 187.  Investment Commission, supra note 184. 
 188.  Author’s interview with LIU Shu-tien, Bangkok, Thailand, February 15, 2016.  
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This trend continued and the gap between Taiwan’s investments in 
mainland China and ASEAN widened under both CHEN Shui-bian’s pres-
idency from 2000 to 2008 and MA Ying-jeou’s from 2008 to 2016. In 
2001, Chen and his Mainland Affairs Council Minister at the time, TSAI 
Ing-wen, relaxed regulations for investment to mainland China. Guided by 
their “Active Openness and Effective Management” policy, the Chen ad-
ministration reversed Lee’s “No Haste, Be Patient” approach, lifting the 
US$50 million cap on individual investments to mainland China. This pol-
icy also opened up a direct investment channel for the first time, allowing 
Taiwanese companies to invest in mainland China without first transfer-
ring capital through subsidiaries in third party locations such as Hong 
Kong or Singapore.189
After Ma took office in May 2008, Taiwan began proactively expand-
ing cross-Strait economic relations; signing the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) and agreements on postal services and air 
and sea transport with mainland China. Each side also signed agreements 
on investment protection and customs cooperation, aimed to create a better 
environment for business on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.190 These 
cross-Strait agreements facilitated investment opportunities for Taiwanese 
businesses interested in Chinese markets. From 1991 to 2005, approxi-
mately 53.3 percent (US$47.3 billion) of Taiwanese investment that accu-
mulated overseas went to mainland China.191 When President Ma suc-
ceeded President Chen in May 2008, this percentage had already increased 
to 55.9 percent (US$69.0 billion) over the last seventeen years.192 Under 
Ma’s presidency, the figure increased from 5.5 percent to 61.4 percent to-
tal (US$154.9 billion) from January 1991 through December 2015 – while 
4.3 percent went to Singapore (US$10.9 billion), 3.2 percent went to Vi-
etnam (US$8 billion), 1.1 percent went to Thailand (US$2.8 billion), 0.5 
percent went to the Philippines (US$1.4 billion), and 0.4 percent went to 
 189.  “Explanation of the Active Openness and Effective Management Policy,” MAC, 
R.O.C., November 7, 2001; 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=68176&ctNode=6621&mp=1. 
 190.  Cristina Garafola and Bao-chiun Jing, “Will China’s Leadership Transition Lead to a 
New Cross-Strait Policy?” The SAIS Review of the International Affairs, Feb 2, 2013; 
https://saisreviewdc.wordpress.com/2013/02/02/will-chinas-leadership-transition-lead-to-a-
new-cross-strait-policy/ 
 191.  See “Taiwan Approved Outward Investment by Country (Area),” Cross-Strait Eco-
nomic Statistics Monthly, No. 160, Table 13, March 2006, MAC, R.O.C; 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=52072&ctNode=5720&mp=1&xq_xCat=2006.  
 192. See “Taiwan Approved Outward Investment by Country (Area),” Cross-Strait Eco-
nomic Statistics Monthly, No. 186, Table 13, May 2008, MAC, R.O.C; 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=51035&ctNode=5720&mp=1&xq_xCat=2008. 
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Indonesia (US$1.1 billion).193 These figures illustrate why public concern 
regarding Taiwan’s perceived over-reliance on Chinese markets has in-
creased.
Irrespective of the Chen administration’s pledge to “Go South” again 
in 2002, Taiwan’s investment in Southeast Asia between 2002 and 2006 
did not reach pre-Asian financial crisis levels. According to former R.O.C. 
Foreign Minister Eugene Chien, due to the relatively stronger economic 
growth in mainland China compared to Southeast Asia in the early 2000s, 
ASEAN countries struggled to compete with mainland China for Taiwan-
ese investment.194 Table 3.3 shows Taiwan’s annual investment in 
ASEAN countries from 2001 to 2015. Between 2002 and 2007, Taiwan’s 
total approved investment in ASEAN countries amounted to US$12.2 bil-
lion – much lower than the US$21.7 billion of total investments from 1992 
to 1997. However, sluggish investment ties between ASEAN countries 
and Taiwan turned around in 2008. Boosted by huge FDI outflows into 
Vietnam that year, Taiwan’s annual investment in ASEAN reached a rec-
ord high of US$12.5 billion in 2008. Under Ma’s presidency, ASEAN 
countries continued to attract a large portion of Taiwan’s total approved 
investment. The US$16.7 billion worth of Taiwanese investments in 
ASEAN countries from 2009 to 2014 surpassed Taiwan’s investment lev-
els under Chen from 2002 to 2007. As of year-end 2015, Taiwan remains 
the third largest foreign investor in Thailand, fourth largest in Malaysia 
and Vietnam, seventh in Cambodia, and tenth in Indonesia. 
 193.  See “Taiwan Approved Outward Investment by Country (Area),” Cross-Strait Eco-
nomic Statistics Monthly, No. 274, Table 10, February 2016, MAC, R.O.C; 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/274_10.pdf.  
 194.  Author’s interview with Eugene Chien, Taipei, Taiwan, March 31, 2016. 
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As more investors from different countries flocked to Southeast Asia 
for its promising economic prospects, the region became a competitive 
destination for FDI. In the 1990s, Taiwanese firms led Asia-Pacific invest-
ments in ASEAN countries, ahead of mainland China, South Korea, and 
Australia. However, Taiwanese FDI outflows to the region were outpaced 
by the aforementioned countries in the 2000s. Data from the ASEAN Sec-
retariat shows that from 2006 to 2014, Taiwan ranked as the ninth largest 
source of FDI in ASEAN, after the European Union, ASEAN, Japan, the 
United States, mainland China, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Australia 
(in descending order, with the European Union being the largest inves-
tor).195 ASEAN countries offere lucrative investment opportunities for 
many reasons, not the least of which are the region’s young demographics 
and comparatively dynamic economies.196
If Taiwan is to maintain its position as a top ten investor in ASEAN, 
businesses should seek investment opportunities that correlate with the ris-
ing middle classes in ASEAN’s developing members. Traditionally, Tai-
wanese companies have heavily invested in ASEAN’s manufacturing in-
dustries – such as electrical machinery, textiles, ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals, and chemicals – exporting the products to the United States and 
European countries. However, the growth of ASEAN’s middle classes cre-
ates an opportunity for those countries to shift economic activity from ex-
port-oriented manufacturing toward domestic consumption. Taiwanese 
businesses should see ASEAN as a new consumer market and structure 
their investment strategies accordingly. For example, LIU Shu-tien of the 
Thai First Enamel Co. Ltd recently began investing in factories that man-
ufactured enamel steel teakettles specifically tailored for ASEAN consum-
ers.197
Another opportunity to grow Taiwan’s investment presence in 
ASEAN can be found in the financial industry. Given their abundant cap-
ital resources, Taiwanese banks are in a good position to tap into ASEAN’s 
financial markets either by collaborating with local banks through mergers 
and acquisitions or by setting up new branches in the region. Increased 
 195.  See “Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to ASEAN by Source Country, 2006-2013,” 
ASEAN Statistic Yearbook 2014, P. 110, http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-statistical-year-
book-2014; and “ASEAN Statistics Top ten sources of foreign direct investment inflows in 
ASEAN, 2012-2014,” http://www.asean.org/storage/2015/09/Table-27.pdf. 
 196.  James L. Schoff, “U.S.-ASEAN relations: Hiding in Plain Sight,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, February 10, 2016; http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/10/u.s.-
asean-relations-hiding-in-plain-sight/itr0. 
 197.  Author’s interview with LIU Shu-tien, supra note 188. 
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Taiwanese banking presence in ASEAN also benefits Taiwanese busi-
nesses in the region. It is easier for Taiwanese banks to evaluate the credit 
conditions of Taiwanese investors in Southeast Asia, ensuring these inves-
tors have better access to corporate financing and facilitating more invest-
ment. In 2013, former Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission 
(FSC), TSENG Ming-chung, initiated a policy to promote the expansion 
of Taiwanese banks into the Asia-Pacific market – Southeast Asia in par-
ticular. Tseng’s “Asia Cup” strategy began easing regulatory hurdles for 
Taiwanese companies in the banking, insurance, and securities brokerage 
sectors.198 For example, in January 2015, Taiwan’s legislature passed the 
FSC’s Banking Act amendment, easing overseas investment limits in the 
banking sector from 40 percent of paid-in capital (share capital) to 40 per-
cent of net worth (assets minus liabilities). According to Tseng, the amend-
ment was expected to release US$16 billion (NT$500 billion) in capital 
for potential offshore merger and acquisition bids.199 As of March 2016, 
Taiwanese banks have established branches and representative offices in 
175 overseas institutions in Southeast Asia, accounting for 38 percent of 
Taiwan’s 458 overseas banking institutions.200 Taiwanese banks have even 
set up representative offices in Myanmar, eleven total, thus far. Among 
them, E.Sun Commercial Bank obtained preliminary approval to establish 
a branch in the country in March 2016.201 Once the branch officially be-
comes operational, it will support Taiwanese companies investing in My-
anmar and help Taiwan forge stronger investment relations with this de-
veloping country in Indochina. 
B. Taiwan-Southeast Asia Trade Relations 
Taiwan’s strong investment presence in Southeast Asia has facili-
tated greater Taiwan-ASEAN trade relations. Primarily due to their famil-
iarity with Taiwan’s business networks and confidence in the quality of 
Taiwanese products, Taiwanese businesses based in ASEAN often import 
raw materials, parts and components, and machines and equipment from 
Taiwan, later exporting their finished or semi-finished products back to 
the island.202 Taiwanese investment in ASEAN expanded quickly in the 
 198.  Author’s interview with TSENG Ming-chung, Taipei, Taiwan, April 1, 2016.  
 199.  Ibid; and see Jackie Horne, “Taiwan’s banks eye wider regional role,” FinanceAsia,
June 17, 2015; http://www.financeasia.com/News/398349,taiwans-banks-eye-wider-regional-
role.aspx.
 200.  “Overview of Banking Sector of the First Quarter of 2016,” Financial Supervisory 
Commission, R.O.C.; http://www.banking.gov.tw/webdowndoc?file=/stat/bas/31140.zip. 
 201.  “Four more banks get Myanmar license,” Channel NewsAsia, March 06, 2016; 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/four-more-banks-get/2577036.html. 
 202.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p. 110. 
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late 1980s making ASEAN the third largest trading partner of Taiwan by 
1990, after the United States and Japan, and before Hong Kong and Ger-
many. Taiwan-ASEAN trade increased from 6.4 percent of Taiwan’s total 
foreign trade in 1986 to 9.0 percent in 1990. Taiwanese exports to the re-
gion also rose from 5.4 percent to 10.2 percent of the island’s total export 
value during the same time period, elevating ASEAN to Taiwan’s fourth 
largest export market.203
In the 1990s, ASEAN became an even more important trading partner 
of Taiwan after President Lee’s “Go South” policy came into effect in 
1994. The Taiwan-ASEAN trade relationship experienced double-digit 
growth from 1990 to 1995 with a remarkable 23.0 percent growth rate in 
1994 and 26.4 percent in 1995 (see Table 3.4). ASEAN replaced Japan as 
Taiwan’s third largest export market in 1994, when Taiwanese exports to 
the region grew at a rate of 21.7 percent, followed by 30.8 percent in 1995. 
By the time the Lee administration completed the first three-year phase of 
its “Go South” strategy in 1996, trade between ASEAN and Taiwan had 
reached US$26.7 billion, exceeding 1993 trade numbers by over US$10 
billion.
Although the Taiwan-ASEAN trade relationship was briefly stalled 
by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Taiwan’s trade with the region recov-
ered after 1999. In 1998, Taiwan-ASEAN trade suffered a negative growth 
rate for the first time in the 1990s, shrinking 17.5 percent. However, trade 
bounced back with a 17.3 percent growth rate in 1999 followed by 34.5 
percent growth in 2000. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, Lee’s 
economic technocracy created various business assistance programs de-
signed to support Taiwanese trade relations. The programs included 
measures which brought more business delegations to the region, provide 
up-to-date political and economic risk analysis to Taiwanese business 
communities, and offered Taiwanese exports more credit insurance. Lee 
also expanded the “Relending Facility” service – a scheme which extended 
credit lines to Taiwanese and foreign financial institutions from the Ex-
port-Import Bank of the Republic of China (Eximbank). In turn, these en-
tities used their increased credit lines to lend funds to their clients for the 
importation of goods from Taiwan.204 These policies effectively helped 
reduce the risks faced by Taiwanese companies, promoting Taiwan’s trade 
with ASEAN during the financial crisis. 
 203.  Ibid, and data from Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, R.O.C; 
http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/. 
 204.  See “Special Report: Guidelines for Strengthening Economic and Trade Ties with 
Southeast Asia, New Zealand, and Australia,” MOEA, R.O.C., April 25, 2001; 
http://npl.ly.gov.tw/npl/report/900425/5.pdf; and Eximbank website: http://www.ex-
imbank.com.tw/en-us/BankServices/RelendingFacility/Pages/RelendingFacility.aspx. 
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Table 3.4: Taiwan’s Trade with ASEAN (1989-2015) 
Value in US$ million; Share in percent 
Exports Imports Total Trade
World 
ASEAN 
World 
ASEAN 
World 
ASEAN 
Year Value 
(US$ 
m) 
Growth 
Rate 
 (%) 
Share 
(%) 
Value 
(US$ 
m) 
Growth 
Rate  
(%) 
Share 
(%) 
Value 
(US$ 
 m) 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
Share 
(%) 
1989 66,304 5,505 - 8.30 52,264 3,233 - 6.19 118,568 8,738 - 7.37 
1990 67,214 6,853 24.50 10.20 54,715 4169 28.93 7.62 121,929 11,022 26.14 9.04 
1991 76,178 7,530 9.87 9.88 62,860 5072 21.67 8.07 139,038 12,602 14.34 9.06 
1992 81,468 8,448 12.20 10.37 72,003 6291 24.03 8.74 153,471 14,740 16.96 9.60 
1993 85,092 9,419 11.49 11.07 77,059 7020 11.59 9.11 162,151 16,439 11.53 10.14 
1994 93,037 11,459 21.67 12.32 85,347 8753 24.69 10.26 178,383 20,213 22.96 11.33 
1995 111,656 14,984 30.76 13.42 103,547 10561 20.64 10.20 215,204 25,545 26.38 11.87 
1996 115,939 15,498 3.43 13.37 102,368 11195 6.01 10.94 218,307 26,693 4.50 12.23 
1997 122,078 16,317 5.29 13.37 114,422 13391 19.62 11.70 236,500 29,708 11.30 12.56 
1998 110,580 11,870 -27.26 10.73 104,662 12650 -5.53 12.09 215,241 24,520 -17.46 11.39 
1999 121,588 14,293 20.41 11.75 110,685 14478 14.44 13.08 232,273 28,770 17.33 12.39 
2000 148,316 18,476 29.27 12.46 140,005 20231 39.74 14.45 288,321 38,707 34.54 13.42 
2001 126,314 15,358 -16.87 12.16 107,966 16082 -20.51 14.90 234,279 31,440 -18.77 13.42 
2002 135,313 16,451 7.12 12.16 113,238 16674 3.68 14.72 248,550 33,125 5.36 13.33 
2003 150,595 18,131 10.21 12.04 128,007 17541 5.20 13.70 278,602 35,672 7.69 12.80 
2004 182,364 24,026 35.51 13.17 168,751 20376 16.16 12.07 351,114 44,401 24.47 12.65 
2005 198,424 27,363 13.89 13.79 182,610 21170 3.90 11.59 381,035 48,534 9.31 12.74 
2006 224,013 31,193 14.00 13.92 202,695 23403 10.55 11.55 426,708 54,595 12.49 12.79 
2007 246,673 36,301 16.38 14.72 219,248 23789 1.65 10.85 465,922 60,090 10.06 12.90 
2008 255,625 38,927 7.23 15.23 240,444 25678 7.94 10.68 496,069 64,604 7.51 13.02 
2009 203,671 30,586 -21.43 15.02 174,367 19835 -22.76 11.38 378,038 50,421 -21.96 13.34 
2010 274,596 41,961 37.19 15.28 251,233 28884 45.62 11.50 525,829 70,845 40.51 13.47 
2011 308,253 51,541 22.83 16.72 281,434 32796 13.54 11.65 589,687 84,337 19.04 14.30 
2012 301,177 56,547 9.71 18.78 270,469 31531 -3.86 11.66 571,646 88,078 4.44 15.41 
2013 305,437 58,768 3.93 19.24 269,893 32605 3.41 12.08 575,330 91,374 3.74 15.88 
2014 313,692 59,529 1.30 18.98 274,022 34114 4.63 12.45 587,714 93,644 2.48 15.93 
2015 280,384 50,929 -14.45 18.16 228,616 28323 -16.98 12.39 508,999 79,252 -15.37 15.57 
Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs. http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ 
FSCI/ (compiled by the author). 
Despite the disruption caused by the 1997-1998 Asian financial cri-
sis, Taiwan-ASEAN trade ties steadily increased under Lee’s presidency. 
From 1989 to 2000, trade between Taiwan and ASEAN more than quad-
rupled from US$8.7 billion to US$38.7 billion, accounting for 13.4 percent 
of Taiwan’s total trade value in 2000 (see Table 3.4). This trade growth 
sustained ASEAN’s position as Taiwan’s third largest trading partner and 
export market at the end of the twentieth century. 
At the start of the new millennium, an unprecedented peaceful party 
turnover from President LEE Teng-hui to the new administration of Pres-
ident CHEN Shui-bian took place in Taiwan - a huge step forward for de-
mocracy on the island. President Chen faced challenges immediately when 
Taiwan’s economy suffered its first recession since 1951. In April 2000, a 
month before President Chen took office, Taiwan’s stock market index 
38189-aop_16-2 Sheet No. 32 Side A      08/11/2016   08:45:46
38189-aop_16-2 Sheet No. 32 Side A      08/11/2016   08:45:46
No. 2 2016 Macro (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2016  3:29 PM 
 TAIWAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 63 
was over 10,000 points. However, it dramatically dropped to under 5,000 
points in July 2001 as Taiwan’s GDP simultaneously contracted 1.26 per-
cent in the same year.205 This recession was undeniably affected by the 
burst of the dot-com bubble and subsequent economic downturn in the 
United States. Yet, the Chen administration’s lack of effective economic 
strategy and sudden decision to halt the construction of the Fourth Nuclear 
Power Plant, combined with lingering political gridlock in Taipei, further 
exacerbated the island’s economic downtown.206 As a result, Taiwan’s 
trade with the world and with ASEAN decreased 18.7 percent and 18.8 
percent respectively in 2001. 
In order to diversify Taiwan’s portfolio of trade partners, in July 2002 
Chen followed the footsteps of his predecessor Lee and rekindled the “Go 
South” policy. By further strengthening Taiwan’s trade and investment 
ties with ASEAN countries, the Chen administration hoped to reduce the 
island’s economic dependence on mainland China. Although Taiwan’s 
trade with ASEAN gradually recovered after the recession in 2001, prob-
ably boosted by Chen’s emphasis on Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s share of 
Taiwan’s trade with the world remained fairly static, hovering between 
12.7 percent and 13.4 percent from 2000 to 2008. In contrast, after main-
land China and Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001 and 2002, respectively, the cross-Strait share of Taiwan’s total trade 
value rose substantially. In 2004, the year of Chen’s reelection, mainland 
China surpassed ASEAN and the United States to become Taiwan’s sec-
ond largest trading partner (after Japan) and largest export destination. In 
2005, mainland China became Taiwan’s largest trading partner (16.7 per-
cent of Taiwan’s total trade) and maintained that position ever since.207
Deepening trade relations across the Taiwan Strait again raised Tai-
wanese concerns about over-reliance on Chinese markets, particularly ex-
ports into mainland China and Hong Kong. In 2007, 40.7 percent of Tai-
wan’s total exports went to mainland China (25.3 percent) and Hong Kong 
(15.4 percent). From 2008 to 2014, that number hovered between 40 per-
cent and 42 percent; however, in 2015, total exports to mainland China 
and Hong Kong dropped slightly to 39 percent (25.4 percent went to main-
land China and 13.6 percent went to Hong Kong).208 These figures are of-
ten cited by President Ma to refute criticisms that his policies have made 
Taiwan more dependent on Chinese markets. 
 205.  See Taiwan’s GDP statistics provided by the Directorate General of Budget, Account-
ing and Statistics (DGBAS), R.O.C.; http://www.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=1. 
 206.  Wang, “No Haste, Be Patient,” supra note 185, p. 135. 
 207.  Data acquired from Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, R.O.C; 
http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/ 
 208.  Ibid.
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The fact is, Taiwan has put more eggs into its ASEAN export basket 
over the past decade. As Table 3.4 shows, exports to ASEAN countries 
represented 13.9 percent of Taiwan’s total exports in 2006 and 15.2 per-
cent in 2008. That figure further increased to 19.2 percent in 2013 and 
slightly dropped to 18.2 percent in 2015, with Singapore representing 
about one third of Taiwanese exports to ASEAN (6.1 percent), followed 
by Vietnam (3.4 percent), the Philippines (2.6 percent), Malaysia (2.5 per-
cent), and Thailand (2.0 percent).209 Taken as a whole, ASEAN is currently 
Taiwan’s second largest export partner after mainland China, and before 
Hong Kong, the United States, and Japan. Concerning the origins of Tai-
wan’s main imports, ASEAN is Taiwan’s third largest import partner after 
mainland China and Japan, and before the United States and South Korea 
(see Table 3.5). Despite the plunge of Taiwan-ASEAN trade during the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009 (see Table 3.4), Taiwan’s bilateral 
trade with ASEAN more than doubled between 2000 and 2015. In 2015, 
Taiwan-ASEAN trade exceeded US$79 billion, making ASEAN the sec-
ond largest trading partner of Taiwan after mainland China, and before the 
United States, Japan, and Hong Kong. 
Table 3.5: Top Five Taiwan’s Trade Partner Countries or Areas 
(2015)
                                            Value in US$ million; Share in percent 
Exports Imports Total Trade
 Value 
(US$ m) 
Share 
(%) 
 Value 
(US$ m) 
Share 
(%) 
 Value 
(US$ m) 
Share 
(%) 
1 Mainland 
China 
$71,209 25.4 Mainland 
China 
$44,183 19.3 Mainland 
China 
$115,392 22.7 
2 ASEAN $50,929 18.2 Japan $38,700 16.9 ASEAN $79,252 15.6 
3 Hong 
Kong 
$38,043 13.6 ASEAN $28,323 12.4 United 
States
$60,658 11.9 
4 United 
States
$34,249 12.2 United 
States
$26,409 11.6 Japan $57,975 11.4 
5 Japan $19,274 6.9 South Ko-
rea 
$13,026 5.7 Hong 
Kong 
$39,479 7.8 
Top Five 
Subtotal 
$213,704 76.3 Top Five 
Subtotal 
$150,641 65.9 Top Five 
Subtotal 
$352,756 69.4 
Other $66,680 23.7 Other $77,974 34.1 Other $156,243 30.6 
Total $280,384 100 Total $228,615 100 Total $508,999 100 
Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (compiled by the author). 
As Table 3.6 shows, Taiwan was ASEAN’s sixth largest trading part-
ner outside of the ASEAN bloc in 2014, accounting for 4.3 percent of 
 209.  Ibid.
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ASEAN trade. Mainland China was the largest external trading partner 
(13.9 percent), followed by Japan (9.7 percent), the United States (9.5 per-
cent), the European Union (8.2 percent), and South Korea (5.3 percent). 
Given the relatively small size of Taiwan’s population and land area, the 
value of Taiwan-ASEAN trade is quite significant. Trade of goods be-
tween ASEAN and Taiwan has been concentrated in electrical equipment, 
mineral fuels, machinery and mechanical appliances, and plastics. Indone-
sia and Brunei were the only ASEAN countries that ran a goods trade sur-
plus with Taiwan in 2014 mainly because they exported a large amount of 
energy related goods to Taiwan. Taken as a whole, ASEAN ran a trade 
deficit of US$29.3 billion with Taiwan in 2014. 
Sustaining Taiwan’s role as a significant trading partner of ASEAN, 
however, has been confronted by challenges from the ongoing regional 
economic integration. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), offi-
cially launched in January 2016, is expected to further integrate the re-
gion’s economies over and above the mega-trading blocs of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (TPP). As Joshua Meltzer has noted, these economic initiatives 
will impact Taiwan. Participation in RCEP could increase Taiwan’s GDP 
by up to 4 percent and boost exports by over 6.5 percent.210 In contrast, 
according to Meltzer, if Taiwan continues to be left out of the Asia-Pa-
cific’s new economic regionalism, the island “will be harmed by these 
FTAs’ trade diversion effect – whereby Taiwan’s exports lose out in FTA 
markets due to increased competition from imports from other FTA part-
ners.”211 To solve these economic challenges, Taiwan must prudently en-
gage with the United States and mainland China in order to join the re-
gional economic integration and be included in multilateral or bilateral 
economic cooperation agreements. Meanwhile, Taiwan should also effec-
tively integrate and mobilize its public and private resources in ASEAN to 
forge stronger trade relations and increase its participation in regional sup-
ply chains. Taiwan’s trade and development offices (TAITRA and Tai-
wanICDF), de facto diplomatic presence (MOFA’s representative offices 
in the region), and strong network of Taiwanese business associations 
across Southeast Asia would be a good place to start. 
 210.  Meltzer, “Opportunities and Challenges,” supra note 132, p. 11. 
 211.  Ibid.
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Table 3.6: Top Ten ASEAN’s Trade Partner  
Countries or Areas (2014) 
Value in US$ billion; Share in percent 
Exports Imports Total Trade
  Value 
(US$ b) 
Share
(%) 
 Value 
(US$ b) 
Share 
(%) 
 Value 
(US$ b) 
Share 
(%) 
1 ASEAN $330.3 25.6 ASEAN $278.2 22.5 ASEAN $608.6 24.1 
2 Mainland 
China 
$152.5 11.8 Mainland 
China 
$198.0 16.0 Mainland 
China 
$350.5 13.9 
3 Japan $124.4 9.6 Japan $121.8 9.9 Japan $246.2 9.7 
4 United 
States
$122.9 9.5 United 
States
$117.9 9.5 United 
States
$240.8 9.5 
5 European 
Union
$114.5 8.9 European 
Union
$92.3 7.5 European 
Union
$206.9 8.2 
6 Hong Kong $85.3 6.6 South Ko-
rea 
$82.1 6.6 South Ko-
rea 
$135.0 5.3 
7 South Ko-
rea 
$52.8 4.1 Taiwan $68.8 5.6 Taiwan $108.3 4.3 
8 Australia $45.5 3.5 India $25.9 2.1 Hong Kong $99.4 3.9 
9 India $41.9 3.2 Australia $22.5 1.8 Australia $68.1 2.7 
10 Taiwan $39.5 3.1 Hong Kong $14.1 1.1 India $67.9 2.7 
 Top Ten 
Subtotal 
$1,109.7 85.9 Top Ten 
Subtotal 
$1,021.8 82.7 Top Ten 
Subtotal 
$2131.5 84.3 
Others $182.7 14.1 Others $214.4 17.3 Others $397.1 15.7 
Total $1,292.4 100 Total $1,236.2 100 Total $2528.6 100 
Source: ASEAN Merchandise Trade Statistics Database (compiled/computed from data 
submission, publications and/or websites of ASEAN Member States’ national ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) units, national statistics offices, customs departments/agencies, 
or central banks); http://www.asean.org/storage/2016/01/statistic/table20_asof121Dec15 
.pdf.
Notes:
1. Preliminary data (as of December 21, 2015). 
2. Some figures may not sum up to totals due to rounding errors. 
C. Southeast Asian Migrant Workers in Taiwan 
Taiwan officially opened up its labor market to migrant workers in 
October 1989 when the government allowed foreign laborers to work on 
high-priority national infrastructure projects in Taiwan for the first time. 
However, before then, the island’s private sector was already hosting a 
large number of undocumented low-skill workers from Southeast Asia. As 
early as the mid-1980s, due primarily to severe labor shortages and rela-
tively higher wages in Taiwan, thousands of undocumented migrant work-
ers from Southeast Asia began to flock to Taiwan for jobs. Many of them 
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entered Taiwan on tourist visas and worked illegally.212 By 1987, it had 
been reported that about 70,000 migrant workers from the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Malaysia had either illegally entered Taiwan or overstayed 
their six-month tourist visas in order to join the workforce on the island. 
The illegal jobs were mainly in the shoemaking, textile, food processing, 
and construction industries.213
Although the substantial influx of foreign workers in the 1980s re-
lieved Taiwan’s labor shortages to some extent, it created social problems 
because of the lack of laws that regulated and recognized the status of for-
eign workers. Without proper legal protection, migrant workers were vul-
nerable to exploitation by their Taiwanese employers. For example, labor 
recruiters frequently enticed Filipino and Thai workers to Taiwan with 
false promises of high wages and comfortable living conditions. On top of 
that, recruiters often withheld workers’ passports and portions of their sal-
aries as brokerage fees. Without legal protection, these foreign workers 
were left with few options. In order to address both the issues of undocu-
mented foreign workers and the continuation of the labor shortage, Tai-
wan’s government finally promulgated the Employment Service Act in 
1992, legalizing the hiring of blue-collar foreign laborers and regulating 
all foreign workers across industries. Under this law, the government 
hoped to eventually replace the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 undocumented 
foreign workers in the private sector with legal contract laborers.214
Since the enactment of the 1992 Employment Service Act, the num-
ber of blue-collar workers from Southeast Asia and the industries in which 
they are allowed to work have grown steadily. According to the statistics 
of Taiwan’s Ministry of Labor (see Table 3.7), between 1995 and 2015, 
the total number of legal migrant workers in Taiwan has more than tripled 
from 189,051 to 587,940. Before 2005, Thailand and the Philippines were 
ranked the largest and the second largest sources of migrant laborers in 
Taiwan, with their workers respectively representing 30 and 29 percent of 
Taiwan’s total foreign labor force at the end of 2005. However, the number 
of Indonesian workers in Taiwan has risen rapidly since 2006, making In-
donesia the largest source of foreign laborers on the island. By the end of 
2015, 236,526 Indonesian laborers were in Taiwan accounting for 40 per-
cent of total blue-collar foreign workers on the island, followed by 169,981 
Vietnamese persons (29 percent), 123,058 Filipino persons (21 percent, 
and 58,372 Thai persons (10 percent). 
 212.  Dorothy S. Liu, “The 1992 Employment Service Act and the Influx of Foreign Workers 
in Taiwan,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, (1996), p. 604. 
 213.  Ibid, p. 605.  
 214.  Ibid, p. 613.  
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Table 3.7: Foreign Laborers in Taiwan by Nationality (1995-2015) 
Unit: Person 
Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam Mongolia Total 
1995 5,430 2,071 54,647 126,903 - - 189,051 
2000 77,830 113 98,161 142,665 7,746 - 326,515 
2005 49,094 13 95,703 98,322 84,185 79 327,396 
2010 156,332 10 77,538 65,742 80,030 1 379,653 
2015 236,526 1 123,058 58,372 169,981 - 587,938 
Source: Workforce Development Agency, Ministry of Labor, R.O.C. 
Notes:
1. The statistics are drawn from year-end data. For example, December 31, 1995, De-
cember 31, 2000, and so on. 
2. Compiled by the author from MOL Yearly Bulletin 2010, P. 332, Table 13-5: Foreign 
Workers in Productive Industries and Social Welfare by Nationality. And Monthly 
Bulletin, March 2016, P. 203, Table 12-3: Foreign Workers in Productive Industries 
and Social Welfare by Nationality. 
Among the five Southeast Asian countries that have migrant labor 
ties with Taiwan, Vietnam is the late comer in Taiwan’s labor market. In 
the 1980s, Vietnam sent its citizens to work in the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe. However, following economic and social crises in the region 
in the 1990s, Hanoi was forced to look to different destinations for its mi-
grant laborers and negotiate terms of employment with other govern-
ments.215 As a result, a sizable number of Vietnamese workers started to 
move to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In November 1999, the first 
batch of 34 Vietnamese workers arrived in Taiwan. Despite the fact that 
from 2005 to 2015 Taiwan’s Ministry of Labor enforced a ban on the em-
ployment of Vietnamese laborers in the social welfare and fishing indus-
tries due to high desertion rates, the number of Vietnamese workers in 
Taiwan rose steadily, driven primarily by their growth of hiring in Tai-
wan’s manufacturing sector.216 Since 2008, Vietnam has become Taiwan’s 
second largest source of migrant laborers. 
In terms of the industries in which the migrant workers serve in Tai-
wan, Indonesian laborers are mostly working in the field of social welfare 
while Filipinos, Thais, and Vietnamese laborers are primarily employed in 
the manufacturing sector. Table 3.8 shows the industry distribution of mi-
grant workers in Taiwan. Besides the social welfare and manufacturing 
 215.  Chen, New Taiwan, supra note 11, p.115 
 216.  See the press release on July 15, 2015, from MOL, R.O.C.; http://www.mol.gov.tw/an-
nouncement/2099/23158/ 
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sectors, Indonesian workers contribute to 76 percent of Taiwan’s total for-
eign laborers in the fishing industry while Thai laborers constitute 46 per-
cent of the foreign workforce in construction sector. By the end of Febru-
ary 2016, approximately 75 percent of the Indonesian laborers are 
employed as social welfare workers, such as domestic helpers and care-
takers. Meanwhile, 94 percent of the Thai laborers, 87 percent of the Vi-
etnamese laborers, and 76 percent of the Filipino laborers serve in the man-
ufacturing industry, particularly fabricating metal products, electronic 
parts and components, machinery and equipment, basic metals, plastics 
products, textiles, and food products and animal feeds.217
Table 3.8: Foreign Laborers in Taiwan by Industry and Nationality 
(As of February 2016) 
Unit: Person 
Industry Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam Total 
Fishing 7,732 - 1,643 23 842 10,240 
Manufacturing 50,256 1 93,890 54,432 147,425 346,004 
Construction 1,526 - 40 3,107 2,105 6,778 
Social Welfare  179,310 - 28,346 564 19,446 227,666 
Total 238,824 1 123,919 58,126 169,818 590,688 
Source: Workforce Development Agency, Ministry of Labor (MOL), R.O.C. 
Note: Compiled by the author from MOL Monthly Bulletin, March 2016, P. 204, Table 12-
4: Foreign Workers in Productive Industries and Social Welfare by Industry and National-
ity. 
The growing number of Indonesian social welfare workers in Taiwan 
reflects the island’s rising demand for domestic workers, which is caused 
primarily by its aging society. According to Taiwan’s Directorate General 
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), as of November 2015, 
Taiwan’s aging index – the number of seniors 65 years and older per every 
100 youth  under the age of 15 – was 91.6, a drastic increase from 52.0 at 
the end of 2005.218 This demographic trajectory correlated with the growth 
of the island’s foreign workers in social welfare, which was caused by the 
increase of the Indonesian laborers. Between 2005 and 2015, the total 
number of Taiwan’s foreign workers in social welfare grew from 144,015 
 217.  Data acquired from MOL Monthly Bulletin, March 2016, P. 204, Table 12-4: Foreign 
Workers in Productive Industries and Social Welfare by Industry and Nationality.   
 218.  Chen Cheng-wei and Y.F Low, “Taiwan’s population aging rapidly,” Central News 
Agency. February 9, 2016; http://focustaiwan.tw/news/asoc/201602090008.aspx; and “Age-spe-
cific distribution of population, dependency ratio, index of aging and median age,” National 
Statistics, R.O.C.; http://eng.stat.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas03/bs2/yearbook_eng/y010.pdf. 
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to 224,356, with Indonesian domestic workers increasing from 41,906 to 
177,265. This trend is clear and is expected to continue to accommodate 
the needs of Taiwan’s aging population. 
However, as Indonesia plans to gradually phase out sending female 
domestic workers overseas, Taiwan may encounter severe shortages of do-
mestic workers. On February 13, 2015, Indonesia’s President Joko 
Widodo said in a speech in Solo, Central Java, “I have given Manpower 
Minister a target to come up with a clear roadmap on when we can stop 
sending female domestic workers. We should have pride and dignity.”219
Prior to his speech, Widodo visited Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. 
Because Indonesia was one of the few countries in the world supplying 
domestic workers, he felt ashamed and upset when discussing related is-
sues with his Malaysian counterpart. A few weeks later, Nusron Wahid, 
the head of the Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers, said in an interview that Indonesia would follow Presi-
dent Widodo’s policy of bringing Indonesian domestic caretakers home. 
Wahid stressed that this ban would gradually be implemented in 2017 and 
would include workers in the Asia-Pacific region including Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Malaysia, regions that currently host a significant number of 
Indonesian domestic workers.220 This followed the May 2015 announce-
ment, which banned Indonesia’s human resource agencies from sending 
new domestic workers to 21 countries in the Middle East.221
Whether the Widodo administration will actually follow through with 
the plan regarding the Asia-Pacific region remains to be seen. However, it 
is certain that Indonesia will continue to request that Taiwan help improve 
the working conditions of its migrant workers. For instance, Wahid has 
urged Taiwan to ensure that wages for Indonesian domestic workers fulfill 
minimum wage requirements, work hours are limited to a level consistent 
with Taiwan’s Labor Standards Act, and domestic workers are provided 
with dormitories.222 With respect to salary, foreign workers in the social 
welfare sector – unlike those employed in manufacturing, fishing, and con-
struction industries – do not enjoy the regular monthly minimum wage of 
NT$20,008 (US$625) guaranteed by the Labor Standards Act in Taiwan. 
 219.  Zubaidah Nazeer, “Indonesia will stop sending its women to work as maids overseas, 
says Jokowi,” The Straits Times. Feb. 14, 2015; http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indo-
nesia-will-stop-sending-its-women-to-work-as-maids-overseas-says-jokowi. 
 220.  Wen Lii, “Ministry looks to Burmese workers to solve shortage,” Taipei Times, March 
01, 2015; http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/03/01/2003612508. 
 221.  Anita Rachman, “Indonesia Bans Maids in 21 Middle East Countries,” The Wall Street 
Journal, May 4, 2015; http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2015/05/04/indonesia-bans-
maids-in-21-middle-east-countries/. 
 222.  Lii, “Burmese workers,” supra note 220. 
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It was not until September 2015 that Taiwan’s Ministry of Labor, after an 
unprecedented multilateral negotiation with Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, agreed to raise the minimum wage by seven per-
cent for domestic workers to NT$17,000 (US$531) from NT$15,840 
(US$495) – the salary level of the previous 18 years.223 The raise was in-
deed a step forward in improving the working conditions for foreign do-
mestic workers. However, if the Taiwanese government supports equal 
rights for migrant workers, its Ministry of Labor must continue to reform 
the wage system for foreign domestic workers either by following the La-
bor Standards Act or by collaborating with the Legislative Yuan to pass 
the Domestic Worker Protection Act, which currently remains in limbo in 
the Executive Yuan. 
The more-than-two-decade-long cooperation on migrant laborers be-
tween Taiwan and Southeast Asia has not only helped relieve labor short-
age pressure on Taiwan’s economy but also provided job opportunities and 
generated remittances for blue-collar workers from Southeast Asia, espe-
cially Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 2015, Tai-
wan’s Ministry of Labor announced the plan to introduce agricultural and 
industrial workers from Myanmar on a trial basis. If the initial attempts are 
successful, Taiwan can expand this cooperation with Myanmar to other 
industries such as the social welfare and fishing sectors. However, this re-
quires an adequate number of Burmese translators and interpreters on the 
island to facilitate better communication with workers from Myanmar. 
If Southeast Asian migrant laborers are treated fairly and welcomed 
by Taiwanese society, the workers can serve as the bridge between Taiwan 
and ASEAN countries. In recent years, Taiwan’s civil society has paid 
more attention to the rights of migrant workers, driving government offi-
cials and legislators to engage in related legal reforms. For example, the 
amendment to the Employment Service Act that allows foreign domestic 
workers to work a total of 14 years instead of 12 was passed in October 
2015.224 Although the extension is conditional upon domestic workers’ 
language and professional skills, the amendment provided flexibility for 
experienced domestic helpers and caretakers to plan their careers. In terms 
of helping foreign workers continue to utilize their skills back in their 
home countries, LIU Shu-tien has suggested that the Taiwanese govern-
ment should consider establishing a foreign worker database where South-
east Asian laborers in Taiwan can register (their names and skills) at their 
 223.  See the press release on August 28, 2015, from the Ministry of Labor, R.O.C.; 
http://www.mol.gov.tw/announcement/2099/23599/. 
 224.  Alison Hsiao, “Duration of stay for foreign workers extended.” Taipei Times, Septem-
ber 19, 2015; http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/09/19/2003628075 
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discretion. Liu, the President of the Thai-Taiwan Business Association, 
has argued that sharing a human resource database with Taiwanese busi-
ness associations in Southeast Asia will help Taiwanese companies recruit 
well-trained workers who are already familiar with Taiwan’s business en-
vironment and culture. This can also be beneficial to the workers and their 
respective countries because it will help them secure jobs and contribute 
to employment back home, creating a win-win-win situation for laborers, 
business owners, and governments.225
IV.   TAIWAN’S SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
This chapter analyzes Taiwan’s soft power resources and how the is-
land uses public diplomacy to mobilize public support in Southeast Asian 
countries. Whereas hard power is used by international actors to induce 
change in other actors via military or economic might, Joseph Nye’s defi-
nition of “soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes 
one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.”226 Hard 
power is the ability to force change through threats or inducements while 
soft power is the ability to shape outcomes by attraction and persuasion. 
Given the international political and economic challenges that Taiwan 
faces, particularly vis-à-vis mainland China in Southeast Asia, Taiwan has 
a limited amount of hard power to exercise in the region. In this sense, 
Taiwan should fully embrace the concept of soft power to help improve 
its relationships with ASEAN countries and promote its interests in South-
east Asia. 
According to Nye, “soft power is attractive power,” and a country’s 
soft power rests primarily on its resources such as culture, political values, 
and foreign policy.227 Taiwan has preserved and cultivated high culture 
such as competitive higher education, as well as indigenous Chinese and 
Taiwanese art and literature. The island also serves as a hub of popular 
culture including music, movies, television programs, and food, particu-
larly among ethnic Chinese populations throughout the world. In terms of 
political values, Taiwan’s vibrant democracy has not only encouraged the 
formation of an open society but also sustained a number of free and fair 
elections. This openness is an invaluable soft-power asset in the interna-
 225.  Author’s interview with LIU Shu-tien, supra note 188.  
 226.  Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (March 2008), p.94. 
 227.  Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2004, pp. 6-11. 
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tional arena. As Gary Rawnsley notes, Taiwan’s successful liberal democ-
racy gives the island far more soft power capacity than mainland China 
“because credibility works within and helps shape an enabling environ-
ment and the PRC is denied access to this environment because of the au-
thoritarian nature of its political system.”228 Furthermore, based on Nye’s 
argument, government in a liberal society cannot and should not control 
culture because “the absence of policies of control can itself be a source 
of attraction.”229 It is therefore fair to say that Taiwan’s liberal-democratic 
political system and values without any cultural control serves as a source 
of soft power. 
With respect to foreign policy, Taiwan is a regional leader in human-
itarian aid. The R.O.C.’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and its 
semi-official International Cooperation and Development Fund (Tai-
wanICDF) have actively partnered with the non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) in Taiwan to provide technical support and humanitarian aid 
to developing countries, as well as rescue work in areas hit by natural dis-
asters.230 These activities, which Taiwanese presidents have often referred 
to as the fulfillment of obligations to the international community and the 
promotion of human rights, are also among the island’s sources of soft 
power.
Taiwan has also incorporated the concept of public diplomacy into 
its foreign policy platform. In the words of Nye, public diplomacy tries to 
attract foreign populations by drawing attention to soft power resources 
“through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, 
and so forth.”231 Or according to Philip Altbach and Patti Peterson, public 
diplomacy consists of engaging, informing, and influencing citizens of 
other countries.232 In this regard, Taiwan in recent years has dedicated 
more effort towards the formation of public diplomacy strategies that can 
mobilize the resources necessary to produce and reinforce the island’s soft 
power. This chapter argues that within Southeast Asia, Taiwan holds a 
significant amount of soft power assets in academic and cultural ex-
changes as well as in technical assistance and humanitarian aid. If Taiwan 
 228.  Gary D. Rawnsley, “Taiwan’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy,” Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2014), p. 166. 
 229.  Nye, Soft Power, supra note 227, p. 17. 
 230.  Rawnsley, “Taiwan’s Soft Power,” supra note 228, p. 169. 
 231.  Nye, “Public Diplomacy,” supra note 226, p. 95. 
 232.  Philip G. Altbach and Patti McGill Peterson. “Higher Education as a Projection of 
America’s Soft Power,” in Yasushi Watanabe and David McConnell, eds., Soft Power Super-
powers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, New York: Routledge, 
2008, p. 38. 
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can continue to use public diplomacy to mobilize these resources, the is-
land will wield much more soft power in Southeast Asia. 
A. Academic and Cultural Exchanges and People-to-People 
Connectivity
A key component of public diplomacy, as Nye points out, is “building 
long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for govern-
ment policies.”233 Nye argued that there are three dimensions of public 
diplomacy, which all require long-term cultural relationships. While the 
first two dimensions – daily and strategic communication – focus on gov-
ernment information and both domestic and foreign press corps, the third 
dimension emphasizes academic and cultural exchanges. According to 
Nye, “the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over 
many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, confer-
ences, and access to media channels” is the third dimension of public di-
plomacy.234 Taiwan has effectively leveraged its liberal education system 
and rich Chinese language literature to flourish in this third dimension and 
attract foreign students and professionals in search of high quality educa-
tion. With the liberal education system and rich Chinese language litera-
ture cultivated by Taiwan’s democratic society, Taiwan has adequately 
utilized this third dimension to attract foreign students and professionals 
seeking higher education. 
Table 4.1 demonstrates the number of ASEAN students in Taiwanese 
colleges and universities between 2009 and 2015. During this period, the 
Southeast Asian countries that sent the most students to Taiwan are Ma-
laysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. The number of Malaysian stu-
dents in Taiwanese colleges and universities grew substantially from 5,181 
in 2009 to 14,946 in 2015 (188 percent growth). The numbers of Indone-
sian and Vietnamese students also increased from 2,277 to 4,394 (93 per-
cent growth) and from 2,774 to 4,043 (46 percent growth) respectively. 
Although Singapore is not a major source of international students in Tai-
wan – not least because of its own well-established higher education sys-
tem and its relatively small population size – the number of Singaporean 
students rose from 228 in 2009 to 747 in 2015 (228 percent growth). In 
recent years, the majority of ASEAN countries have sent an increasing 
number of students to Taiwan (Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos are the ex-
ceptions). Taken as a whole, the total number of ASEAN students more 
than doubled from 12,866 in 2009 to 26,756 in 2015 (108 percent growth), 
 233.  Nye, Soft Power, supra note 227, p. 107. 
 234.  Ibid, p. 109. 
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making ASEAN the second largest source of non-R.O.C. students in Tai-
wan (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.1: Southeast Asian Students in Taiwanese Colleges and 
Universities (2009-2015) 
Unit: Person 
Academic
Year/
Country 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Malaysia 5,181 5,836 7,256 8,530 10,374 13,024 14,946 
Indonesia 2,277 2,279 2,520 2,799 3,223 3,455 4,394 
Vietnam 2,774 3,469 3,922 3,915 3,641 3,681 4,043 
Thailand 1,017 1,109 1,287 1,250 1,601 1,557 1,481 
Singapore 228 232 331 348 452 603 747 
Myanmar 997 725 560 449 419 486 579 
Philippines 372 352 429 480 570 545 533 
Brunei 6 9 17 14 16 31 25 
Cambodia 14 6 9 6 4 3 4 
Laos - 2 3 2 5 5 4 
ASEAN
Total
12,866 14,019 16,334 17,793 20,305 23,390 26,756 
Source: Ministry of Education, R.O.C. (compiled by the author). 
Note: The statistics include both degree-seeking and non-degree-seeking students. 
The growth in scholarships and short-term exchange programs devel-
oped by the Taiwanese government and universities partially explain the 
rapid increase of ASEAN students in Taiwan. The Ministry of Education 
(MOE) and MOFA have instituted several programs such as the Taiwan 
Scholarship, the Taiwan Fellowship, and the Huayu (Mandarin) Enrich-
ment Scholarship for students who want to pursue degrees, conduct short-
term research, or learn Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan colleges and univer-
sities. In 2008, MOE also established the Elite Study in Taiwan (ESIT) 
project office to specifically foster higher education cooperation between 
Taiwan and Southeast Asia by providing a number of scholarships tailored 
for students and professionals from the region. For instance, the Vietnam-
ese Elites Study in Taiwan 500 (VEST-500) Scholarship, jointly funded 
by Taiwan and Vietnam, aims to sponsor 500 Vietnamese university lec-
turers to obtain doctorates in Taiwan. Similarly, the Elite 600 Scholarship 
plans to send 600 lecturers or staff members from Thai universities to Tai-
wan to pursue master’s or doctoral degrees. Moreover, ESIT’s Aceh Gov-
ernment Scholarship supports students from Aceh Province of Indonesia 
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to study master’s or doctoral degrees in Taiwan. Between 2010 and 2015, 
the Aceh program has sponsored 150 students to study in Taiwan.235
Another factor contributing to the increase of ASEAN students in 
Taiwan is the strong cultural linkage between Taiwan and overseas Chi-
nese communities in the region. Malaysia, for example, is an ASEAN 
country that has a well preserved Chinese culture with its more than 6.5 
million Chinese Malaysians.236 According to former R.O.C. Foreign Min-
ister David Lin, mainly because Chinese Malaysians and Taiwanese share 
the Hokkian and Hakka cultures and Mandarin Chinese language, Taiwan 
and Malaysia have developed strong cultural and educational ties for dec-
ades.237 Before the Ma administration started allowing students from main-
land China to study in Taiwan in 2011, Malaysian students were the largest 
non-R.O.C. student group in Taiwan (see Table 4.1 and Table 4.2). Ac-
cording to CHANG Chi-ping, Representative of the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Office in Malaysia, Chinese independent high schools in Malay-
sia are the primary source of Malaysian students that later pursue higher 
education in Taiwan. As Chang pointed out, there are 62 Chinese inde-
pendent high schools funded by the Chinese Malaysian communities and 
each of these private schools provides secondary education instruction in 
Mandarin Chinese. Moreover, the Chinese independent high school cur-
riculum and course structure is similar to that in the Taiwanese secondary 
education system. This in turn is conducive to enabling Malaysian students 
to successfully continue on to higher education in Taiwanese universities. 
The existence of this type of school has helped increase the number of 
Malaysian students in Taiwan, making Taiwan the third largest host coun-
try of Malaysian students, after Australia and the United Kingdom.238 As 
of March 2016, more than 60,000 Malaysians have studied in Taiwan, 
many of whom have joined alumni associations to maintain the bonds of 
friendship under the Federation of Alumni Association of Taiwan Univer-
sities in Malaysia. As Chang has described, this Federation has 39 alumni 
association branches across Malaysia and form a very strong network to 
encourage and help students to pursue higher education in Taiwan. These 
former students, who usually return home with a greater appreciation of 
Taiwanese culture and democratic values, can form a remarkable reservoir 
of goodwill for Taiwan. 
To develop longer lasting relationships with younger ASEAN indi-
viduals who may become leaders in the future, Taiwan should seek more 
 235.  See ESIT scholarship information at http://www.esit.org.tw/esit.scholarship.infor-
mation/index/scholarship_sn/4. 
 236.  Author’s interview with CHANG Chi-ping, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, March 7, 2016. 
 237.  Author’s interview with David Lin, Taipei, Taiwan, April 1, 2016.  
 238.  Author’s interview with Chang, supra note 236. 
38189-aop_16-2 Sheet No. 39 Side A      08/11/2016   08:45:46
38189-aop_16-2 Sheet No. 39 Side A      08/11/2016   08:45:46
No. 2 2016 Macro (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2016  3:29 PM 
 TAIWAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 77 
educational partnerships with ASEAN countries. Firstly, within Southeast 
Asia, Taiwan has only signed educational cooperation agreements with 
two ASEAN countries – one with Thailand in September 2013 and the 
other one with Vietnam in March 2015. Given the less politicized nature 
of educational cooperation, there is room for Taiwan to negotiate more 
education deals and to strengthen educational ties with ASEAN. In this 
regard, Taiwan may consider establishing an educational cooperation 
agreement with the Philippines because both sides already signed a mem-
orandum of understanding on such cooperation in May 2012. Malaysia 
and Singapore are also potential partners for Taiwan to ink agreements on 
education, not least because they have already established solid cultural 
relations with Taiwan. 
Secondly, Taiwan’s MOE has set up Taiwan Education Centers in 
Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia to promote opportunities for 
higher education in Taiwan. Since MOFA just opened its first Taipei Eco-
nomic and Cultural Office in Myanmar in March 2016, it is practical for 
MOE to establish a Taiwan Education Center in Yangon as a foothold in 
the country. This will help disseminate information about higher education 
in Taiwan and attract more talented students from Myanmar. In a similar 
vein, Taiwanese universities should proactively compete for top perform-
ing high school students from ASEAN countries. In March 2016, six uni-
versities led by National Taiwan University (NTU) announced a first-ever 
joint recruitment project targeting students from Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam. This kind of initiative will not only 
reinforce Taiwan’s soft power in the region but also make the campuses 
more dynamic and diverse with ASEAN elements. As NTU’s President 
YANG Pan-chyr said, “most Southeast Asian students have a global vision 
and speak more than one language, so they can help internationalize uni-
versity campuses in Taiwan.”239 Furthermore, Taiwanese universities can 
utilize the existing network of the Southeast and South Asia and Taiwan 
Universities President’s Forum (SATU President’s Forum) to promote ac-
ademic and cultural exchanges with its member universities in Southeast 
Asia.240
 239.  Yu-qian Zheng, “Led by NTU, 6 Taiwan Universities Recruit More Southeast Asian 
Students,” United Daily News, March 19, 2016. 
 240.  In 2005, the International Secretariat of SATU Presidents’ Forum was established at 
National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan. According to its website, in 2016, it has 26 member 
universities in ASEAN, 53 in Taiwan, and 4 in India. See SATU’s website at 
http://conf.ncku.edu.tw/satu/index.php.  
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Table 4.2: Non-R.O.C. Students in Taiwanese Colleges and 
Universities by Source Country or Area (2009-2015) 
Unit: Person 
Academic 
Year/
Country or 
Area
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mainland
China 
- - 12,155 17454 25,120 33,288 41,951 
ASEAN 12,866 14,019 16,334 17,793 20,305 23,390 26,756 
Hong Kong 2,001 2,411 2,561 3,083 4,399 6,209 8,260 
Japan 2,438 2,620 3,699 4,457 5,726 5,620 6,319 
Macau 3,932 4,101 4,352 4,495 4,500 4,721 5,144 
South Korea 2,041 2,035 2,505 2,531 3,035 3,488 3,820 
United States 2,957 2,950 3,561 3,582 3,439 3,278 3,806 
France 834 866 1,045 1,232 1,262 1,623 1,545 
Other 7,216 7,816 9,251 9,931 10,475 11,068 12,581 
Total 34,285 36,863 55,463 64,558 78,261 92,685 110,182 
Source: Ministry of Education, R.O.C. (compiled by the author). 
Note: The statistics include both degree-seeking and non-degree-seeking students. 
Finally, Taiwanese leaders should leverage ASEAN students’ con-
nections with their home countries to facilitate and deepen cultural and 
economic exchanges. Southeast Asian students can offer invaluable 
knowledge of the cultural, business, and societal norms in their 
hometowns and countries of origin. Therefore, they can serve as influential 
bridges to help Taiwan become further integrated within other regional 
economies. The Taiwanese government should thus develop better strate-
gies to retain talent from ASEAN countries. By doing so, Taiwan’s soft 
power and economic might will reinforce each other, creating a virtuous 
circle favorable for Taiwan’s interests. 
Besides promoting cooperation on higher education with ASEAN, 
Taiwan should also take steps to help Southeast Asian immigrants and 
their children to not only become more integrated within Taiwanese soci-
ety but to also serve as cultural bridges between Taiwan and their countries 
of ethnic origin in ASEAN. According to Taiwan’s National Immigration 
Agency, as of March 2016, Taiwan has become home to more than 
512,000 immigrants who married Taiwanese citizens. At least 140,000 of 
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these come from ASEAN countries – mostly Vietnam, Indonesia, Thai-
land, and the Philippines.241 The number of second generation children has 
also surpassed 350,000. About 123,000 of these are middle school or ele-
mentary school students who either have a mother or a father from South-
east Asia.242 LIN Li-chan, Taiwan’s first immigrant legislator who was 
inaugurated in February 2016, said the language skills and cultural under-
standing possessed by immigrants are a source of strength for themselves 
and for Taiwan. Lin, a Cambodia-born lawmaker in Taiwan, has advocated 
for the use of this strength to facilitate people-to-people connectivity be-
tween Taiwan and ASEAN, helping the former build stronger cultural and 
business ties with Southeast Asia.243 For this reason, Lin has actively pro-
moted government-sponsored programs to assist the children of immi-
grants in visiting their countries of ethnic origin during school breaks to 
learn about the cultures and languages of their ethnic origin. Moreover, 
Lin has worked with civil rights groups to improve the domestic environ-
ment for ASEAN immigrants by breaking down stereotypes against them. 
Nowadays, it is still common to find people in Taiwan who hold preju-
diced views against Southeast Asians, seeing the latter as low-skilled im-
migrants who are a burden to society.244 These kinds of stereotypes under-
cut the island’s efforts to strengthen relations with Southeast Asia. 
Another effective approach to enhance people-to-people connectivity 
is to further the promotion of tourism. In 2015, as Table 4.3 shows, about 
13.7 percent of Taiwan’s record-breaking 10 million visitors were from 
Southeast Asia while 40.1 percent were from mainland China. As of May 
2016, the island only waives visa requirements for tourists from Singapore 
and Malaysia from among ASEAN member nations. Taiwan should fol-
low in the footsteps of Japan and South Korea and consider granting visa-
free access to travelers from Thailand, Brunei, and Indonesia. The more 
tourists Taiwan attracts from ASEAN countries, the more Southeast Asian 
publics are exposed to Taiwanese popular culture and democratic values, 
thereby enriching the island’s soft power resources. In the end, any well-
formed policy that facilitates people-to-people exchanges will promote 
 241.  Statistics on foreign spouses by nationality in Taiwan (March 2016), National Immi-
gration Agency, Ministry of the Interior, R.O.C.; http://www.immigra-
tion.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=1313198&ctNode=29699&mp=1.  
 242.  Data acquired from National Immigration Agency, Ministry of the Interior, R.O.C.; 
http://ifi.immigration.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=270&ctNode=36534&mp=ifi_zh; and Ministry of 
Education, R.O.C.; http://stats.moe.gov.tw/files/analysis/son_of_foreign_104.pdf. 
 243.  Author’s interview with LIN Li-chan, Taipei, Taiwan, April 1, 2016. 
 244.  Victoria Jen, “In Taiwan, Southeast Asian immigrants finally earn their place in soci-
ety,” Channel NewsAsia. January 1, 2016; http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapa-
cific/in-taiwan-southeast-asian/2391344.html. 
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mutual understanding between ASEAN and Taiwan – a necessary step for 
Taiwan to effectively “Go South” and participate in regional integration. 
Table 4.3: Southeast Asian Visitor Arrivals to Taiwan by Country of 
Residence (2006-2015) 
 Unit: Person 
Year Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Philippines Thailand Vietnam Others ASEAN 
Total 
World 
Total 
ASEAN/
World 
Ratio 
2006 115,202 184,160 90,870 79,993 95,643 - 77,470 643,338 3,519,827 18.3 
2007 141,308 204,494 95,572 85,030 90,069 - 83,814 700,287 3,716,063 18.9 
2008 155,783 205,449 110,420 87,936 84,586 - 81,577 725,751 3,845,187 18.9 
2009 166,987 194,523 106,612 77,206 78,405 - 65,294 689,027 4,395,004 15.7 
2010 285,734 241,334 123,834 87,944 92,949 - 79,379 911,174 5,567,277 16.4 
2011 307,898 299,599 156,281 101,539 102,902 - 103,756 1,071,975 6,087,484 17.6 
2012 341,032 327,253 163,598 105,130 97,712 89,354 8,513 1,132,592 7,311,470 15.5 
2013 394,326 364,733 171,299 99,698 104,138 118,467 8,935 1,261,596 8,016,280 15.7 
2014 439,240 376,235 182,704 136,978 104,812 137,177 11,159 1,388,305 9,910,204 14.0 
2015 431,481 393,037 177,743 139,217 124,409 146,380 13,218 1,425,485 10,439,785 13.7 
Source: Tourism Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, R.O.C. (com-
piled by the author). 
Notes:
1. Others include Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (2006-2011) 
2. In 2015, the number of mainland Chinese visitor arrivals to Taiwan was 4,184,120, 
accounting for 40.1 percent of Taiwan’s total visitor arrivals during that year. 
B. Technical Assistance and Humanitarian Aid 
Taiwan also has a long history of offering developmental assistance 
and humanitarian aid to several ASEAN countries, which helps the island 
build up goodwill among the nations in Southeast Asia. Ever since Tai-
wan’s first group of agricultural specialists arrived in Vietnam in 1959, the 
R.O.C. has dispatched numerous technical missions to the region to assist 
in rural development, especially in the agricultural sector. In the case of 
Indonesia, the archipelago country has received agricultural technical mis-
sions from Taiwan since 1976. The main goal of these missions has been 
to boost Indonesia’s agricultural production through improved methods of 
cultivation and pest control for crops, livestock, and fisheries.245 Through-
out the four-decade-long partnership, Taiwanese agricultural support has 
covered the areas of Java, Sumatra, and Bali. The latest completed project 
was the “One Village, One Product Agribusiness Project” in Bali. This 
project, implemented from 2010 to 2015 by TaiwanICDF with nearly 
US$100 million, successfully assisted the Bangli and Badung regencies of 
Bali to increase specialization in orange and asparagus production. Cur-
rently, TaiwanICDF focuses on a training project for farmers in Bandung 
 245.  Ku, “Indonesia’s Relations” supra note 7, p. 238. 
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city to improve agricultural operations. These projects have not only 
helped Indonesian farmers improve their skills and productivity but also 
enhanced Taiwan’s positive image in the country. 
Another notable agricultural partnership exists between Taiwan and 
Thailand’s Royal Project Foundation. In 1973, three years after Thai King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej and R.O.C. Ambassador SHEN Chang-huan dis-
cussed how to replace opium poppies with temperate crops on the highland 
of northern Thailand, Taiwan officially partnered with the Royal Project 
of Thailand and began to send agricultural experts to northern Thailand to 
plant temperate fruit trees, vegetables, ornamental flowers, and forest 
trees. This Thailand-Taiwan cooperation has successfully transformed 
lands formerly covered by weeds and poppies into lands with high-yield-
ing cash crops. LIN Wei-ho, TaiwanICDF’s representative to Thailand 
and the Project Manager of the ongoing Pathology Prevention and Control 
of Citrus and Passion Fruit Project in the Royal Project Foundation, said 
Taiwan’s agricultural assistance has significantly improved the livelihood 
of highland residents in northern Thailand, a long-term technical support 
the Thai people appreciated. 246
Both Taiwan’s governmental and non-governmental sectors have 
contributed to Taiwan’s soft power by providing timely humanitarian aid 
to Southeast Asia in the wake of major natural disasters in the region. For 
instance, shortly after the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsu-
namis in the Indian Ocean that struck the coastal areas in Southeast Asia 
and South Asia on December 26, 2004, the CHEN Shui-bian administra-
tion pledged to donate US$50 million for disaster relief in Indonesia, Thai-
land, and Sri Lanka.247 NGOs such as the Red Cross Society in Taiwan 
also played significant roles in tsunami relief – more than US$25 million 
of private donations were made by over 200,000 people in Taiwan to the 
Red Cross tsunami relief project.248 CHEN Charng-ven, former President 
of the Red Cross Society in Taiwan, said a victim told him, “I don’t know 
where Taiwan is, but I know that the Taiwanese people are kind.”249
Taiwan also responded swiftly to the mass devastation caused by Ty-
phoon Haiyan in the Philippines on November 8, 2013. Within ten days 
after the typhoon made landfall in the Philippines, the Taiwanese govern-
ment sent more than 680 metric tons of relief supplies to the affected areas, 
distributed via 18 sorties of C-130 cargo planes and one trip from an 
 246.  Author’s interview with LIN Wei-ho, Bangkok, Thailand, February 16, 2016. 
 247.  Luis Huang, “Taiwan will keep low profile in post-tsunami relief: president,” Central 
News Agency, January 19, 2005. 
 248.  Jean Lin, “Red Cross shares tsunami stories,” Taipei Times, December 24, 2005; 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/12/24/2003285797. 
 249.  Ibid.
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R.O.C. navy vessel.250 A number of NGOs also provided immediate assis-
tance. The Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, for example, 
helped build temporary school buildings in the Leyte province, one of the 
most severely affected areas. LIN Song-huann, Taiwanese Representative 
to the Philippines, commented that Taiwanese aid for Typhoon Haiyan 
was one of the most immediate and effective humanitarian efforts initiated 
by any country at the time.251 The provision of typhoon relief significantly 
enhanced the friendship between Taiwan and the Philippines. As Philip-
pine Representative to Taiwan Antonio Basilio said, “The quick and 
timely response and the scope and magnitude of this generosity will for-
ever be remembered by our people.”252 As Nye notes, “telling is far less 
influential than actions and symbols that show as well as tell.”253 Taiwan’s 
humanitarian actions convey a far more convincing narrative than words, 
adding credibility to the island’s public diplomacy in Southeast Asia.254
V.   CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR  
TAIWAN-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS 
Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has sought to both expand its interna-
tional participation and strengthen bilateral relations with its neighboring 
countries in Southeast Asia. Under the banners of LEE Teng-hui’s “prag-
matic diplomacy” and “Go South” policy, Taiwan not only resumed par-
ticipation in the Asian Development Bank’s annual meeting in 1988 and 
joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1991 but also forged 
stronger economic ties with Southeast Asian countries and provided de-
velopmental assistance to the region, particularly in improving their indus-
trial and agricultural sectors. These efforts, continued under both President 
CHEN Shui-bian and President MA Ying-jeou in the 21st century, led to 
Taiwan’s accession into the World Trade Organization in 2002 and the 
conclusion of a free trade agreement with Singapore in 2013. The incum-
bent, President TSAI Ing-wen, has also pledged to further buttress eco-
nomic and cultural ties with Southeast Asia under her “New Southbound” 
policy. However, Taiwan’s continued engagement with the region, either 
on a multilateral or a bilateral basis, has been overshadowed by Beijing’s 
 250.  Shu-hua Lee, Pei-chun Tang, and Jay Chen, “As Manila’s ‘nearest friend,’ Taiwan had 
responsibility to help: Ma,” Central News Agency, December 27, 2013; http://fo-
custaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201312270029.aspx. 
 251.  Author’s interview with LIN Song-huann, Makati, Philippines, March 10, 2016. 
 252.  Elaine Hou, “Philippines thanks Taiwan for typhoon relief at national day event,” Cen-
tral News Agency, June 12, 2014; http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201406120030.aspx. 
 253.  Nye, “Public Diplomacy,” supra note 226, p. 103. 
 254.  See Rawnsley, “Taiwan’s Soft Power,” supra note 228, pp. 169-170. 
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“one-China” principle and its rising economic and political influence in 
the region, particularly since the late 1990s. 
As discussed in Chapter II, Taiwan under Lee’s presidency effec-
tively leveraged its strong economic clout to the island’s diplomatic ad-
vantage in the early 1990s. Lee’s unprecedented trips to the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Thailand, coupled with a number of reciprocal high-level 
visits and economic agreements with Southeast Asian countries, epito-
mized the elevation of Taiwan-ASEAN relations in general. This momen-
tum, nevertheless, was stopped subsequently by the 1995-1996 Taiwan 
Strait crisis and the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. The former made 
ASEAN leaders wary of closely engaging Taipei while the latter forced 
many Taiwanese investors in ASEAN to divert their capital to mainland 
China. Furthermore, the formation of the ASEAN Plus Three in the wake 
of the Asian financial crisis enhanced mainland China’s economic ties 
with ASEAN, later leading to the signing of the initial framework agree-
ment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area in 2002. The emergence of 
closer economic cooperation between mainland China and ASEAN con-
strained Taiwan’s leeway for further diplomatic engagement in Southeast 
Asia. 
President Chen’s pursuit of a set of aggressive foreign policies and 
his rekindling of the “Go South” strategy failed to improve political ties 
with ASEAN. Instead, Taiwan-ASEAN relations turned sour because of 
Chen’s provocative pro-independence policies that minimized space for 
ASEAN countries to engage with Taiwan. The downward spiral was re-
versed after President Ma embarked on cross-Strait reconciliation in 2008, 
enhancing regional stability in East Asia. Cross-Strait peace was an inte-
gral element of Ma’s engagement policy toward Southeast Asia, and more 
broadly, the “viable diplomacy” and “diplomatic truce” in his foreign pol-
icy. However, improved cross-Strait relations did not negate the fact that 
Beijing continued to block Taiwan’s participation in the regional architec-
ture as a dialogue partner of ASEAN, or to sign free trade agreements with 
both the whole of ASEAN and its individual member states. Beijing’s stra-
tegic rationale was to avoid lending any international dimensions to Tai-
wan’s participation that would confirm the island’s view of its de facto
independent status. 
In spite of the P.R.C.’s maritime territorial disputes with several 
ASEAN countries, mainland China remains to be ASEAN’s largest trad-
ing partner outside of the ASEAN bloc. Mainland China’s ongoing initia-
tives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and “One Belt, One 
Road” are expected to strengthen its economic cooperation with ASEAN 
countries, increasing China’s economic prowess in the region. In order to 
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benefit economically from mainland China, Southeast Asian countries will 
unlikely risk ire from Beijing by forging a FTA with Taiwan.255
In her inaugural speech on May 20, 2016, President Tsai reiterated 
that the new government will promote a “New Southbound” policy in the 
years ahead, aiming to “broaden exchanges and cooperation with regional 
neighbors in areas such as technology, culture, and commerce, and expand 
in particular our dynamic relationships with ASEAN and India.”256 Ac-
cording to Tsai, the overall objective of the policy was to “elevate the 
scope and diversity of our external economy, and to bid farewell to our 
past overreliance on a single market” – a clear reference to Taiwan’s per-
ceived reliance on mainland China’s economy.257 Though this was not a 
brand-new policy goal of reducing the degree of trade and investment de-
pendence on mainland China, it had not been achieved throughout the ten-
ures of Lee, Chen, and Ma. 
As noted in details in Chapter III, from 1991 to 2015, approximately 
55.9 percent of accumulatedTaiwanese overseas investments went to 
mainland China. On the trade side, mainland China has become Taiwan’s 
largest trading partner and largest export destination since 2005. Although 
Taiwan has increased its share of exports to ASEAN countries over the 
past decade, the island is still largely reliant on its Chinese export market. 
In order to diversify Taiwan’s investment and trade portfolio, Tsai needs 
to effectively integrate and utilize Taiwan’s public and private resources 
in Southeast Asia to facilitate more economic collaboration, embedding 
Taiwan more deeply in the region. 
On the cultural front, the Tsai administration should continue to fos-
ter people-to-people connectivity between Taiwan and ASEAN by utiliz-
ing public diplomacy that draws attention to the island’s soft power re-
sources. As illustrated in Chapter IV, Taiwan holds a remarkable amount 
of soft power assets in areas ranging from academic and cultural ex-
changes to technical assistance and humanitarian aid. The new govern-
ment must strive to mobilize these resources to wield much more soft 
power in the region. Moreover, measures such as encouraging two-way 
tourism and nurturing talents for ASEAN markets, as emphasized by 
James Huang, head of the New Southbound Policy Office, should be fully 
 255.  A similar view was expressed by Bonnie Glaser, see “CNBC phone interview with 
Glaser,” May 20, 2016; http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000519250. 
 256.  On the campaign trail of Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election, TSAI Ing-wen introduced 
her plan to pursue a “New Southbound” policy at a DPP diplomatic reception on September 22, 
2015. See the full text of the speech at http://english.dpp.org.tw/dpp-29th-anniversary/; and see 
the full text of Tsai’s inaugural address in 2016 at http://english.president.gov.tw/De-
fault.aspx?tabid=1124&itemid=37443&view=home. 
 257.  Ibid.
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embraced.258 With respect to the large number of immigrants and migrant 
workers from Southeast Asia, Taiwan needs to improve and uphold their 
rights and help them become better integrated in Taiwanese society. These 
individuals serve as intrinsic cultural linkages between Taiwan and their 
countries of origin in ASEAN. 
Ultimately, the future of Taiwan’s engagement with Southeast Asia 
depends on how effective the island can utilize its economic and cultural 
resources to foster stronger government-to-government relations and peo-
ple-to-people ties. It is also predicated upon whether Taipei and Beijing 
can maintain peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations and develop com-
mon ground that is conducive to economic multilateralism and prosperity 
in East Asia and Southeast Asia. 
 258.  “Taiwan plans visa waiver for Asean visitors,” The Straits Times, May 28, 2016; 
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-plans-visa-waiver-for-asean-visitors. 
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No. 5 - 1983 (58) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-57-X
China’s War Against Vietnam:  A Military Analysis (King C. Chen),
33 pp. $3.00
No. 6 - 1983 (59) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-58-8
The People’s Republic of China, International Law and Arms Control
(David Salem), 325 pp. Index $7.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and
Politics Series, No. 3, ISBN 0-942182-59-6) $15.00
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1984 Series
No. 1 - 1984 (60) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-60-X
China’s Nuclear Policy:  An Overall View (Shao-chuan LENG), 18 pp.
$3.00
No. 2 - 1984 (61) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-61-8
The Communist Party of China:  Party Powers and Group Politics from
the Third Plenum to the Twelfth Party Congress (Hung-mao
TIEN), 30 pp. $3.00
No. 3 - 1984 (62) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-62-6
Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China
Sea (Ying-jeou MA), 308 pp. Index (out of print) $10.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and
Politics Series, No. 4, ISBN 0-942182-63-4) $15.00
No. 4 - 1984 (63) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-64-2
A New Direction in Japanese Defense Policy:  Views from the Liberal
Democratic Party Diet Members (Steven Kent Vogel), 63 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1984 (64) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-65-0
Taiwan’s Elections:  Political Development and Democratization in the
Republic of China (John F. Copper with George P. Chen), 180 pp.
Index $5.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-942182-66-9) $10.00
No. 6 - 1984 (65) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-67-7
Cankao Xiaoxi:  Foreign News in the Propaganda System of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (Jo¨rg-Meinhard Rudolph), 174 pp. Index
$5.00
1985 Series
No. 1 - 1985 (66) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-68-5
The Political Basis of the Economic and Social Development in the Re-
public of China (Alan P. L. Liu), 22 pp. $3.00
No. 2 - 1985 (67) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-69-3
The Legal System and Criminal Responsibility of Intellectuals in the
People’s Republic of China, 1949-1982 (Carlos Wing-hung Lo), 125
pp.  Index $5.00
No. 3 - 1985 (68) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-70-7
Symposium on Hong Kong:  1997 (Edited by Hungdah CHIU), 100 pp.
Index $4.00
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No. 4 - 1985 (69) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-71-5
The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law (Hungdah CHIU),
18 pp. (out of print) $3.00
No. 5 - 1985 (70) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-72-3
Peking’s Negotiating Style:  A Case study of U.S.-PRC Normalization
(Jaw-Ling Joanne CHANG), 22 pp. $3.00
No. 6 - 1985 (71) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-73-1
China’s Marine Environmental Protection Law:  The Dragon Creeping
in Murky Waters (Mitchell A. Silk), 32 pp. $3.00
1986 Series
No. 1 - 1986 (72) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-74-X
From Tradition to Modernity:  A Socio-Historical Interpretation on
China’s Struggle toward Modernization Since the Mid-19th Cen-
tury (Wen-hui TSAI), 76 pp. $4.00
No. 2 - 1986 (73) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-75-8
Peace and Unification in Korea and International Law (Byung-Hwa
LYOU), 205 pp.  Index. $8.00
No. 3 - 1986 (74) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-76-6
The Hong Kong Agreement and American Foreign Policy (Hungdah
CHIU), 18 pp. $3.00
No. 4 - 1986 (75) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-77-4
United States-China Normalization:  An Evaluation of Foreign Policy
Decision Making (Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG), copublished with
Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver, 246 pp.
Index. (out of print) $8.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and Politics
Series, No. 7.  ISBN 0-942182-78-2) $12.00
No. 5 - 1986 (76) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-79-0
Communications and China’s National Integration:  An Analysis of
People’s Daily and Central Daily on the China Reunification Issue
(Shuhua CHANG), 205 pp. $8.00
No. 6 - 1986 (77) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-80-4
Since Aquino:  The Philippine Tangle and the United States (Justus M.
van der Kroef), 73 pp. $3.00
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1987 Series
No. 1 - 1987 (78) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-81-2
An Analysis of the U.S.-China Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement
(Benjamin Chin), 40 pp. $3.00
No. 2 - 1987 (79) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-82-0
Survey of Recent Developments in China (Mainland and Taiwan), 1985-
1986 (edited by Hungdah CHIU, with the assistance of Jaw-ling Jo-
anne CHANG), 222 pp.  Index $8.00
No. 3 - 1987 (80) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-83-9
Democratizing Transition in Taiwan (Yangsun CHOU and Andrew J.
Nathan), 24 pp. $3.00
No. 4 - 1987 (81) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-84-7
The Legal Status of the Chinese Communist Party (Robert Heuser),
25 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1987 (82) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-85-5
The Joint Venture and Related Contract Laws of Mainland China and
Taiwan:  A Comparative Analysis (Clyde D. Stoltenberg and David
W. McClure), 54 pp. $4.00
No. 6 - 1987 (83) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-86-3
Reform in Reverse:  Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China,
1986/1987 (Ta-Ling LEE and John F. Copper), 150 pp. $8.00
1988 Series
No. 1 - 1988 (84) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-87-1
Chinese Attitudes toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978-
1987 (Hungdah CHIU), 41 pp. $3.00
No. 2 - 1988 (85) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-88-X
Chinese Views on the Sources of International Law (Hungdah CHIU),
20 pp. $3.00
No. 3 - 1988 (86) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-89-8
People’s Republic of China:  The Human Rights Exception (Roberta
Cohen), 103 pp. (out of print) $5.00
No. 4 - 1988 (87) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-90-1
Settlement of the Macau Issue:  Distinctive Features of Beijing’s Negoti-
ating Behavior (with text of 1887 Protocol and 1987 Declaration)
(Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG), 37 pp. $3.00
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No. 5 - 1988 (88) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-91-X
The Draft Basic Law of Hong Kong:  Analysis and Documents (edited
by Hungdah CHIU), 153 pp. $5.00
No. 6 - 1988 (89) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-92-8
Constitutionalism in Asia:  Asian Views of the American Influence
(edited by Lawrence W. Beer), 210 pp. $10.00
1989 Series
No. 1 - 1989 (90) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-00-1
The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People’s Republic of China
(Margaret Y.K. Woo), 43 pp. $3.00
No. 2 - 1989 (91) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-01-X
The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties, Agreements and
Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Chinese Law (Hungdah
CHIU), 22 pp. $3.00
No. 3 - 1989 (92) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-02-8
One Step Forward, One Step Back, Human Rights in the People’s Re-
public of China in 1987/88 (John F. Cooper and Ta-ling LEE), 140
pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 1989 (93) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-03-6
Tibet:  Past and Present (Hungdah CHIU and June Teufel Dreyer), 25
pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1989 (94) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-04-4
Chinese Attitude toward International Law of Human Rights in the
Post-Mao Era (Hungdah CHIU), 38 pp. $4.00
No. 6 - 1989 (95) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-05-2
Tibet to Tiananmen:  Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign
Policy (W. Gary Vause), 47 pp. $4.00
1990 Series
No. 1 - 1990 (96) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-06-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Hungdah
CHIU), 20 pp. (Please order No. 5-1992 (112) for a revised version
of this issue) $3.00
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No. 2 - 1990 (97) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-07-9
Tiananmen:  China’s Struggle for Democracy—Its Prelude, Develop-
ment, Aftermath, and Impact (Winston L. Y. Yang and Marsha L.
Wagner), 314 pp.  Index (paperback out of print) $8.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and
Politics Series, No. 11, ISBN 0-925153-08-7) $14.00
No. 3 - 1990 (98) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-09-5
Nationality and International Law in Chinese Perspective (Hungdah
CHIU), 37 pp. $4.00
No. 4 - 1990 (99) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-10-9
The Taiwan Relations Act after Ten Years (Lori Fisler Damrosch),
27 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1990 (100) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-11-7
The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations (Hungdah
CHIU), 34 pp. (out of print) $4.00
No. 6 - 1990 (101) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-12-5
Taiwan’s Recent Elections:  Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (John F.
Copper), 174 pp. Index (out of print) $8.00
1991 Series
No. 1 - 1991 (102) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-13-3
Legal Aspects of Investment and Trade with the Republic of China (Ed-
ited by John T. McDermott, with contributions by Linda F. Powers,
Ronald A. Case, Chung-Teh LEE, Jeffrey H. Chen, Cheryl M.
Friedman, Hungdah CHIU, K.C. Fan and Douglas T. Hung), 94 pp.
$6.00
No. 2 - 1991 (103) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-14-1
Failure of Democracy Movement:  Human Rights in the People’s Re-
public of China, 1988/89 (Ta-ling LEE and John F. Copper), 150 pp.
Index $10.00
No. 3 - 1991 (104) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-15-X
Freedom of Expression:  The Continuing Revolution in Japan’s Legal
Culture (Lawrence W. Beer), 31 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1991 (105) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-16-8
The 1989 US-Republic of China (Taiwan) Fisheries Negotiations (Mark
Mon-Chang Hsieh), 84 pp. $6.00
No. 5 - 1991 (106) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-17-6
Politics of Divided Nations:  China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam —
Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development (Ed-
ited by Quansheng ZHAO and Robert Sutter), 198 pp. Index $12.00
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No. 6 - 1991 (107) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-18-4
Lawyers in China:  The Past Decade and Beyond (Timothy A. Gelatt),
49 pp. $5.00
1992 Series
No. 1 - 1992 (108) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-19-2
Judicial Review of Administration in the People’s Republic of China
(Jyh-pin FA & Shao-chuan LENG), 37 pp. $5.00
No. 2 - 1992 (109) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-20-6
China’s Ministry of State Security:  Coming of Age in the International
Arena (Nicholas Eftimiades), 24 pp. $4.00
No. 3 - 1992 (110) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-21-4
Libel Law and the Press in South Korea:  An Update (KYU Ho Youm),
23 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1992 (111) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-22-2
Tiananmen Aftermath:  Human Rights in the People’s Republic of
China, 1990 (John F. Copper and Ta-ling LEE), 133 pp.  Index $15.00
No. 5 - 1992 (112) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-23-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Revised ver-
sion of No. 1-1990 (96)) (Hungdah CHIU), 37 pp. $4.00
No. 6 - 1992 (113) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-24-9
China’s Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-Democracy Dissi-
dents (Hungdah CHIU), 21 pp. $3.00
1993 Series
No. 1 - 1993 (114) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-25-7
Can One Unscramble an Omelet?  China’s Economic Reform in Theory
and Practice (Yuan-li WU and Richard Y. C. Yin), 34 pp. $4.00
No. 2 - 1993 (115) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-26-5
Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on
Taiwan (With Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 61 pp. $6.00
No. 3 - 1993 (116) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-27-3
Sheltering for Examination (Shourong Shencha) in the Legal System of
the People’s Republic of China (Tao-tai HSIA and Wendy I.
Zeldin), 32 pp. $4.00
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No. 4 - 1993 (117) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-28-1
In Making China Modernized:  Comparative Modernization between
Mainland China and Taiwan (Wen-hui TSAI), 281 pp.  Index (out
of print, please order No. 5 - 1996 for 2nd ed.) $18.00
No. 5 - 1993 (118) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-30-3
Hong Kong’s Transition to 1997:  Background, Problems and Prospects
(with Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 106 pp. $7.00
No. 6 - 1993 (119) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-31-1
Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (with Documents) (Hungdah
CHIU), 69 pp. $5.00
1994 Series
No. 1 - 1994 (120) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-32-X
Statutory Encouragement of Investment and Economic Development in
the Republic of China on Taiwan (Neil L. Meyers), 72 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 1994 (121) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-33-8
Don’t Force Us to Lie:  The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Re-
form Era (Allison Liu Jernow), 99 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 1994 (122) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-34-6
Institutionalizing a New Legal System in Deng’s China (Hungdah
CHIU), 44 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1994 (123) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-35-4
The Bamboo Gulag:  Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China,
1991-1992 (Ta-ling LEE & John F. Copper), 281 pp.  Index $20.00
No. 5 - 1994 (124) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-36-2
Taiwan’s Legal System and Legal Profession (Hungdah CHIU and
Jyh-pin FA), 22 pp. $3.00
No. 6 - 1994 (125) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-37-0
Toward Greater Democracy:  An Analysis of the Republic of China on
Taiwan’s Major Elections in the 1990s (Wen-hui TSAI), 40 pp. $6.00
1995 Series
No. 1 - 1995 (126) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-38-9
Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Chile
(Herman Gutierrez B. and Lin CHOU), 31 pp. $5.00
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No. 2 - 1995 (127) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-39-7
The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Barry Sautman
and Shiu-hing LO), 82 pp. $10.00
No. 3 - 1995 (128) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-40-0
Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial
Army:  Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility?
(David Boling), 56 pp. $5.00
No. 4 - 1995 (129) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-41-9
The Role of the Republic of China in the World Economy (Chu-yuan
CHENG), 25 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1995 (130) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-42-7
China’s Economy after Deng:  A Long-Term Perspective (Peter C.Y.
Chow), 43 pp. $5.00
No. 6 - 1995 (131) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-43-5
An Entreprenurial Analysis of Opposition Movements (Ching-chane
HWANG), 179 pp. Index $18.00
1996 Series
No. 1 - 1996 (132) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-44-3
Taiwan’s 1995 Legislatiave Yuan Election (John F. Copper), 39 pp. $6.00
No. 2 - 1996 (133) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-45-1
Russian-Taiwanese Relations:  Current State, Problems, and Prospects
of Development (Peter M. Ivanov), 76 pp. $10.00
No. 3 - 1996 (134) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-46-X
Recent Relations between China and Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Ca-
pabilities (Hungdah CHIU & June Teufel Dreyer), 28 pp. $4.00
No. 4 - 1996 (135) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-47-8
Intellectual Property Protection in the Asian-Pacific Region:  A Com-
parative Study (Paul C. B. Liu & Andy Y. Sun), 183 pp. Index. $25.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-48-6) $32.00
No. 5 - 1996 (136) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-49-4
In Making China Modernized:  Comparative Modernization between
Mainland China and Taiwan (2nd ed.) (Wen-hui TSAI), 297 pp.
Index. $30.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-50-8) $37.00
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No. 6 - 1996 (137) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-51-6
A Study of the Consular Convention between the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 68 pp.
$6.00
1997 Series
No. 1 - 1997 (138) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-52-4
Tiananmen to Tiananmen, China under Communism 1947-1996
(Yuan-Li WU), 348 pp.  Index $35.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-53-2) $45.00
No. 2 - 1997 (139) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-54-0
The External Relations and International Status of Hong Kong (TING
Wai), 72 pp. $8.00
No. 3 - 1997 (140) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-55-9
Sheltering for Examination (Shoushen) in the People’s Republic of
China:  Law, Policy, and Practices (Kam C. WONG), 53 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 1997 (141) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-56-7
Legal Aid Practices in the PRC in the 1990s — Dynamics, Contents and
Implications, (LUO Qizhi) 68 pp. $8.00
No. 5 - 1997 (142) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-57-5
The KMT’s 15th Party Congress:  The Ruling Party at a Crossroads
(John F. Copper), 38 pp. $5.00
No. 6 - 1997 (143) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-58-3
From Pirate King to Jungle King:  Transformation of Taiwan’s Intellec-
tual Property Protection (Andy Y. Sun), 138 pp. $18.00
1998 Series
No. 1 - 1998 (144) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-59-1
From “Multi-System Nations” to “Linkage Communities”:  A New
Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations
(Yung WEI), 20 pp. $4.00
No. 2 - 1998 (145) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-60-5
The Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Lack of Trans-
parency in the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 63 pp.
$7.00
No. 3 - 1998 (146) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-61-3
The Nationalist Ideology of the Chinese Military (Xiaoyu CHEN), 45
pp. $6.00
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No. 4 - 1998 (147) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-62-1
Convergence and the Future of Reunification between Mainland China
and Taiwan:  A Developmental View (Wen-hui TSAI), 33 pp. $5.00
No. 5 - 1998 (148) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-63-X
Chinese Patent Law and Patent Litigation in China (Xiang WANG),
61 pp. $8.00
No. 6 - 1998 (149) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-64-8
The Development of Banking in Taiwan:  The Historical Impact on Fu-
ture Challenges (Lawrence L.C. Lee), 39 pp. $6.00
1999 Series
No. 1 - 1999 (150) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-65-6
An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T’iaoyutai Islets
(Senkaku Gunto) (Hungdah CHIU), 27 pp. $6.00
No. 2 - 1999 (151) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-66-4
Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative Yuan, Metropolitan Mayoral and City Coun-
cil Elections:  Confirming and Consolidating Democracy in the Re-
public of China (John F. Copper), 53 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 1999 (152) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-67-2
The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute:  Its History and an Analysis of
the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan
(Han-yi SHAW), 148 pp. (out of print) $20.00
No. 4 - 1999 (153) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-68-0
Election and Democracy in Hong Kong:  The 1998 Legislative Council
Election (Shiu-hing LO & Wing-yat YU), 68 pp. $9.00
No. 5 - 1999 (154) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-69-9
The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century:  A Paradigm Reexam-
ined (Edited by Chien-min CHAO & Cal Clark), 189 pp. $24.00
No. 6 - 1999 (155) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-70-2
Party Primaries in Taiwan:  Trends, Conditions, and Projections in Can-
didate Selection (Julian Baum and James A. Robinson), 39 pp. $6.00
2000 Series
No. 1 - 2000 (156) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-71-0
United States-Taiwan Relations:  Twenty Years after the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act (Edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang & William W. Boyer),
309 pp. Index. $28.00
(Hardcover edition:  ISBN 0-925153-72-9) $42.00
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No. 2 - 2000 (157) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-73-7
Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election:  Consoli-
dating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics
(John F. Copper), 66 pp. $9.00
No. 3 - 2000 (158) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-74-5
Legal Eligibility of Taiwan’s Accession to GATT/WTO (CHO Hui-
Wan), 22 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 2000 (159) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-75-3
Russia’s Northeast Asia Policy:  Challenges and Choices for the 21st
Century (Sharif M. Shuja), 22 pp. $6.00
No. 5 - 2000 (160) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-76-1
East Asia and the Principle of Non-Intervention:  Policies and Practices
(Linjun WU), 39 pp. $7.00
No. 6 - 2000 (161) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-77-X
The Association of South East Asian Nations’ Confidence and Security
Building with the People’s Republic of China:  Internal Constraints
and Policy Implications (Kwei-Bo HUANG), 61 pp. $9.00
2001 Series
No. 1 - 2001 (162) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-78-8
Socio-economic Changes and Modernization in an Age of Uncertainty:
Taiwan in the 1990s and Its Future Challenge (Wen-hui TSAI),
35 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 2001 (163) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-79-6
Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act:  An Examination after
Twenty Years (Edited by Hungdah CHIU, Hsing-wei LEE and
Chih-Yu T. WU), 267 pp. $27.00
No. 3 - 2001 (164) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-80-X
The Diplomatic War between Beijing and Taipei in Chile (Lin CHOU),
61 pp. $9.00
No. 4 - 2001 (165) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-81-8
Reforming the Protection of Intellectual Property: The Case
of China and Taiwan in Light of WTO Accession
(Andy Y. Sun), 46 pp. $8.00
No. 5 - 2001 (166) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-82-6
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in China (Vai Io LO), 26 pp. $6.00
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No. 6 - 2001 (167) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-83-4
Building a Democratic State in Modernizing Taiwan:  The 2001 Legisla-
tive Election and the Push for Pluralism (Wen-hui TSAI and
George P. Chen), 24 pp. $6.00
2002 Series
No. 1 - 2002 (168) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-84-2
United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea:  A Study
of Ocean Law and Politics (Yann-huei SONG), 321 pp. $35.00
No. 2 - 2002 (169) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-85-0
The Politics of Racial Discrimination in Hong Kong (Barry Sautman
and Ellen Kneehans), 83 pp. (out of print) $10.00
No. 3 - 2002 (170) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-00-3
The Social and Political Bases for Women’s Growing Political Power in
Taiwan (Cal Clark and Janet Clark), 40 pp. $7.00
No. 4 - 2002 (171) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-01-1
The U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement: A Bridge for Economic Inte-
gration in the Asia-Pacific Region (Peter C.Y. Chow), 62 pp. $9.00
2003 Series
No. 1 - 2003 (172) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-02-X
Bringing People Back In: Collected Essays on Major Elections in Tai-
wan at the Turn of the 21st Century (Wen-hui TSAI), 125 pp. $18.00
No. 2 - 2003 (173) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-03-8
Taiwan: The Commercial State (Arthur I. Cyr), 81 pp. (out of print,
please order No. 1 - 2005 (180) for a revised version of this issue)
$10.00
No. 3 - 2003 (174) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-04-6
New Rules to the Old Great Game:  An Assessment of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization’s Proposed Free Trade Zone (Leland
Rhett Miller), 25 pp. $6.00
No. 4 - 2003 (175) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-05-4
The Republic of China Legislative Yuan:  A Study of Institutional
Evolution (Thomas J. Bellows), 35 pp. $7.00
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2004 Series
No. 1 - 2004 (176) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-06-2
Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Demoracy’s
Consolidation or Devolution? (John F. Cooper), 80 pp. $10.00
No. 2 - 2004 (177) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-07-0
Peace, Reunification, Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations (Zhaohui
HONG and Yi SUN), 16 pp. $5.00
No. 3 - 2004 (178) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-08-9
Judicial Discretion in Dispensing with the Service of Process Require-
ment in Hong Kong under Order 45, Rule 7(7): Moving towards a
Doctrine? (Simon Teng), 27 pp. $7.00
No. 4 - 2004 (179) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-09-7
Taiwan’s 2004 Legislative Election:  Putting it in Perspective (John F.
Copper), 75 pp. $13.00
2005 Series
No. 1 - 2005 (180) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-10-0
Taiwan: The Commercial State (revised version of No. 2-2003 (173))
(Arthur I. Cyr), 81 pp. $13.00
No. 2 - 2005 (181) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-11-9
Retracing the Triangle: China’s Strategic Perceptions of Japan in the
Post-Cold War Era (Danielle F. S. Cohen), 74 pp. (out of print)
$13.00
No. 3 - 2005 (182) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-12-7
Putting Things into Perspective: The Reality of Accountability in East
Timor, Indonesia and Cambodia (Suzannah Linton), 90 pp. $13.00
No. 4 - 2005 (183) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-13-5
Taiwan and the Soviet Bloc, 1949-1991 (Czeslaw Tubilewicz), 85 pp. $13.00
2006 Series
No. 1 - 2006 (184) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-14-3
Japan’s Changing Security Policy: An Overall View (Sharif Shuja),
32 pp. $7.00
No. 2 - 2006 (185) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-15-1
China in ASEAN-LED Multilateral Forums (Serene Hung),
102 pp. $14.00
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No. 3 - 2006 (186) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-16-X
East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, the West, and
“Colonialism” in Africa (Barry Sautman and YAN Hairong),
77 pp. (out of print) $13.00
No. 4 - 2006 (187) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-17-8
Taiwan’s 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections and
the Politics of Corruption (John F. Copper), 65 pp. $12.00
2007 Series
No. 1 - 2007 (188) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-18-6
National Identity, Ethnic Identity, and Party Identity in Taiwan (Chang-
Yen TSAI), 34 pp. $8.00
No. 2 - 2007 (189) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-19-4
Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for Other Asian Coun-
tries (Jon S.T. Quah), 56 pp. $12.00
No. 3 - 2007 (190) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-20-8
The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties, Agreements and
Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Law of the Republic of
China on Taiwan (Hungdah CHIU and Chun-I CHEN), 31 pp. $8.00
No. 4 - 2007 (191) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-21-6
Rape Myths in American and Chinese Laws and Legal Systems: Do
Tradition and Culture Make the Difference? (Marietta Sze-chie
Fa), 109 pp. $16.00
2008 Series
No. 1 - 2008 (192) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-22-4
Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election:  Maturing
Democracy (John F. Copper), 90 pp. $15.00
No. 2 - 2008 (193) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-23-2
The Political Economy of South Korea:  Economic Growth, Democrati-
zation, and Financial Crisis (Uk HEO, Houngcheul JEON, Hayam
KIM and Okjin KIM), 24 pp. $7.00
No. 3 - 2008 (194) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-24-0
Korean Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, or
International Law? (Terence Roehrig), 59 pp. $12.00
No. 4 - 2008 (195) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-25-9
Evolving On-Line Empowerment: The Manchu Identity Revival Since
the 1980s (BAI Lian), 48 pp. $10.00
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2009 Series
No. 1 - 2009 (196) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-26-7
Taiwan at a Turning Point (Edited by Seyom Brown, Cal Clark, Hiroki
Takeuchi, and Alex Tan), 98 pp. $18.00
No. 2 - 2009 (197) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-27-5
The Background, Principles and Core Contents of the Real Right Law
of The People’s Republic of China (ZHU Yan), 39 pp. (out of
print) $8.00
No. 3 - 2009 (198) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-28-3
“All that Glitters Is Not Gold”: Tibet as a Pseudo-State (Barry
Sautman), 86 pp. $15.00
No. 4 - 2009 (199) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-29-1
Positive Equilibrium in U.S.-China Relations: Durable or Not? A time
of “testing” in Sino-American Relations (Robert Sutter), 52 pp.
$12.00
2010 Series
No. 1 - 2010 (200) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-30-5
An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater China (Greg Tzu Jan Yang),
61 pp. $14.00
No. 2 - 2010 (201) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-31-3
Taiwan’s Anti-Corruption Strategy: Suggestions for Reform (Jon S.T.
Quah), 111 pp. $18.00
No. 3 - 2010 (202) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-32-1
The East Asia Summit and the Regional Security Architecture (Ralf
Emmers, Joseph Chinyong Liow, and See Seng TAN), 52 pp. $12.00
No. 4 - 2010 (203) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-33-X
Taiwan’s 2010 Metropolitan City Elections: An Assessment of Taiwan’s
Politics and a Predictor of Future Elections (John F. Copper),
67 pp. $15.00
2011 Series
No. 1 - 2011 (204) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-34-8
Legal Aid and the Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China
(Mark Jia), 63 pp. $15.00
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No. 2 - 2011 (205) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-35-6
Mahathir’s Successors: Sharpening Dilemmas in Malaysian Politics
(William Case), 72 pp. $16.00
No. 3 - 2011 (206) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-36-4
In Pursuit of Gradual Stabilization and Peace Dividends: Cross-Taiwan
Strait Relations and Their Influence on the Asia Pacific (Kwei-Bo
HUANG), 54 pp. $13.00
No. 4 - 2011 (207) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-37-2
Institutional Design and Development in the ROC (Taiwan):  A Critical
Review of the Thoughts of SUN Yat-sen and the Global Develop-
ment of the Ombudsman System (GER Yeong-kuang), 59 pp. $14.00
2012 Series
No. 1 - 2012 (208) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-38-0
Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential/Vice Presidential and Legislative Elections:
Assessing Current Politics and Charting the Future (John F. Cop-
per), 85 pp. $17.00
No. 2 - 2012 (209) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-40-2
Insider Trading in China: Compared with Cases in the United States
(Greg Tzu Jan Yang), 65 pp. $16.00
No. 3 - 2012 (210) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-39-9
The Chinese Are the Worst?: Human Rights and Labor Practices in
Zambian Mining (Barry Sautman and YAN Hairong), 100 pp. $20.00
No. 4 - 2012 (211) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-41-0
The State of Play on International Piracy and Anti-Counterfeiting Strat-
egies (Andy Y. Sun), 59 pp. $16.00
2013 Series
No. 1 - 2013 (212) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-42-9
Sustaining the Triangular Balance: The Taiwan Strait Policy of Barack
Obama, XI Jinping, and MA Ying-jeou (Dean P. Chen), 83 pp.
$18.00
No. 2 - 2013 (213) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-43-7
China Under the New Leadership (Hsin-Chi KUAN), 70 pp. $17.00
No. 3 - 2013 (214) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-44-5
Political Economy of Vietnam: Market Reform, Growth, and the State
(Joshua M. Steinfeld and Khi V. THAI), 72 pp. $17.00
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No. 4 - 2013 (215) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-45-3
Minimizing Corruption in China: Is This an Impossible Dream? (Jon S.
T. Quah), 99 pp. $20.00
2014 Series
No. 1 - 2014 (216) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-46-1
The Mutual Non-Denial Principle, China’s Interests, and Taiwan’s
Expansion of International Participation (Wei-chin LEE), 55 pp.
$15.00
No. 2 - 2014 (217) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-47-X
Seeking Common Ground While Keeping Differences: “Using the Case
of Cross-Strait Relations as a Case” (Charles Chong-han Wu),
51 pp. $15.00
No. 3 - 2014 (218) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-48-8
Indonesia Beyond Reformasi: Necessity and the “De-centering” of
Democracy (Leonard C. Sebastian, Jonathan Chen and
Adhi Priamarizki), 79 pp. $18.00
No. 4 - 2014 (219) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-49-6
Taiwan’s 2014 Nine-in-One Election:  Gauging Politics, the Parties, and
Future Leaders (John F. Copper), 81 pp. $19.00
2015 Series
No. 1 - 2015 (220) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-50-X
Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of
X1 Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March
2015) (Jon S.T. Quah), 98 pp. $22.00
No. 2 - 2015 (221) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-51-8
Localists and “Locusts” in Hong Kong: Creating a Yellow-Red Peril
Discourse (Barry Sautman and YAN Hairong), 94 pp. $22.00
No. 3 - 2015 (222) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-52-6
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the South China Sea through Fisher-
ies Resources Cooperation and Management (Kuan-Hsiung
WANG), 45 pp. $17.00
No. 4 - 2015 (223) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-53-4
The Recent Development of China’s Anti-monopoly Law on Standard
Setting Organization’s Patent Pooling Arrangement and the Issues
of Incorporating Patent Misuse Doctrine as the Antitrust Review
Standard (Nigel Naihung Lee), 53 pp. $18.00
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2016 Series
No. 1 - 2016 (224) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-54-2
Taiwan’s 2016 Presidential/Vice Presidential and Legislative Election:
Reflections on the Nature of Taiwan’s Politics and Shifts Therein
(John F. Copper), 79 pp. $20.00
No. 2 - 2016 (225) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-55-0
Taiwan and Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Constraints of Contin-
ued Engagement (JING Bo-jiun), 86 pp. $21.00
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MARYLAND STUDIES IN EAST ASIAN LAW AND
POLITICS SERIES
(The following books are published under the auspices or co-
auspices of the East Asian Legal Studies Program of the Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law.  The views expressed in each
book reflect only those of the author.  All books published in
hard cover edition, unless otherwise indicated.)
1. Hungdah CHIU, China and the Taiwan Issue.  New York:  Praeger
Publishers, A Division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston/CBS, Inc.,
1979.  295 pp.  (Now distributed by the Greenwood Press)
ISBN 0-03-048911-3 $49.95
2. Hungdah CHIU, Agreements of the People’s Republic of China, A
Calendar of Events 1966-1980.  New York:  Praeger Publishers, A
Division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston/CBS, Inc., 1981.  329 pp.
(Now distributed by the Greenwood Press)
ISBN 0-03-059443-X $49.95
3. David Salem, The People’s Republic of China, International Law and
Arms Control.  Baltimore, Maryland:  University of Maryland
School of Law OPRSCAS*, 1983.  325 pp.
ISBN 0-942182-59-6 $15.00
4. Ying-jeou MA, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in
the East China Sea.  Baltimore, Maryland:  University of Maryland
School of Law, 1984.  308 pp.
ISBN 0-942182-63-4 $15.00
5. Hungdah CHIU and Shao-chuan LENG, editors, China:  70 Years Af-
ter the 1911 Hsin-hai Revolution.  Charlottesville, Virginia:  Uni-
versity Press of Virginia, 1984.  600 pp.
(Published under the co-auspices of the Committee on Asian Stud-
ies, University of Virginia.)
ISBN 0-8138-1027-7 $35.00
6. Shao-chuan LENG and Hungdah CHIU, Criminal Justice in Post-
Mao China.  Albany, New York:  State University of New York
Press, 1985.  325 pp.
(Published under the co-auspices of Committee on Asian Studies,
University of Virginia.)
ISBN 0-87395-950-7 (hardcover) $74.50
ISBN 0-87395-948-5 (paperback) $24.95
* Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc. (It has
been changed to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, MSCAS), 500 West
Baltimore St., Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786.  (Tel. 410-706-3870)
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7. Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG, United States-China Normalization:  An
Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making.  Baltimore, Mary-
land:  University of Maryland School of Law OPRSCAS, 1986.  246
pp.  (Copublished with Monograph Series in World Affairs, Univer-
sity of Denver)
ISBN 0-942182-78-2 $12.00
8. Lester Ross and Mitchell A. Silk, Environmental Law and Policy in
China.  Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press (Quorum Books), 1987.
449 pp.
ISBN 0-89930-204-1 $75.00
9. Hungdah CHIU, Y.C. JAO and Yuan-li WU, editors, The Future of
Hong Kong:  Toward 1997 and Beyond.  Westport, CT:  Green-
wood Press (Quorum Books), 1987.  262 pp.
ISBN 0-89930-241-6 $55.00
10. Ray S. Cline and Hungdah CHIU, eds., The United States Constitu-
tion and Constitutionalism in China.  Washington, D.C.:  U.S.
Global Strategy Council, 1988.  Distributed by OPRSCAS, 166 pp.
Paper. $8.00
11. Winston L.Y. YANG and Marsha L. Wagner, eds., Tiananmen:
China’s Struggle for Democracy—Its Prelude, Development, After-
math, and Impact.  Baltimore, Maryland:  University of Maryland
School of Law OPRSCAS, 1990.  314 pp.  Index
ISBN 0-925153-08-7 $14.00
12. Mitchell A. Silk, ed., Taiwan Trade and Investment Law.  Hong
Kong:  Oxford University Press, 1994.  693 pages.
ISBN 0-19-585289-3 $59.00
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDER FORM
Mail this order form to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies,
University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West Baltimore Street,
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786, U.S.A.  Or e-mail to eastasia@law.
umaryland.edu or fax to (410)706-1516
Check One:
❏ Please Send:
ISBN Title No. of Copies
❏ Please start my subscription of the MSCAS: Starting year 
Subscription price is U.S. $50.00 per year for 4 issues in the U.S. and
$60.00 for Canada, Mexico or overseas (regardless of the price of
individual issues).
My check of U.S. $  is enclosed.
 copy(s) of invoice/receipt required.  (Institution/
library may request billing before making payment)
For individual order, please add postage/handling of $8.00 for one
copy and $4.00 for each additional copy.  Make checks payable to
MSCAS.
Please send books to:
Contact Name
Corporation/Library/Institution
Address (Please include zip code)
Country
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